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ABBREVIATIONS

- ABS. = Advaitabrahmasiddhi (Sadānanda).
 ACK. = Advaitacintākaustubha (Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī, B.I., 1901).
 AM. = Āptamīmāṃsā (Samantabhadra Svāmī), Benares, 1914.
 AMV. = Āptamīmāṃsāvṛtti on AM., (Basunandyačārya), Benares, 1914.
 AP. = Appendix.
 ATP. = Advaitatattvaprabodhinī (edited by Sādhu Śāntinātha), Amalner, 1932.
 BG. = Bhagavad Gītā.
 BhP. = Bhāṣāpariccheda (Viśvanātha) Jāvāji's edition, Bombay, 1916.
 B.I. = Bibliotheca Indica, Asiatic Society Library, Calcutta.
 BP. = *Buddhist Philosophy* (A. B. Keith).
 BPR. = Bhāvapradīpa (Śūrya Nārāyaṇa Śukla) on VPD., Saṃvat, 1993.
 BPs. = *Buddhist Psychology* (Mrs. Rhys Davids).
 Br. = Brhadāranyaka.
 B.S. = Brahma Sūtra (Bādarāyaṇa).
 B.S.S. = Benares Sanskrit Series, Benares.
 CCB. = *The Central Conception of Buddhism* (Scherbatsky).
 Chānd. = Chāndogya.
 Ch. S.S. = Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, Benares.
 CP. = *Compendium of Philosophy* (S. Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids).
 CSV. = *Comparative Studies in Vedantism* (M. N. Sircar).
 C.U. = Calcutta University.
 C.U.P. = Cambridge University Press.
 DHIP. = *History of Indian Philosophy* (S. N. Das Gupta), C.U.P.
 DS. = Dravyasaṃgraha (Nemicandra), Bombay, Saṃvat, 1976.
 DSV. = Dravyasaṃgrahavṛtti (Brahmadeva) on DS., Bombay, Saṃvat, 1976.
 E.R.E. = *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics*.
 E.T. = English Translation.
 G.O.S. = Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Oriental Institute, Baroda.
 H.I.L. = *History of Indian Logic* (S. C. Vidyābhūṣaṇa), C.U., 1921.
 HIP. = *A History of Indian Philosophy* (Jadunath Sinha), Vol. I & II, Calcutta, 1952 and 1956.
 I.L.A. = *Indian Logic and Atomism* (A. B. Keith), 1921.
 IPM. = *Introduction to Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* (Pashupati Śāstrī).
 JTV. = Jainatarkavārtika, Benares, 1917.
 JTVV. = Jainatarkavārtikavṛtti (Śantyačārya), Benares, 1917.
 Kāth. = Kātha.
 Kir. = Kiraṇāvalī (Udayana), B.S.S., Saṃvat, 1941.
 KM. = *Karma Mīmāṃsā* (A. B. Keith).
 KR. = Kiraṇārahasya (Śaṃkara Miśra), Ch. S.S., No. 231.
 K.S.S. = Kashi Sanskrit Series, Benares.
 KU. = Khaṇḍanoddhāra (Vācaspati Miśra), Benares, 1909.
 KVB. = Kiraṇāvalībhāṣkāra (Padmanābha Miśra), S.B.T., 1920.
 LV. = Lakṣaṇāvalī (Udayana), Benares, 1897.
 MB. = Mītabhāṣiṇī (Mādhava Sarasvatī) on SP., V.S.S., 1893.
 M.S. = Mīmāṃsā Sūtra (Jaimini).
 Muṇḍ. = Muṇḍaka.
 NB. = Nyāyabindu (Dharmakīrti), K.S.S., 1924.
 NBh. = Nyāyabhāṣya (Vātsyāyana) on NS., Jīvananda's edition, Calcutta, 1919.
 NBT. = Nyāyabindutīkā (Dharmottara), on NB., K.S.S., 1924.
 NK. = Nyāyakandalī (Śrīdhara) on PBh., V.S.S., 1895.
 NKL. = Nyāyakalikā (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), S.B.T., 1925.
 NKS. = Nyāyakusumāñjali (Udayana), Benares, 1912.

- NKSH. = Haridāsa's gloss on NKS., Benares, 1913.
 NKSP. = Nyāyakusumāñjaliprakāśa (Vardhamāna) on NKS., Benares, 1912.
 NM. = Nyāyamañjarī (Jayanta Bhaṭṭa), V.S.S., 1895.
 NP. = Nyāyapariśuddhi (Veṅkatanātha), Ch.S.S., No. 249.
 NPR. = Nyāyapraveśa (Dinnāga), G.O.S., 1930.
 NPV. = Nyāyapraveśavṛtti (Haribhadra Sūri) on NPR., G.O.S., 1930.
 NPVP. = Nyāyapraveśavṛttipañjikā (Pārśvadeva) on NPV., G.O.S., 1930.
 NR. = Nyāyaratnākara (Pārthasārathimīśra), on ŚV., Ch.S.S., 1898-9.
 NS. = Nyāyasūtra (Gautama), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1919.
 NSA. = Nyāyasiddhāñjana (Veṅkatanātha), Benares, 1901.
 NŚār. = Nyāyasāra (Bhāsarvajña), B.I., 1910.
 NSM. = Nyāyasiddhāntamañjarī (Jānakānātha), Benares, 1916.
 NSPP. = Nyāyasārapadapañcikā (Vāsudeva Sūri) on NŚār., T.S.S., No. 109.
 NSV. = Nyāyasūtravṛtti (Viśvanātha) on NS., Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1919.
 NTD. = Nyāyatātparyadīpikā (Jayasīmahāsūri) on NŚār., B.I., 1910.
 NV. = Nyāyavārtika (Uddyotakara) on NBh., B.I., 1893.
 NVTT. = Nyāyavārtikatātparyatīkā (Vācaspati Miśra), V.S.S., Benares, 1898.
 PBh. = Prasastapādabhāṣya on V.S., V.S.S., 1895.
 PK. = Pañcāstikāya (Kundakunda Svāmī), Bombay, 1972.
 PKM. = Prameyakamalamārtanḍa (Prabhācandra), Jāvāji's edition, Bombay, 1912.
 PKSI. = Introduction, PK. (E.T.), (A. Chakravarty).
 PKV. = Pañcīkaraṇavārtika (Suresvara), K.S.S., 1923.
 PMS. = Parīkṣābhūkhasūtra (Māṇikyanandī), B.I., 1909.
 PMV. = Parīkṣāsmukhalaghuvṛtti (Anantavīrya), B.I., 1909.
 PNT. = Pramāṇanayatatvālokañkāra (Śrī Vādi Deva Sūri).
 PP. = Prakarapāñcikā (Śālikānātha Miśra), Ch.S.S., 1903-1904.
 PPV. = Pañcapādīkāvivaraṇa (Prakāśātman), V.S.S., 1892.
 PR. = Prasthānaratnākara (Puruṣottamañjī Mahārāja), Ch.S.S., No. 141.
 Pras. = Prasāna.
 PRP. = Pramāṇaparīkṣā (Vidyānanda Svāmī), Benares, 1914.
 PSAH. = *Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus* (B. N. Seal), Longmans.
 PSPM. = *The Prābhākara School of Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* (Gaṅgānātha Jhā), 1911, in *Indian Thought*.
 R.B. = Rāmānuja's Bhāṣya on B.S.
 RK. = Ratnāvakārikā on PNT.
 RM. = Rājamārtanḍa (Bhojadeva), on YS., Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1903.
 SAS. = Sarvārthasiddhi (Veṅkatanātha) on TMK., Benares, 1900.
 S.B. = Śāṅkara's Bhāṣya on B.S.
 S.B.E. = Sacred Books of the East.
 SBNT. = *Six Buddhist Nyāya Tracts*, B.I., 1910.
 S.B.T. = Sarasvatī Bhavan Text, Benares.
 ŚD. = Śāstradīpikā (Pārthasārathi Miśra), Benares, Saṁvat, 1964.
 ŚDP. = Śāstradīpikāprakāśa (Sudarśanācārya), Benares, Saṁvat, 1964.
 SK. = Sāṁkhyakārikā (Īśvarakṛṣṇa), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1911.
 SKG. = Gauḍapāda's Bhāṣya on SK., Calcutta, 1911.
 S.L. = *The Sādhulāl Lectures on Nyāya* (Gaṅgānātha Jhā), *Indian Thought*.
 SLS. = Siddhāntaleśasamgraha (Appayadikṣita), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1897.
 SM. = Siddhāntamuktāvalī (Viśvanātha), Jāvāji's edition, Bombay, 1916.
 SMD. = Dinakarī (Dinakara Bhaṭṭa) on SM., Bombay, 1916.
 SP. = Saptapadārthī (Śivādītya), V.S.S., Benares, 1893.
 SPB. = Sāṁkhyapravacanabhāṣya (Vijñānabhikṣu), Benares, 1909.
 SPS. = Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra (Kapila), B.I., 1888.
 SS. = Sāṁkhyapravacanasūtra (Kapila), B.I., 1888.
 SS. = Sarvārthasiddhi (Pūjyapāda) on U.T.S., Kolahpur, Śaka, 1839.
 SSP. = Śabdaśaktiprakāśikā (Jagadīśa).
 SSV. = Sāṁkhyasūtravṛtti (Aniruddha), on SS., B.I., 1888.
 SSV. = Commentary on SSV. (Mahādeva Vedāntin), B.I., 1888.

- ST. = Śāradā Tilaka, S.B.T.
 STK. = Sāṁkhyatattvakaumudī (Vācaspati Miśra), Bombay, Saṁvat, 1969.
 ŚV. = Ślokaṇṭika (Kumārila), Ch.S.S., Benares, 1898-9.
 Svet. = Svetāśvatara.
 SVM. = Syādvādamāñjarī (Mallīṣena), Ch.S.S., 1900.
 TA. = Tarkāmṛta (Jagadīśa), Jivānanda's edition, Calcutta, 1921.
 TBh. = Tarkabhāṣā (Keśavamīśra), Poona, 1924.
 Tait. = Taittirīya.
 TC. = Tattvacintāmaṇi (Gaṅgeśa), B.I.
 TCA. = Tattvacintāmaṇi (.), Anumāna, Vol. 2, B.I., 1892.
 TDTV. = Tattvadīpikātātparyavṛtti on PK., Bombay, Saṁvat 1972.
 TK. = Tarkakaumudī (Laugākṣi Bhāskara), Jāvāji's edition, Bombay, 1914.
 TMK. = Tattvamuktākālāpa (Veṅkatanātha), Benares, 1900.
 TR. = Tārkikarakṣā (Varadarāja), Benares, 1903.
 TRV. = Tattvārtharājavārtika (Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka), Benares, 1915.
 TS. = Tarkasamgraha (Annambhāṭṭa),
 TSar. = Tattvārthasāra (Amṛtacandra Sūri), Calcutta, 1919.
 TSC. = Tarkasamgrahacandrikā (Mukunda Śarma), Bombay, 1912.
 TSD. = Tarkasamgrahadīpikā (Annambhāṭṭa).
 TSN. = Nilakanthī (Nīlakaṇṭha Bhaṭṭa) on TS.
 T.S.S. = Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, Trivandrum.
 TSV. = Tattvārthaslokaṇṭika (Vidyānandī Svāmī), Bombay, 1918.
 TV. = Tattvavaiśārādī (Vācaspati Miśra) on YBh.
 UP. = Upaniṣad.
 U.T.S. = Tattvārthādhigamasūtra (Umāsvāmī) edited by J. L. Jaini.
 VCM. = Vivekacūḍāmaṇi (Śāṅkara), Gītā Press, Gorakhpur.
 VMR. = Vidyānmanoranjanī (Rāmatīrtha Yati) on VSR., (edited by Col. Jacob), Bombay, 1925.
 VP. = Vedāntaparibhāṣā (Dharmarājādhvarīndra), Bombay, Saṁvat, 1968.
 VPD. = Vākyapadīya (Bhartṛhari), K.S.S., Saṁvat, 1993.
 VPS. = Vivaraṇaprameyasamgraha (Mādhavācārya Vidyāraṇya), V.S.S., 1893.
 VRS. = Vitarāgastuti (Hemacandra) on SVM., Ch. S.S., 1900.
 V.S. = Vaiśeṣika Sūtra (Kaṇāda), Saṁvat, 1969.
 VSB. = Vaiśeṣikasūtrabhāṣya (Candrakānta Bhaṭṭācārya), Saṁvat, 1969.
 VSR. = Vedāntasāra (Sadānanda), Jacob's edition, Bombay, 1925.
 V.S.S. = Vizianagram Sanskrit Series, Benares.
 VSU. = Upaskāra (Śāṅkara Miśra) on V.S., Gujratī Press, Saṁvat, 1969.
 VSV. = Vaiśeṣikasūtravivṛti (Jaya Nārāyaṇa) on V.S., Saṁvat, 1969.
 YBh. = Yogabhāṣya (Vyāsa) on YS., Benares, 1911.
 YCh. = Chāyāvṛtti (Nāgeśa) on YS., Benares, 1907.
 YHD. = Yoginīhrdayadīpikā, S.B.T.
 YMD. = Yotindramatadīpikā (Śrīnivāsa), B.S.S., 1907.
 YP. = *Yoga Philosophy* (S. N. Das Gupta), C.U.
 YPR. = *Yoga as Philosophy and Religion* (S. N. Das Gupta), Kegan Paul, London.
 YS. = Yoga Sūtra (Patañjali), Benares, 1911.
 YSP. = Yuktisnehaprapūraṇī (Rāmakṛṣṇa) on ŚD., Bombay, 1915.
 YV. = Yogavārtika (Vijñānabhikṣu) on YBh., Benares, 1884.

PREFACE TO THE REPRINT

I had spiritual experiences throughout my life. I had visions of great saints like Śaṅkara, Rāmānuja, Nimbārka, Caitanya, Śrī Aurobindo, Śrī Bāmdev and others who prompted me to write Indian Philosophy and Indian Psychology.

I had vision of Lord Krishna, Lord Śiva and Divine Mother Tārā who had blessed and bestowed grace on me. I have devoted fifty years of life in severe spiritual discipline, shunned luxury, undergone penances, studied, meditated, disseminated knowledge, went on pilgrimages, resorted to saints, yogis and seers. My source of knowledge has been divine inspiration, intuition and original Sanskrit texts.

The first edition of the book was published by Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner & Co., London under the title *Indian Psychology: Perception*.

In the second edition chapters on Memory, Imagination, Thought and Language were added and the same was published by Sinha Publishing House, Calcutta, under the title *Indian Psychology: Cognition* which constitutes the first volume of *Indian Psychology*.

The available material on the psychology of imagination and thought is scanty and inadequate. Hence the treatment of these topics is not as comprehensive as that of perception. But there is vast material on the psychology of language in Indian philosophical literature. The material on different topics, which could not be incorporated in the body of the book, has been embodied in the Appendix.

My special thanks to my son, Amiya Kumar Sinha, Executive Director, Jadunath Sinha Foundation, and founder, Bamdev International Centre, who took great pains to get the second edition of the book published and further helped me in preparing the manuscripts of all the volumes.

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CHAPTER XX

MEMORY AND IMAGINATION

1. *The Nature of Recollection: Its Kinds*

Gautama maintains that the self which is a permanent substance endued with knowledge can recall an object of its past experience.¹ Vātsyāyana states that it is the self that recalls, and that a stream of cognitions can never recall.² These statements are directed against the Buddhist account of memory. *The Questions of King Milinda* expounds the Buddhist view. "The King said, 'By what, Nāgasena, does one recollect what is past and done long ago?' 'By memory'. 'But is it not by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?' 'Do you recollect any business, O king, that you have done and forgotten?' 'Yes.' 'What then? Were you then without a mind?'" 'No. But my memory failed me'. 'Then why do you say that it is by the mind, not by the memory, that we recollect?' 'Very good, Nāgasena'.³ The Buddhist regards the self as a stream of momentary ideas, feelings and volitions. It is not a permanent principle. The permanent self cannot recall a past object or action. But a later idea recalls a past object perceived by a past idea. Memory does not presuppose the existence of a permanent self. This is the Buddhist view.

But Vātsyāyana gives the Nyāya definition of recollection which contradicts the Buddhist view. He defines recollection as recalling and recognizing an object perceived in the past by the same self. One and the same self perceived it in the past, remembers it at present, and recognizes it as an object of its past experience. Recollection appears in the form 'I have known it before'.⁴ The definition implies the following characteristics of recollection. (1) Recollection presupposes a past apprehension of an object by the self. (2) It presupposes an impression (*saṃskāra*) produced by the past apprehension in the same self. (3) It pre-

supposes the awakening (*udbodha*) of the impression by excitants (*udbodhaka*), e.g., the perception of a similar object and the like. (4) It implies recognition of the recalled object as perceived in the past by the same self. A complete recollection involves an element of recognition. (5) Recollection implies temporal localization in the past. The object recalled and recognized is referred to a particular time in the past. (6) Recollection presupposes the identity of the self. The self that recalls an object is the same as perceived it in the past. If there were no identity of the self, there would be no recollection. Udayana asserts that the past perception, its impression, and its recollection must subsist in the same self; that otherwise one's impression would produce another's recollection.⁵ Hence, recollection implies the identity of the self which is endowed with the essential nature of knowing the past, the present, and the future.⁶ It implies retention (*dhāraṇā*) and recall (*smṛti*). It presupposes original apprehension, retention of its impression (*saṃskāra*), and recall and recognition of the object apprehended in the past by the same self. This is the Nyāya view of recollection.

Māṇikyanandi, a Jaina philosopher, defines recollection as a cognition in the form of 'that' which is produced by the revival of an impression.⁷ For example, Devadatta was perceived in the past, and *that* Devadatta is remembered at present. Vidyānanda Svāmī asserts that recollection is a cognition that assumes the form of 'that'; and that it cognizes an object which was perceived in the past.⁸ Prabhācandra defines recollection as a cognition in the form of 'that' due to the revival of an impression generated by the perception of an object on a previous occasion,—the revival being due to the perception or thought of a cue.⁹ It is a representative cognition as distinguished from a presentative cognition. If the past perception of Devadatta, Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka observes, did not cognize itself, then the present recollection would be a novel knowledge, and consequently cease to be recollection. But it is an already acquired knowledge devoid of novelty, and therefore a reproduction of a past perception which cognized itself.¹⁰ This is the Jaina view of recollection.

¹ Kir., p. 149; KVB., pp. 154, 160.

² Trikalavyāpini jñānaśaktireva jñāsvābhāvyam. NVTT., p. 403.

³ Saṃskārodobodhanibandhanā tadityākārā smṛtiḥ. PMS., iii, 3.

⁴ Tadityākārānubhūtarthaviśayā smṛtiḥ. PRP., p. 69.

⁵ PKM., p. 96. ¹⁰ TRV., i, 5, 5, p. 36.

¹ Smaraṇantvātmano jñāsvābhāvyāt. NS., iii, 2, 43.

² Ātmana eva smaraṇam, na buddhi-santati-mātrasya. NBh., iii, 2, 43.

³ Vol. I, pp. 120-1. (S.B.E., Oxford, 1890).

⁴ NBh., iii, 2, 42.

The Sāṃkhya defines recollection as the cognition of a past object,¹¹ or a cognition produced by an impression.¹² It is the representative cognition of an object perceived in the past due to the resuscitation of an impression (*saṃskāra*).¹³

The Yoga gives a similar account of recollection. Patañjali defines it as mental mode which cognizes an object which was apprehended in the past.¹⁴ It does not cognize anything in excess of the object of a past apprehension. Vyāsa raises an interesting question whether the mind remembers a cognition or whether it remembers an object, and replies that recollection cognizes both a cognition and an object, since a cognition is coloured by its object. Consciousness is common to all cognitions, which are distinguished from one another by their objects which colour them.¹⁵ A cognition coloured by an object which is cognized by it, produces an impression of a similar nature. When it is revived by a proper excitant, it produces a recollection of the past cognition and its object. Both apprehension and recollection cognize a cognition and an object. But the manifestation of a cognition is predominant in apprehension, while the manifestation of an object is predominant in recollection. Apprehension cognizes an object which was not known already so that the manifestation of a cognition is predominant in it; whereas recollection cognizes an object that was known already so that the manifestation of an object is predominant in it.¹⁶ All recollections are produced by the apprehension of valid knowledge, illusion, imagination, sleep and recollection.¹⁷ These mental modes were apprehended in the past, and are remembered on a future occasion. Apprehension is an immediate knowledge of an object, which prompts a fruitful action leading to its attainment, whereas recollection is a reproduction of that apprehension.¹⁸

Pārthasārathi Mīśra, a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka, defines recollection as a cognition that cognizes an object apprehended before,—that

¹¹ Smṛtir atītajñānam. SSV., ii, 33.

¹² Smṛtiḥ saṃskārajanyaṃ jñānam. SPB., ii, 33.

¹³ SSV., iv, 21.

¹⁴ Anubhūta viśaya saṃpramōṣaḥ smṛtiḥ. YS., i, 1, 11.

¹⁵ Grāhyoparaktāḥ pratyayo grāhyagrahanobhayākāra-nirbhāsaḥ grāhyagrahanobhyātmikāṃ smṛtiṃ janayati. YBh., i, 1, 11.

¹⁶ Tatra grahaṇākārapūrvā buddhiḥ, grāhyākārapūrvā smṛtiḥ. YBh., i, 1, 11.

¹⁷ Sarvāḥ smṛtayaḥ pramāṇa-viparyaya-vikalpa-nidrā-smṛtīnām anubhavāt prabhavanti. YBh., i, 1, 11.

¹⁸ TV., i, 1, 11.

never cognizes an unapprehended object.¹⁹ Śālikānātha Mīśra, a Prābhākara Mīmāṃsaka, defines it as a representative cognition which is produced by the impression of a past cognition only.²⁰ They do not differ from the Naiyāyika in their views of recollection. They regard perception, impression and recollection as qualities of the self.

Vācaspati Mīśra defines recollection as a cognition which is produced by an impression only. It is different from apprehension consisting of perception, inference, testimony, comparison, presumption and non-apprehension.²¹ Śāṅkara regards dreams as recollections.²² In a sleeping person's mind only impressions persist, which produce dreams. They are false because they are tainted by sleep.²³ Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī gives the same definition of recollection as Vācaspati Mīśra does.²⁴ Prakāśānanda observes, the past cognition which produced an impression, which is the cause of recollection, cognized an object only, but not itself; so that recollection produced by the impression of the cognition of a mere object cognizes an object only, but not the past cognition.²⁵ He rejects the view of Vyāsa who maintains that recollection cognizes both a past cognition and its object. Mādhavācārya Vidyāranya regards recollection as a reproduction of an object exactly as it was apprehended in the past, which depends upon the mere revival of the impression of the past apprehension. It cannot transcend the limits of the past apprehension. It cannot be created, destroyed or altered at will.²⁶

Veṅkaṭanātha, a Rāmānujīst, gives the same definition of recollection as Prabhākara, Vācaspati Mīśra and others give. He observes that a recollection cognizes that particular object, the apprehension of which produces it. The perception of an object produces a recollection, which cognizes that object which was known by the perception in the past. The perception of a jar produces the recollection of it. It can never produce the

¹⁹ NR., iv, 30, p. 142.

²⁰ Smṛtiḥ punaḥ pūrvavijñāna-saṃskāramātrajaṃ jñānam. PP., p. 42. TR., p. 20.

²¹ Saṃskāramātrajaṃ hi vijñānaṃ smṛtiḥ. Bhāmatī, S. B., ii, 2, 29. TK., p. 6; TSD., p. 35; TSC., p. 29.

²² Smṛtir eṣā yat svapnadarśanam. S.B., ii, 2, 29.

²³ Bhāmatī, S.B., ii, 2, 29.

²⁴ Arthamātraviśaya-jñānajaṃ smṛtir arthamātrameva viśayīkaroti. PPV., p. 24.

²⁵ Kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum aśakyā yathānubhūtaṃ vastu avilanghayatī tatsaṃskārod bodhamātrādhīnā smṛtiḥ. VPS., p. 253.

recollection of a cloth.²⁷ Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja, a Vallabhite, defines recollection as a cognition produced by an impression only, and not by the external sense-organs, and not during sleep; or as a cognition produced by an impression as impression; or as a cognition which is different from an apprehension.²⁸

Some regard recollection as non-sensuous perception, since it is vivid like the experience of pleasure and pain. Vidyānanda Swāmī refutes this view. Recollection is not vivid (*viśada*) like perception. Sometimes by repeated representation it acquires vividness, but still it is invalid like a dream-cognition. A representation can never be perception.²⁹ The later cognitions of a serial perception (*dhārāvāhikabuddhi*) are not recollections, since they are perceptions, being produced by the stimulation of the sense-organs by external objects.³⁰

The Jainas regard recollection as mediate knowledge (*parokṣa jñāna*), like inference and testimony, because an object which was perceived in the past and is remembered at present can never be vivid, like an object which is perceived at present. Every recollection cognizes its object as 'that.'³¹ A memory-image is a faint copy of the original percept.

But recollection is not inference, since it is produced without the knowledge of a mark (*liṅga*). If the recollection of invariable concomitance be inference, then the uniform relation is the probans, and so its relation to the recollection must be admitted. The recollection of this being an inference, it will depend upon the recollection of another invariable concomitance, and so on to infinity. Hence recollection is different from inference.³²

Recollection is different from recognition. (1) The former cognizes a past object, whereas the latter cognizes an object qualified by the past time and the present time.³³ (2) The former is produced by impressions as its specific cause, whereas the latter is produced by the sense-object-intercourse as its specific cause, which is aided by impressions.³⁴

²⁷ Smṛter anubhūtavaktiniyataviśayatvam. SAS or TMK., p. 579. PKM., p. 131; YMD., p. 4.

²⁸ PR., p. 21.

²⁹ PP., p. 42.

³⁰ Pratyakṣaṁ viśadaṁ jñānam. Pūrvānubhūte'tite'rthe vaiśadyā sambhavāt smṛtiḥ parokṣameva. PRP., p. 69.

³¹ TSV., i, 22-3, p. 189.

³² NM., 459-60.

³³ Bhāvanā'sādhāraṇakāraṇaṁ jñānaṁ smṛtiḥ. SP., p. 59. Pratyabhijñā indriya-sannikarṣāsādhāraṇa-kāraṇikā. MB., p. 59.

Some maintain that recognition is not produced by impressions but by recollection.³⁵ Prabhācandra also maintains that recognition is produced by perception and recollection.³⁶ But recognition cannot be produced by perception and recollection, since there is no distinct recollection of the object of past perception in it. A memory-image is not disengaged from a percept, but there is a fusion of a nascent memory-image with a percept in it. Recognition is an effect of peripheral stimulation aided by an impression, and not of distinct recollection. It is a kind of perception qualified by an impression of past experience.³⁷

Recollection cognizes its past object, even as perception cognizes its present object. If recollection cannot cognize its past object because of its indistinctness, then inference also should not cognize its object for the same reason. But inference cognizes past, future and remote objects, and prompts actions which lead to their attainment. So recollection also cognizes its past object.³⁸

Memory consists in retention and recollection. Recall depends upon retention. If there is no retention of an impression of a previous perception, there can be no recollection. The Jaina regards retention (*dhāraṇā*) as the last element in the process of perception. An impression is retained in the self.³⁹ Retention is non-oblivion of an object that was known in the past.⁴⁰ An impression is produced by an apprehension or a recollection.⁴¹ It is different from merit and demerit. The former is a residuum of a cognition, while the latter are potencies of moral and immoral actions.⁴²

In the Alāṅkāra literature the nature of recollection is described. It is a representative cognition that cognizes an object perceived in the past.⁴³ It is a representation of the causes of pleasure and pain. It is the remembrance of emotions due to pleasure and pain.⁴⁴ It is the reproduction of objects forgotten

³⁵ Keci tu pratyabhijñāyām na saṁskāro janakaḥ kintu smṛtiḥ iti manyante. KR., p. 133. TK., p. 6.

³⁶ Pratyabhijñānasya darśana-smaraṇe kāraṇam. PKM., p. 97.

³⁷ KR., pp. 133-4. Advaitacintāmaṇi, pp. 21-2.

³⁸ TSV., i, 28-9.

³⁹ PKM., p. 96.

⁴⁰ Nirjñātārthā' vismṛtiḥ dhāraṇā. TRV., i, 5, -5. p. 43.

⁴¹ Nyāyasāra, Benares, Saṁvat 1962, p. 103.

⁴² Karma-vāsanā dharmādharmau, jñāna-vāsanā bhāvanā. KVB., p. 114.

⁴³ Smṛtiḥ pūrvānubhūtartha-pratītiḥ. Rasārnavasudhākara, p. 126. Daśarūpa, p. 149; Sāhityadarpaṇa, pp. 134-5.

⁴⁴ Sukha-duḥkha-kṛtānāṁ bhāvanāṁ anusmaraṇam. Nāṭyaśāstra (G.O.S.), p. 364. Kāvyaṇuśāsana, p. 87.

for a long time, which gave pleasure or pain in the past at a particular time, in a particular place, appropriate to the occasion.⁴⁵

The act of recalling is expressed by shaking the head, raising or lowering eye-brows, turning the head upward, looking at the sky, gazing, inhibiting the movements of the body and the like.⁴⁶

There are two kinds of memory, viz., passive memory and active memory. Mādhavācārya Vidyāranya describes the former as spontaneous recall which depends entirely upon the energizing of the impressions of the past cognitions of objects, and not upon a person's will.⁴⁷ It often appears in spite of his desire not to remember it. It does not appear even when he intently desires to remember it. An undesired object is recalled owing to the revival of an impression on the perception of a similar object or under influence of an unseen agency (*adr̥ṣṭa*). But sometimes there is active memory when a recollection depends upon the volition of a person; a series of thoughts produces concentration of mind which revives an impression.⁴⁸

Vyāsa describes two kinds of recollection: recollection of an imagined object, and recollection of unimagined object.⁴⁹ Dream is the recollection of an imagined object. Waking recall is the recollection of an unimagined object. Vyāsa gives these examples. Dream involves imagination, whereas recollection involves memory. This is Vācaspati's interpretation. But Vijñānabhikṣu gives a different interpretation. He mentions two kinds of recollection: (1) recollection of forecast objects (e.g., dreams), and (2) recollection of unforecast objects (e.g., waking recollection). Some dreams foreshadow future events, though they are recollections. Waking recollections do not forecast future events. They merely faithfully reproduce past objects or events perceived before. Vācaspati's interpretation seems to be right because it is natural. But it may be contended, that dreams are not recollections because they are not produced by impressions only, and because they do not represent objects perceived in the past. Vijñānabhikṣu

⁴⁵ Bhāva-prakāśana (G.O.S.), p. 19.

⁴⁶ Nāṭyadarpaṇa, (G.O.S.), p. 180; Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 123; Bhāva-prakāśana, pp. 19, 844; Kāvyaṇuśāsana, p. 87; Nāṭyaśāstra, (G.O.S.), p. 364; Sāhityadarpaṇa, p. 134; Daśarūpa, (B.I.), p. 149; Rasārṇava-sudhākara, p. 126.

⁴⁷ Smṛtijñānaṁ saṁskārod bodhādhīnaṁ na puruṣa-prayāt nādhīnam. VPS., p. 251.

⁴⁸ VPS., p. 251.

⁴⁹ Sā ca dvayī bhāvita-smartavyā ca abhāvita-smartavyā ca. YBh., i, 11.

rejects this contention, and replies that sometimes they are recollections of objects perceived in the past,—being produced by impressions only.⁵⁰

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī divides recollection into (1) valid recollection and (2) invalid recollection, and subdivides the former into (1) recollection of the self and (2) recollection of the not-self. Keśavamīśra, Jagadīśa, Mahādeva Paṇḍita and others also recognize valid recollection and invalid recollection. If the past apprehension is valid, the recollection is valid; and if it is invalid, the recall is invalid. Keśavamīśra regards dreams as invalid recollections.⁵¹

2. Memory and Identity of the Self

The Cārvāka denies the existence of the self, and cannot account for memory. All other schools of Indian philosophy except Buddhism maintain, that memory presupposes the existence and identity of the self. Gautama, Vātsyāyana, and Vācaspati Mīśra's views have already been given. It is the permanent self that perceived an object in the past, retained its impression, remembers it at present, and will remember it in future. It is the self that remembers because it is endued with the character of being a knower. A mere series of cognitions cannot remember an object of past experience, because it is devoid of substantiality (*nirātma*). Memory presupposes the identity of the self as related to past, present and future cognitions.⁵²

The Buddhist idealist regards the self as a series of discrete and momentary psychoses.^{52a} Vātsyāyana urges that this conception of this self makes recollection impossible. If the self were a mere series of fleeting cognitions, then one momentary past cognition would perceive an object and another momentary future cognition would remember it—there being no connection whatever between them—which is absurd! What was perceived by one cognition cannot be remembered by another unconnected with it. Further, recollection involves recognition. Both presuppose the identity of the permanent self which knows the past, the present, and the future.⁵³

⁵⁰ YV., i, 1, 11; TV., i, 1, 11.

⁵¹ ACK., pp. 258-9; TA., p. 11; TBh., p. 30; Nyāyasāra, p. 116; Bhāskarodayā, p. 168.

⁵² NBh., NVTT., iii, 2, 43.

^{52a} Cp. David Hume, J. S. Mill and W. James.

⁵³ NBh., iii, 2, 42.

The Advaita Vedāntist also urges that the Buddhist idealist, who advocates the doctrine of momentary ideas, cannot account for recollection, since the original apprehension, its impression, and its recollection, which are momentary, do not abide in a common permanent substrate; and that if they abide in different substrates which are momentary, then the same person cannot remember an object apprehended by him in the past. The Buddhist idealist argues that these discrete momentary cognitions can produce recollection because they belong to the same psychical series (*viññānasantāna*). The Advaita Vedāntist rejects this argument as invalid, since the so-called series is unreal. When one member of a series is produced, its preceding member is destroyed, and its succeeding member has not yet come into existence. Even if a series is real, there can be no recollection, inasmuch as impressions were destroyed long ago. An entity which is destroyed cannot produce an effect. If impressions are assumed to continue, then they cease to be momentary and contradict the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness. Hence, the Yogācāra cannot account for recollection. The Śūnyavādin also cannot account for personal identity involved in memory. If all are non-existent in their real nature, then all empirical life is destroyed.

The Advaita Vedāntist criticizes the Naiyāyika view. The Naiyāyika who regards the self as omnipresent can account for personal identity in memory, because apprehension, impression and recollection abide in the same self. But there being no relation of a self and its cognition to an object, recollection cannot have the form of it. The Naiyāyika regards cognition as formless. If a cognition does not cognize the form of its object, it cannot have its form. If the cognition has no form of its object, then its impression cannot have the form of the cognition, and consequently the recollection produced by the impression cannot have the form of the object perceived in the past. Moreover, if a cognition is absolutely destroyed, a recollection cannot be like a previous cognition, since an impression which is not a particular condition of a cognition, but assumes another independent quality, is not a residuum (*vāsanā*) of the previous cognition, and so cannot produce a similar recollection.

The Advaita Vedānta regards the empirical self limited by the adjunct of the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*) in which pure

consciousness is reflected, as the apprehender, the substrate of the impression, and the recollector, so that the original apprehension, its impression, and its recollection abide in the same substrate. The empirical self is directly related to an object through a mental mode in which pure consciousness is reflected, and which assumes the form of the object. The mental mode produces a residuum (*vāsanā*) in the nescience (*avidyā*) which is the cause of the internal organ; it is called an impression (*saṃskāra*). When the impression is revived by an excitant, a similar recollection is produced. Hence, a recollection is similar to the original apprehension which is its ultimate cause, and the apprehension, the impression, and the recollection have the form of the object which was apprehended in the past.⁵⁴

3. The Nature, Causes and Effects of Impressions

The Buddhist idealists regard impressions (*saṃskāra*) as residua (*vāsanā*) of momentary cognitions modifying the succeeding cognitions, which do not abide in a permanent self. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards an impression as a quality of the self produced by a cognition and subsisting in it. The Sāṃkhya-Yoga and the Vedāntists regard it as a modification of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*), which is retained in it.

Vātsyāyana asserts that an impression is a quality of the self produced by the cognition of an object, which is a cause of recollection.⁵⁵ Praśastapāda says, "An impression is a quality of the self produced by objects seen, heard or otherwise apprehended on a previous occasion, which is a cause of recollection and recognition."⁵⁶ Saṃkara Mīśra describes an impression as the effect of a cognition and the cause of a cognition.⁵⁷ It is produced by perception or presentative cognition. It produces recollection and recognition or representative cognitions.⁵⁸ Jagadīśa opines that an impression is produced by a determinate cognition.⁵⁹ Śrīdhara observes, that even wrong cognitions leave impressions in the self, since we have recollections of even those objects which we

⁵⁴ ATP., pp. 109-10.

⁵⁵ NBh., iii, 2, 44.

⁵⁶ Bhāvanā ātmagūṇo dṛṣṭa-śrūtānubhūteṣvārtheṣu smṛti-prayabhijñāna-heturh. PBh., p. 267. KR., p. 132.

⁵⁷ Jñāna-janitena saṃskāreṇa jñāna-jananāt. KR., p. 131.

⁵⁸ KR., p. 132.

⁵⁹ Bhāvanākhyāḥ saṃskāro viśiṣṭa-jñāna-janyaḥ. TA., p. 12.

perceived wrongly in the past.⁶⁰ Illusions are definite and determinate cognitions. Viśvanātha also opines that impressions are produced by definite and determinate cognitions, and not by doubtful cognitions. They are imperceptible and abide in the self.⁶¹ The Navya Nyāya maintains that recollections also produce impressions.⁶² Thus both presentative and representative cognitions produce impressions (*saṃskāra*) in the self.

Impressions are imperceptible. We infer their existence as the causes of recollection and recognition. We cannot account for them without impressions. Past cognitions cannot produce recollections without the operation (*vyāpāra*) of impressions since nothing can be a cause of an effect, if it does not exist itself or its operation. If recollection is the effect of a past cognition, then it must be due to its operation (*vyāpāra*), because it does not exist when recollection is produced.⁶³ A cause or its operation must exist at the moment immediately before the production of its effect. An impression is the operation of a perception, which produces recollection.⁶⁴ The destruction of a perception, it may be argued, is the operation which produces recollection. This argument is invalid, because an absence and its counter-entity together cannot produce an effect. Further, if an impression be not admitted, then what was perceived on a previous occasion will always be remembered, because the operation in the form of the destruction of a perception always exists. Therefore the destruction of a perception is not its causal operation (*vyāpāra*) which may produce recollection.⁶⁵

Varadarāja observes, that an impression, which is the effect of a perceptual cognition and the cause of a representative cognition, is not a cognition.⁶⁶ It is dissimilar to a cognition. Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja describes an impression as the subtle condition of an apprehension.⁶⁷

Veṅkaṭanātha regards an impression as a peculiar adventitious property produced by a past perception. Any impression cannot produce the recollection of any object. That particular

⁶⁰ NK., p. 268.

⁶¹ BhP., 160; SM., pp. 495-6.

⁶² Smṛter api saṃskāra-janakatvaṃ navinair uktam. TSD., p. 91.

⁶³ SM., pp. 496-7. TK., p. 6.

⁶⁴ Saṃskārah pūrvānubhava-vyāpārah. KR., p. 133.

⁶⁵ SMD., pp. 496-7.

⁶⁶ Saṃskārah anubhava-jñāna-janyaḥ smṛti-jñāna-hetuḥ syayaṃ na jñānajatīyaḥ. TR., p. 147. NBh., iii, 2, 45.

⁶⁷ PR., p. 21. Cp. NM., pp. 376-7.

impression produces the recollection of an object, which was produced by the perception of it. The past perception is not the adventitious property which produces recollection, because it is destroyed when recollection is produced. The perception of a similar object or the like is not a present impression which produces recollection, for, in that case, an imperceptible object would be remembered. Further, it cannot produce recollection without the aid of an impression of a past perception. Hence, the hypothesis of an impression is not unwarranted.⁶⁸

Veṅkaṭanātha, unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, thinks that an impression abides in the intellect (*buddhi*), and not in the self, and regards it as a modification of *buddhi* produced by frequent previous perceptions. He does not regard it as a modification of the self which is unmodifiable. An attributive cognition (*dharma-bhūta-jñāna*) is subject to modifications. So an impression produced by a previous perception subsists in *buddhi* which is a substance.⁶⁹ This is the view of Viśiṣṭādvaitavāda.

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī also regards the mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*) as the receptacle of an impression.⁷⁰ The Nyāya regards the self as its substrate. What is called *ahamkāra* by the Advaita Vedānta is called *Ātman* by the Nyāya.⁷¹ Or, the empirical self limited by the adjunct of the mind (*antaḥkāraṇa*) in which pure consciousness is reflected, is the receptacle of an impression.⁷²

The Sāṃkhya also regards the mind (*manas*) as the receptacle of impressions, since persons whose sense-organs are destroyed still remember objects perceived in the past. It does not regard the self as the substrate of impressions, because it is unmodifiable and devoid of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.⁷³

The Advaita Vedānta severely criticizes the Buddhist view of impressions (*vāsanā*). Impressions are produced, according to Sāṃkhya, by perceptions. The variety of impressions is due to the variety of perceptions. The variety of recollections is due to the variety of impressions. They abide in the permanent empirical self. They cannot abide in the *Ālayavijñāna*, because it is a series of momentary self-cognitions.⁷⁴ Both are momentary and produced at the same moment, and consequently cannot be

⁶⁸ TMK., p. 689; SAS., p. 689.

⁶⁹ Saṃskārah antaḥkāraṇa-niṣṭhaḥ. Tattvānusandhāna on ACK., p. 259.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p. 259.

⁷¹ SPS., SSV., ii, 42-4.

⁷² ATP., p. 110.

⁷³ S.B., ii, 2, 30-1.

related to each other as the substrate and the content, like the two horns of a cow springing up simultaneously.⁷⁵ A cause is the invariable antecedent of its effect. If the *Ālayavijñāna* is prior to the impression, then it cannot be its substrate because it is non-existent when the latter comes into existence.⁷⁶ If the Buddhist regards the *Ālayavijñāna* as permanent, he contradicts the doctrine of momentariness.⁷⁷

Kumārila and Pārthasārathi Mīśra also severely criticize the Buddhist doctrine of impression (*vāsanā*). A preceding cognition that is entirely destroyed cannot modify the succeeding cognition. Even if they are produced simultaneously, they cannot modify each other because they are not related to each other. An impression is due to the operation of conjunction, inherence and the like, which are not possible if the preceding cognition is entirely destroyed before the succeeding cognition is generated. A composite substance (e.g. a *campaka* flower) can perfume another composite substance (e.g. oil), because it can transfer its fine parts into the latter. But a prior momentary cognition cannot transfer its parts to the succeeding momentary cognition and modify it, because both are partless. Further, all residua (*vāsanā*) abide in momentary cognitions. When they are destroyed, the residua are destroyed, and cannot produce recollections in a definite order. If they are supposed to persist as potencies (*śakti*) after the destruction of the cognitions in which they resided, then they undermine the doctrine of momentariness. If a series of residua were supposed to exist like a series of cognitions, then a residuum would produce a residuum only, and a cognition would produce a cognition only, because a like cause produces a like effect only. But a like cause, it may be argued, produces an unlike effect in co-operation with a dissimilar auxiliary condition. Similarly, a cognition produces a residuum, and a residuum produces a cognition. This argument is baseless, since there are no dissimilar auxiliary conditions as there is nothing else than cognitions. The Mīmāṃsakas obviate these difficulties in that they regard the permanent self as the receptacle of impressions.⁷⁸

Impressions produce recollections. They are auxiliary causes of recognition, because they render an aid to the sense-object-

⁷⁵ Bhāmāṭi on S.B., ii, 2, 29.

⁷⁷ S.B., ii, 2, 31.

⁷⁶ K. ataru on Ibid, ii, 2, 29.

⁷⁸ ŚV., NR., V, 192-200.

intercourse which is its principal cause. They are auxiliary causes of determinate perception which involves recollection of similar and dissimilar objects. They are auxiliary causes of acquired perception which is complicated by the recollection of an object perceived on a previous occasion. They are auxiliary causes of illusions in which an object (e.g. a shell) is misperceived as another (e.g. silver) perceived at another time, in another place, and remembered at present, but appearing as an object perceived (*Nyāya*); or in which there is non-discrimination between the perceived element and the remembered element owing to obscuratation of memory (*smṛti-pramoṣā*, *Prabhākara*). Inference depends upon the recollection of invariable concomitance of a probans with a probandum, which is produced by an impression. Comparison and testimony also involve recollection which depends upon an impression. Generally a single impression produced by a single perception produces a single recollection. But sometimes it produces the recollection of a collection of objects in co-operation with other impressions.⁷⁹ 'Bring a jar'. In this example, the impressions of the constituent letters in co-operation with one another produce the recollection of a word; and the impressions of the constituent words jointly produce the recollection of a sentence.⁸⁰ An impression is intensified by repeated recollection of a similar nature. It produces a recollection which produces a stronger impression, which, in its turn, produces another recollection which produces a still stronger impression, and so on. The same impression is not intensified by repeated recollection. Impressions are non-eternal. They are produced and destroyed. They are destroyed by similar recollections, diseases and the lapse of a long time.⁸¹

4. The Conditions of Retention (Causes of Impressions)

Retentive knowledge is the cause of not forgetting the objects which were learnt or perceived in the past. It is a condition of recollection.⁸² It depends upon the following conditions:

(1) The healthy and vigorous condition of the body is the physiological condition of retention. It is indicated by a passage

⁷⁹ Saṃskārah kvacit pratyekānubhava-janito'pi samūhālambanāṃ smṛtim utpādayati. KR., p. 134.

⁸⁰ Ibid, p. 134.

⁸² PRP., p. 68; SS., i, 15.

⁸¹ Śāstrārthasaṃgraha, p. 379.

in the Chāndogya Upaniṣad: "When the food is pure, the mind is pure; when the mind is pure, memory becomes firm."⁸³ Memory depends upon the health of the mind (*sattva*), which, in its turn, depends upon the health of the body. The healthy condition of the psycho-physical organism is a precondition of memory.

Praśastapāda mentions three causes of impressions: (1) intense cognitions, (2) repeated cognitions, and (3) interesting cognitions.⁸⁴

(2) The contact of the self with the mind (*manas*) depending upon the intense perception of a wonderful object produces a deep and excessive impression in the self.⁸⁵ The attentive intense perception of wonderful objects produces deep impressions. For instance, when an inhabitant of the Deccan, who has never seen a camel before, sees it for the first time, his intense perception of the wonderful animal produces a deep impression in his self, which enables him to recall it ever afterwards. Śrīdhara suggests that *paṭupratyaya* not only means an intense cognition, but also a very distinct cognition (*sphuṭatara-pratyaya*). For instance, when we walk on grass barefooted, sometimes we have intense tactual perception of the grass; but it cannot produce a deep impression in the self, because it is not very distinct. Such indistinct perceptions cannot produce deep impressions. Distinct perceptions alone can generate such deep impressions as may produce recollections in future.⁸⁶

(3) Repetition or frequency is another condition of retention inasmuch as it produces a deep impression. In acquiring learning frequent reading is an important condition of retention. Sometimes a single perception, though distinct and intense, cannot produce a deep impression. But when it is repeated several times, it produces a lasting impression. When a chapter of the Veda is read for the first time, it does not produce any distinct impression. But when it is read over and over again, its distinct perception is repeated, produces a deep impression, and fixes the matter in memory.⁸⁷ In learning an art repeated practice is of

⁸³ Āhāraśuddhau sattvaśuddhiḥ, sattvaśuddhau dhruvā smṛtiḥ, vii, 26, 2.

⁸⁴ Paṭyabhyāsādara-pratyayaḥ. PBh., p. 267. KR., p. 132.

⁸⁵ Paṭupratyayāpekṣād ātma-manasoḥ saṁyogād āścarye' rthe paṭuḥ saṁskārātīśayo jāyate. Ibid, p. 267.

⁸⁶ Paṭupratyayaḥ sphuṭatara-paratyayaḥ. NK., p. 257.

⁸⁷ NK., p. 257.

invaluable service. In acquiring skill in physical exercise, swimming, dancing and the like repeated practice is of great help. When study, art, physical exercise and the like are repeatedly practised, deep impressions are produced by the mind-soul-contact and the perceptions aided by the preceding impressions.⁸⁸ A single cognition does not produce a lasting impression, because there is no distinct recollection after the first cognition. The last cognition also cannot be regarded as the cause of the deep impression. If it were so, there would be no need of repeated practice. Therefore, Śrīdhara concludes, the preceding impressions facilitate the succeeding cognitions, which, in their turn, strengthen the preceding impressions. When the practice is continued for a very long time with regard to the same object, the impression becomes very deep, and brings about a distinct recollection of it. This impression is produced by the last cognition, which depends upon the last but one impression. This is how impressions are strengthened by repeated practice.

(4) Interest is another condition of retention. The perception of an object which evokes great interest and compels attention produces a deep impression in the self. When a person puts forth special efforts and fixes his eyes on an interesting object with an attentive mind, which he has never seen before, his perception of it is as vivid as that of a flash of lightning. A deep impression (*saṁskārātīśaya*) is produced by the mind-soul-contact under the influence of the vivid perception. For instance, a deep impression is produced by the vivid perception of lotuses made of gold and silver in the Deva lake at midnight on the full-moon day in the month of Caitra, when the moon is in the asterism of Citrā. Though the lotuses appear for a single moment, they produce so vivid perceptions that they leave lasting impressions, and can be recalled ever afterwards.⁸⁹ Nobody can vouch for the truth of the statement. But the fact remains, that a rare object evokes great interest, attracts attention, and calls forth a special effort of the self to perceive it; and that it produces a lasting impression in it. Sometimes when we perceive a very strange or marvellous object only once in our life, we have such a vivid perception of it that we remember it ever afterwards.⁹⁰

⁸⁸ NK., p. 257.

⁹⁰ NK., p. 257.

⁸⁹ NK., p. 271.

5. The Conditions of Recall

The Buddhist account is found in *Milindapañha* which mentions sixteen conditions of recall in an unscientific and unsystematic manner. (1) An extraordinary effort reminds an adept (e.g. Ānanda) of his previous births. A superhuman effort of the mind is necessary for the revival of the deep-lying impressions of previous births. (2) Outward aid reminds a person of his past experiences. A person, forgetful by nature, is continually reminded by others of things which he cannot recall by unaided efforts. (3) Massive experience which moves a whole personality is a condition of recall. A deep impression left by the vivid perception of an interesting event can easily be recalled. Kings remember their coronation day, and persons remember their days of conversion on account of their deep impressions. This condition of memory corresponds to *ādarapratyaya* mentioned by Praśastapāda. An intense experience which afforded pleasure or joy to a person on a previous occasion reminds him of it. (4) An intense experience which afforded pain or sorrow to a person on a previous occasion reminds him of it. Thus the influence of feelings and emotions on memory was recognized. (5) Similarity of appearance is a condition of recall. The sight of a person resembling the father, the mother, the brother, or the sister reminds us of the latter. The sight of a camel, an ox, or an ass reminds us of some other member of the species like it. These are examples of the law of similarity which is adumbrated here. (6) Difference of appearance is a condition of recall. When we perceive an object, we perceive all its qualities. Hence we remember that a particular colour, a particular smell, a particular taste, and a particular touch belong to a particular object. The law of contiguity is adumbrated here. (7) The knowledge of speech is a condition of memory. A person who is by nature forgetful is reminded by others of an object, and then he remembers it. This condition is akin to the second condition, viz., outward aid. (8) A sign reminds us of an object signified by it. We recognise a draught bullock by a brand mark or some other sign. (9) An effort to recall on the prompting of others is a condition of memory. A person by nature forgetful is urged again and again by others to try his utmost to remember his past experience, and succeeds in doing so. (10) Calculation is a condition

of recall. A person knows by the training he has received in writing that such and such a letter follows another letter. This is a mechanical condition of memory. (11) Arithmetic is a condition of memory. Accountants do big sums by their knowledge of figures. This is a mechanical condition of memory. (12) Learning by heart is a condition of memory. Those who recite the scriptures again and again can recall them easily. This also is a mechanical condition of memory. Calculation, arithmetic and learning by heart correspond to *abhyāsapratyaya* mentioned by Praśastapāda. They remind us of past experiences on account of the mere frequency of the same experience. They are causes of rote memory or cramming. (13) Meditation is a condition of active memory. A monk remembers his days of temporal life by meditation. This condition is mentioned by Gautama. (14) Reference to a book is a condition of memory. Kings are reminded of regulations by referring to the book of laws. This condition is akin to an external aid to memory. (15) Pledge is a condition of memory. A pledged ornament reminds a person of the circumstances under which it was pledged. (16) Past experience is a condition of memory. Recollection is a reproduction of past experience. A person remembers what he has actually seen, heard, tasted, smelt, or touched. Memory cannot transcend the bounds of experience. In *Milindapañha* there is simply an empirical enumeration of the conditions of memory, but no attempt at a classification and explanation of them.⁹¹

The conditions of recall are discussed in the Vaiśeṣika literature. Kaṇāda mentions a particular conjunction of the self with the mind (*manas*) and an impression as the conditions of recollection.⁹² A particular mind-soul-contact, Śaṅkara Miśra observes, called attention (*prañidhāna*) is the non-material cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*), the self is the material cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*), and an impression is the efficient cause (*nimitta-kāraṇa*) of recollection. Attention is the concentration of mind. Past perceptions are the causes of impressions, and consequently the ultimate causes of recollections. There is not always remembrance of an object, because it depends upon the revival of impressions by suggestive forces.⁹³ Jaya Nārāyaṇa mentions the mind-soul-contact, a desire

⁹¹ *The Questions of King Milinda*, Vol. I, pp. 122-3. BhP., pp. 193-4. H.I.L., pp. 112-3.

⁹² *Ātmanāsoḥ saṁyoga-viśeṣāt saṁskārāc ca smṛtiḥ*. V.S., ix, 2, 6.

⁹³ VSU., ix, 2, 6. KVB., p. 154.

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⁹³ VSU., ix, 2, 6. KVB., p. 154.

to recall (*susmūrṣā*), a similar impression, and excitants or cues as the conditions of recollection. He regards a determinate cognition which is not neutral in character as the principal cause (*haraṇa*), an impression as the casual operation (*vyāpāra*), excitants or cues as the auxiliary cause (*sahakāri-kāraṇa*), the mind-soul-contact as the non-material cause, and a desire to recall, attention and the like as the efficient cause of recollection.⁹⁴ There must be a definite, distinct and determinate cognition of an object which is either pleasant or painful. An indefinite, indistinct and indeterminate cognition cannot produce an impression. Further, a cognition with a pleasant or unpleasant feeling-tone can produce an impression. It can be revived by the cognition of suggestive signs. Its revival depends upon the intention to remember the particular object perceived in the past, the mind-soul-contact, and attention. These are the conditions of active memory.

Praśastapāda mentions the following conditions of recall. The recollection of objects seen, heard, or otherwise perceived in the past is produced by a particular mind-soul-contact aided by the cognition of suggestive signs (*liṅgadarśana*), the desire (*icchā*) to recall, the thinking of associated ideas (*anusmarāṇa*), and impressions produced by intense, repeated, and interesting or vivid cognitions.⁹⁵ A particular mind-soul-contact, Śridhara observes, cannot bring about recollection unless it is aided by the perception of a suggestive sign which revives the impression. Hence the impression and the perception of a cue are the efficient causes of recollection.⁹⁶

Gautama mentions attention, context, repetition, signs, distinctive features, similarity, ownership, relation of the supporter and the supported, relationship, immediate sequence, separation, identity of function, excess, attainment, antagonism, concealment, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, fear, need, action, attachment, merit, and demerit as the conditions of recollection.⁹⁷ (1) Attention (*prañidhāna*) is the fixation of the mind on the object by a person who intends to remember it.⁹⁸ It consists in preventing the mind from wandering away to other objects.⁹⁹ Intently thinking of the suggestive signs which have the power of reviving the impression

of the object sought to be remembered is a cause of recollection.¹⁰⁰ Constant thought of the signs (*liṅga*) which suggest the thing to be remembered directly leads to its recollection. Fixation of the mind on the signs which indicate these suggestive signs also indirectly leads to recollection.¹⁰¹ The associative tendencies are controlled and brought to a focus by concentration of mind so that their cumulative strength may easily rouse the dormant impression and produce its recollection. Attention is a subjective condition of recall. It throws the mind into an attitude which is favourable to recollection. (2) Context (*nibandha*) is a condition of recall. When many topics are discussed in the same work and repeatedly read together, an association is established among their ideas; so that they remind us of one another in the same order or in a different order. A person thinks of the means of valid knowledge (*pramāṇa*), and then remembers the object of valid knowledge (*prameya*), because he learnt them repeatedly in the same work on the Nyāya in the past. Here recollection of the contents of past experience follows the same order in which they were learnt in the past. When a person thinks of the grounds of defeat (*nigrahaśthāna*), and then remembers the means of valid knowledge, his recollection follows a different order.¹⁰² Here contiguous association under the influence of the context is responsible for recollection. Vātsyāyana gives another meaning of *nibandha*. It consists in establishing associations between well-known things and new things to be remembered—the familiar and the unfamiliar—with the help of the art of concentration of mind.¹⁰³ It contains a significant suggestion. The things to be remembered must be associated with those already known and incorporated in the system of knowledge. Well-assimilated matter can be easily remembered. Undigested material of knowledge cannot be easily recalled. Hence, apperception is a subjective condition of memory. (3) Repetition (*abhyāsa*) is a condition of recollection. Vātsyāyana means by it an intense impression (*saṃskāra*) produced by the repetition of cognitions with regard to the same object. Vācaspati includes keen interest and vivid cognition (*ādara-pratyaya*) in repetition, since they also produce an impression through which they

⁹⁴ VSV., ix, 2, 6.

⁹⁵ PBh., p. 256.

⁹⁶ Liṅgadarśanavat saṃskāro'pi smṛter nimittakāraṇam. NK., p. 257.

⁹⁷ NS., iii, 2, 44.

⁹⁸ Susmūrṣayā manaso dhāraṇam prañidhānam. NBh., iii, 2, 44.

⁹⁹ Prañidhānam manaso viśayāntara-sañcāra-vāraṇam. NSV., iii, 2, 44.

¹⁰⁰ Susmūrṣita-liṅga-cintanam artha-smṛti-kāraṇam. NBh., iii, 2, 44.

¹⁰¹ NVTT., p. 404.

¹⁰² NVTT., p. 404. NSV., iii, 2, 44.

¹⁰³ Dhāraṇa-śāstra-kṛto vā prajñāteṣu vastuṣu smartavyānām upanikṣepo nibandhaḥ. NBh., iii, 2, 44.

bring about recollection. Repetition of the same experience produces many impressions of the same kind, which intensify and strengthen the last impression and fix it in memory. Though such an intense impression is not an excitant (*udbodhaka*) of recollection, yet it facilitates quick recall. Others maintain, that an intense impression produced by the repetition of the same experience is an excitant of recall.¹⁰⁴ (4) Suggestive signs (*linga*) remind us of the object with which they were associated in our past experience. They are of four kinds: conjunct (*saṃyogī*), inherent (*samavāyī*), coinherent in the same substrate (*ekārtha-samavāyī*), and contradictory (*virodhī*). (i) An object reminds us of something with which it was invariably found to be in contact in our past experience. Smoke was invariably perceived in the past in conjunction with fire. So smoke reminds us of fire. (ii) An object reminds us of something in which it was always perceived to inhere in our past experience. Horns were always perceived to inhere in a cow. So they remind us of a cow. (iii) An object reminds us of another, both of which were always perceived to coinhere in the same substrate. Hands were always perceived in the past along with feet to coinhere in the same body. So hands remind us of feet. Colour and touch were always perceived in the past to coinhere in one and the same substance. So the colour of the object reminds us of its touch. These examples illustrate the law of contiguity. (iv) Two objects, which were always perceived to be antagonistic to each other, remind us of each other. The non-existent remind us of the existent because they are opposed to each other. This is an example of the law of contrast. (5) Distinguishing features (*lakṣaṇa*) remind us of the objects which are distinguished by them. The sight of a flag with a distinctive mark reminds one of the nation to which it belongs. The sight of the distinctive features of an animal leads to the recollection of the species to which it belongs. The distinctive marks on the body of a person remind one of the race to which he belongs. (6) Similarity (*sādṛśya*).—An object reminds us of another on account of its similarity with it. The picture of Devadatta reminds us of him. This is an example of the law of similarity. (7) Ownership (*parigraha*).—When two entities are related to each other as the owner and the owned, either of them reminds us of the other. A property reminds one of its owner,

¹⁰⁴ NBh., NVTT., NSV., iii, 2, 44.

and the owner reminds one of his property. (8) The supporter (*āśraya*) reminds one of the supported. A master reminds one of the servant supported by him. A king reminds us of his attendants. (9) The supported (*āśrita*) remind one of their supporters. A servant reminds one of his master who supports him. The attendants remind one of their king. If two objects are related to each other as the supporter and the supported, they remind us of each other. (10) If two objects are related to each other, one reminds us of the other. A pupil reminds one of his teacher. A priest reminds one of the person for whom he performs a sacrifice. Vācaspati Miśra observes, that some sort of relationship is involved in all the conditions of recall mentioned here. The special mention of relationship as a condition of recall means all relations other than those specially mentioned here.¹⁰⁵ (11) Immediate sequence (*ānantarya*) is a condition of recall. In performing a complex act the performance of one item reminds us of the item that follows it. The preceding item reminds us of the succeeding item. The sprinkling of water on rice reminds us of pounding it in a wooden mortar. Vācaspati gives an example of a series of acts which are habitually performed every day. They form a connected chain of acts; the preceding act reminds us of the succeeding act. We awake early in the morning, then get up from bed, then wash our faces, then satisfy the calls of nature, then clean our teeth. We perform these acts almost automatically owing to habit. Here the preceding act reminds us of the succeeding act, and then the act is performed. (12) Separation (*viyoga*).—When two lovers are separated from each other, one is reminded of the other. Separation implies sorrow which reminds one of the object of sorrow. (13) The identity of effect or function (*ekakārya*).—When C¹, C² and C³ co-operate and produce the same effect E, the perception of C¹ reminds one of C² or C³. Those who are engaged in the same profession or do the same kind of work remind us of one another. The fellow-students who are engaged in the same task remind us of one another. (14) Antagonism (*virodha*).—Of two rivals antagonistic to each other, the sight of the one reminds us of the other. A serpent and a mongoose remind one of each other, because they are naturally hostile to each other. (15) Excess (*atiśaya*) reminds one of what brings it about. The sacred thread ceremony

¹⁰⁵ NVTT., p. 404.

reminds a Brahmin boy of the priest who performed it. He attains a certain superiority in the shape of education, modesty, purity of conduct and the like after he is invested with sacred thread. Hence the superiority reminds him of his preceptor who is its indirect cause. (16) Attainment (*prāpti*).—One who received gifts from a charitable person often remembers him. A beggar often remembers the person from whom he received gifts or will receive them. (17) Concealment (*vyavadhāna*).—A sheath reminds one of a sword which is concealed in it. (18) Pleasure and pain (*sukha-duḥkha*).—Pleasure reminds a person of the object that gave him pleasure in the past. Similarly, pain reminds him of the object that caused his pain in the past. Pleasure and pain not only remind us of their causes, but also of each other. Pleasure reminds us of pain, and pain reminds us of pleasure. Present joy reminds us of past sorrow; present sorrow reminds us of past joy.¹⁰⁸ The law of contrast governs these recollections. (19) Desire and aversion (*icchā-dveṣa*).—Desire reminds a person of the object or person that he likes. Aversion reminds him of the object or person that he dislikes. Desire and aversion remind one of the objects that excite them. Vācaspati Miśra means by desire and aversion affection and hatred respectively. Affection for brothers reminds a person of his brothers. Hatred for a hostile wife reminds him of his wife. Conative tendencies determine recall. (20) Fear (*bhaya*).—Fear reminds one of its cause (e.g. death). (21) Affection (*rāga*).—Love often reminds a lover of his beloved woman. Affection reminds a father of his son. Thus emotions determine recall. (22) Need (*arthitva*).—It reminds a needy person of what he needs in the shape of food or clothing, or of a charitable person who will remove it. (23) Action (*kriyā*).—It reminds one of the agent who performs it. A chariot reminds one of the carpenter who made it. The movement of the branches of a tree reminds one of the wind that causes it. (24) Merit (*dharma*) acquired by the habitual performance of duties enjoyed by the Vedas leads to the recollection of past lives. It is the cause of extraordinary power of retention and recollection in this life. (25) Demerit (*adharma*) acquired by the habitual commission of sins reminds one of the cause of pain and misery experienced in the past. Merit and demerit remind one of the causes of pleasure and pain experienced on previous occasions in

¹⁰⁸ Mahābhārata, Śāntiparva, Ch. 16, 15.

this life and previous births. A new-born baby sucks the breast of his mother because he remembers that it gave him pleasure in the previous birth.¹⁰⁷

The list of conditions of recall mentioned by Gautama is not an exhaustive enumeration of all possible conditions. It is purely suggestive.¹⁰⁸ Sometimes in abnormal conditions of the mind the impressions of past experiences in the inmost recesses of the mind are revived, which were almost beyond the reach of recollection under normal conditions. "It is well-known," Vācaspati asserts, "that insanity and the like also are conditions of recollection."¹⁰⁹

The causes of the revival of impressions are conditions of recall. Three excitants (*udbodhaka*) are mentioned in the Sāṃkhya, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, and the Vedānta literature. The perception of a similar object, an unseen force (*adrṣṭa*), and reflection are the revivers of impressions which are the seeds of recollections.¹¹⁰ (1) Sometimes the excitant is the perception of an object similar to what was perceived in the past. The sight of Devadatta excites the recollection of Yajñadatta who resembles him. Devadatta reminds one of Yajñadatta because of his similarity with him. This is an example of the law of similarity. (2) Sometimes the excitant is an unseen force (*adrṣṭa*). An impression of the past life is revived by an unseen agency (*adrṣṭa*).¹¹¹ An object perceived in the past, e.g. the holy place Śrīraṅgam, suddenly flashes into memory owing to an unseen force (*adrṣṭa*). Here the dormant impression of the place is roused by *adrṣṭa* and thrust into the focus of consciousness. This is an example of spontaneous memory. (3) Sometimes reflection (*cintā*) resuscitates an impression and brings about recollection of an object. For instance, one can voluntarily call up the divine image of Veṅkaṭeśa by thinking of all the associated ideas of its beauty, holiness, auspiciousness and the like. This is an example of active memory. By reflection we can bring to a focus all the forces of suggestion, the cumulative effect of which brings about

¹⁰⁷ NBh., NSV., iii, 2, 44; NVTT., pp. 404-5.

¹⁰⁸ Nidarsāñcedam smṛtihetūnām, na parisañkhyānam iti. NBh., iii, 2, 44.

¹⁰⁹ Unmādādayo'pi smṛtihetavo lokaprasiddhāh. NVTT., p. 405.

¹¹⁰ Sadṛśādrṣṭacintādyāh smṛtibijasya bodhakāh. TBh., p. 28; SSV., iv, 21; VPS., p. 251; SAS., on TMK., p. 688; YMD., p. 4; KR., p. 133.

¹¹¹ Adṛṣṭāj janmāntare saṃskārod bodhah. KR., p. 133.

recollection which is due to convergent association. (4) Śrīnivāsa mentions contiguity (*sāhacarya*) also as a condition of recollection. Devadatta and Yajñadatta were always perceived together in the past. So the sight of the one reminds a person of the other. This is an example of the law of contiguity.¹¹² Veṅkaṭanātha also recognizes the law of similarity and the law of contiguity as the laws of association.¹¹³ Vātsyāyana recognizes the law of contrast and the law of causation also as the laws of association.

The causes of recollection do not operate at the same time. Therefore there cannot be simultaneous recollection of all our past experiences. Just as the mind-soul-contact and impressions are the causes of recollection, so are attention, perception of suggestive signs and the rest, which do not appear simultaneously. There is no simultaneous recollection of all past experiences, because these auxiliary conditions do not appear simultaneously.¹¹⁴ The succession of the causes of recollection accounts for the succession of recollections.

In the Alāṅkāra literature the following conditions of recollection are mentioned: the perception of similar objects, impression, attention, reflection (*cintā*), meditation (*dhyāna*), vividness of previous perception, repetition of similar experience, and health of the organism (*svāsthya*).¹¹⁵

Individual impressions are revived in isolation from one another. Many connected impressions are revived together in a single file. When they are revived singly, they produce recollection of single objects. When they are revived together, they produce recollection of many objects at the same time (*samūhālambanā smṛti*). Though a particular impression is produced by a particular perception, it is revived along with many other connected impressions and brings about recollection of all their objects together. Discrete impressions do not always produce discrete recollections, but a cumulative recollection of all the objects perceived together in the past. For instance, we hear the following words in succession: "Bring the horse". Here the perception of every letter produces an impression. The impressions of the letters are revived together and produce recollection of the words

¹¹² YMD., p. 4.

¹¹³ TMK., p. 576.

¹¹⁴ NS., NBh., NSV., iii, 2, 34; NVT., pp. 398, 429.

¹¹⁵ Nāṭyadarpaṇa, p. 180, (G.O.S.); Rasagaṅgādhara, p. 123; Bhāva-prakāśana, p. 844, (G.O.S.); Rasārṇavasudhākara, p. 126.

constituted by them. The impressions of the words are revived together and produce recollection of a sentence. Thus the isolated impressions of individual letters and words produce a collective recollection of the whole sentence. The meaning of a sentence is comprehended in this way.¹¹⁶

6. The Effects of Recollection

Praśastapāda mentions the following effects of recollection: (1) Recollection is the cause of recalling what remains behind of a previous cognition (*śeṣānuvyaśāya*). Śrīdhara interprets the term in this manner. Recollection consists in the revival of the impressions of previous cognitions by the perception of suggestive signs (*liṅgadarśana*). They revive the particular impressions because they were always perceived in the past together with the objects, the impressions of which are left in the self. The first cognition of a suggestive sign is the cause of recalling the object suggested by it because of recollection of the invariable concomitance between the suggestive sign and the suggested object.¹¹⁷ Śrīdhara thinks that recollection involves inference and recollection of its ground, viz. invariable concomitance (*vyāpti*). But this view is wrong. Recollection does not involve conscious or unconscious inference of the object suggested by the indicative sign or cue due to recollection of the invariable concomitance between them. In recollection there is suggestion, but neither inference nor knowledge of its ground. (2) Recollection of an object is the cause of remembrance of other objects associated with it (*anusmarāṇa*). Recollection of the first word of a sentence is the cause of remembrance of the second word because of its association with the first word. This is an example of contiguous association. One idea suggests another idea associated with it. This is called *anusmarāṇa*. It literally means after-recollection in which the recollection of one idea leads to the recollection of another idea associated with it. Suggestion and association are involved in memory. (3) Recollection is the cause of desire. The recollection of an object which afforded pleasure in the past is the cause of desire for it. This implies that pleasure can produce an impression

¹¹⁶ KR., p. 134.

¹¹⁷ PBh., p. 256. Prathamopajāta-liṅgajñānāpekṣayā tadantarbhāvyānumeyajñānaṁ tasya hetur vyāptismaraṇam. NK., p. 257.

which can be revived by the recollection of the object which afforded pleasure in the past. (4) Recollection is the cause of aversion. The recollection of an object which caused pain on a previous occasion is the cause of aversion to it. This implies that pain can produce an impression which can be revived by the recollection of the object which produced pain in the past. Pleasure and pain can produce impressions which are revived not only by the perception of the objects which caused them in the past, but also by the recollection of them.¹¹⁸

Śrīdhara suggests here that feelings are not directly remembered, but that they are remembered through the medium of cognitions. First there is the recollection of objects; then the feelings caused by them in the past are remembered. Thus feelings are remembered through the intermediate agency of cognitions. Cognitions are directly remembered. But feelings cannot be directly remembered. They depend upon cognitions for their recollection.

7. Suggestion and Association

Milindapañha clearly gives the ideas of suggestion and association. "The King (Milinda) said: 'Does memory, Nāgasena, always arise subjectively, or is it stirred up by suggestion from outside?' 'Both the one and the other'. 'But does not that amount to all memory being subjective in origin, and never artificial?' 'If, O King, there were no artificial memory, then artisans would have no need of practice, or art, or schooling, and teachers would be useless. But the contrary is the case'. 'Very good, Nāgasena'.¹¹⁹

Memory depends upon subjective as well as objective conditions. The force of association of ideas is a subjective condition. One idea is suggested by another idea with which it was associated in the past experience. Or, it is revived by the perception of a suggestive sign or cue, which is an external stimulus. A teacher gives a suggestion to a pupil, which revives the idea of an object perceived by him in the past. The same action repeatedly performed by an artist is ingrained in his organism as a habit, which

¹¹⁸ *Śeṣānuvyavasāyecchānusmaraṇa-dveṣaḥetuḥ*. PBh., p. 256. *Sukha-sādhanaṭva-smṛtir icchāhetuḥ*. *Duḥkha-sādhaka-smaraṇaṃ dveṣaḥetuḥ*. NK., p. 257.

¹¹⁹ *The Questions of King Milinda*, Part I, pp. 120-1.

facilitates the recollection of it in future. Repetition is an objective condition of recollection.

Milindapañha speaks of habit and association both as conditions of recollection. "Now give me an illustration of thought arising where sight is because of habit." "What do you think, great King, if one cart went ahead which way would a second cart go?" "The same as the first." "But would the first tell the second to go where it went, or the second tell the first that it would go where it had gone?" "No, Sir. There would be no communication between the two. The second would follow the first out of habit." "Just so, great King, with sight and thought." "Now give me an illustration of how thought arises, where sight has arisen, through association." "In the art of calculating by using the joints of fingers as signs or marks, in the art of arithmetic, pure and simple, and in the art of writing, O King, the beginner is clumsy. But after a certain time with attention and practice he becomes expert. Just so is it that, where sight has arisen, thought too by association springs up."¹²⁰

8. Loss of Memory

Forgetfulness is due to the destruction of the impressions of past experiences. Śrīnivāsa mentions the lapse of a long time, disease, and the effacement of impressions as the causes of forgetfulness.¹²¹ (1) Impressions are effaced by the lapse of a long time after the original perceptions. They gradually fade away, if they are not strengthened by repeated similar perceptions. (2) Sickness also weakens impressions which are gradually obliterated and lead to forgetfulness. The healthy condition of the body is a condition of memory. Sickness is a condition of forgetfulness. (3) The obscuration or destruction of impressions is a cause of the loss of memory.

Śrīdhara and Śaṅkara Miśra mention the following causes of the effacement of impressions. (4) Impressions are effaced by contrary cognitions.¹²² When Caitra is mistaken for Maitra, the illusory cognition of Maitra produces an impression of Maitra

¹²⁰ Pp. 189-92.

¹²¹ *Kāladairghyād vyādhyādinaṃ vā saṃskārapramoṣāt smṛtyabhāvaḥ*. YMD., p. 4.

¹²² *Samskāraḥ kvacid virodhi-jñāna-nivartyaḥ*. KR., p. 132. *Pratipakṣa-jñānena saṃskāro vināśyate*. NK., p. 268.

which is counteracted by the repeated contrary cognition that this is not Maitra but Caitra. Thus the impression of a wrong cognition is counteracted by the corresponding right cognition. (5) Impressions are obliterated by intoxication.¹²³ The impressions of past experiences of intoxicated persons are found to be obliterated. There is lapse of memory under the influence of intoxication. Mental equilibrium is completely lost in an intoxicated condition. A certain amount of mental equipoise is a condition of memory. (6) Impressions are effaced by intense pain.¹²⁴ The impressions of the past life are effaced by the intense pain of death. Intense pain causes lapse of memory in this life. (7) Impressions are effaced by intense pleasure also. A person enjoying excessive pleasure forgets other things.¹²⁵ There is lapse of memory even under the influence of excessive pleasure. Thus forgetfulness is determined by feelings. (8) Impressions are effaced by anger. In a state of rage (*roṣa*) a person loses his mental equipoise, and consequently cannot remember things. Thus forgetfulness is influenced by strong emotions.¹²⁶ Mahādeva Paṇḍita mentions five causes of the destruction of impressions, viz. recollections of a similar nature, contrary cognitions, intoxication, intense pain, and a long interval of time.¹²⁷ (9) When the mind of a person is pre-occupied with something else, he cannot recall an object. Pre-occupation of the mind with something resists the revival of impressions of other things. When the mind is under the influence of the excitement of gambling and the like, he forgets what he has learnt. When the excitement is continuous, the impressions of other things gradually fade away and disappear.¹²⁸

(10) The *Bhagavad Gītā* traces the lapse of memory to delusion, and the impairment of intellect to the loss of memory.¹²⁹ Delusion is non-discrimination between right and wrong due to anger. It induces the lapse of memory which destroys the power of discriminating between right and wrong. The power of recollection can again be regained by destroying delusion due to ignorance.¹³⁰ Lapse of memory obstructs the production of

¹²³Kvacit madanivartyah. KR., p. 132. Madenāpi saṃskārasya vināśaḥ. NK., p. 268.

¹²⁴Kvacit tīvraduḥkhanivartyah. KR., p. 132. NK., p. 268.

¹²⁵Bhogāsaktaśya pūrvavṛtta-smṛtyabhāvāt. NK., p. 268.

¹²⁶NK., p. 268; KR., p. 132. ¹²⁷Nyāyasāra, p. 103.

¹²⁸Dyūtādi-vyasanāpannasya pūrvādhīta-vismaraṇāt. NK., p. 268.

¹²⁹Samīhāt smṛti-vibhramah. Smṛti-bhramāśad buddhināśaḥ. ii, 63.

¹³⁰Naṣṭo mohah smṛtir labdhā. BG., XVIII, 73.

proper mental modes owing to the increase of contrary thoughts, or produces improper mental modes.¹³¹

(11) Caraka describes epilepsy (*apasmāra*) as a disease in which there is unconsciousness accompanied by abnormal actions, which is caused by the lapse of memory, and loss of intelligence and purity (*sattva*). He ascribes it to the provocation of the bodily humours owing to the excess of energy (*rajas*) and inertia (*tamas*). The bodily humours, being excited by lust, anger, fear, avarice, joy, grief, apprehension and anxiety, attack the heart and the seats of the sense-organs, and thus bring about lapse of memory and consciousness. Thus the provocation of the bodily humours, the loss of mental equipoise, and the preponderance of energy and delusion are the causes of loss of memory. Habitual commission of immoral actions, performance of bodily actions in an unnatural manner, and violation of the principles of dietetics cause epilepsy.¹³²

A past apprehension is the cause of recollection through its impression which is its causal operation. Some are of the opinion that it is the cause of recollection not as an apprehension, but as a cognition (*jñāna*), because otherwise there would be no recollection after recollection, in that the first impression of the past apprehension is destroyed by a similar recollection. But the first recollection, they argue, produces an impression, which produces another recollection. Viśvanātha criticizes this view thus: Where many objects were perceived together in the past, and subsequently some of them were remembered in succession, and not all of them, the recollection of the whole lot has not yet destroyed its impression, which is destroyed by a length of time, disease, or its last recollection, which is its ultimate effect. This view does not make successive recollections impossible. Nor does it make a stronger impression impossible on account of repeated recollections, because the strength of an impression means the quick appearance of an excitant (*udbodhaka*). The same impression continues to exist in the self, until the last recollection is produced. It is better to assume the existence of one impression of a past apprehension which is destroyed by the last recollection than to assume the existence of a series of similar impressions and similar

¹³¹Madhusūdana's commentary on BG., ii, 73.

¹³²Caraka Saṃhitā, XI, 8, 4.

recollections which destroy them. The parsimony of a hypotheses demands it.¹³³

9. The Nature of Imagination: Memory and Imagination: Reverie

Vācaspati Miśra makes a distinction between recollection and imagination. The former cognizes an object perceived in the past in the same order; it cognizes either the entire object or less than it; but it does not cognize more than what was perceived; it never transcends the limits of past experience.¹³⁴ The latter transcends the limits of past experience. It introduces a new order into the contents of past experience. It rearranges them into a new pattern. Memory supplies the material of imagination.

Vyāsa divides recollection into two kinds: recollection of an imagined object (*bhāvita-smartavyā*) and recollection of an unimagined object (*abhāvita-smartavyā*). Dream is recollection of imagined objects. Waking recall is recollection of unimagined or real objects. In dream there is the imagination of unreal objects. In waking recollection there is the reproduction of real objects perceived in the past.¹³⁵ Thus Vyāsa distinguishes between memory and imagination.

Mādhavācārya Vidyāranya defines recollection as the reproduction of the contents of past experience in the same order in which they were perceived in the past. A person read the Vedas repeatedly in the past, retains their impressions in his mind, and recalls them in the same order in which he learnt them. This mental process is called recollection. A person is not free (*svatantra*) in recall. In spite of his best efforts to concentrate his mind on a particular forgotten sentence, he fails to recall it. The sentence which has to be recalled cannot be remembered otherwise. If another sentence is called up, it will not be the proper sentence of the Vedas. Nor can the sentences of them learned frequently be forgotten by an effort of the will. Sometimes after a period of mourning when the study of the Vedas is prohibited, some sentences of them are recalled automatically without an effort

¹³³ SM., pp. 395-6. TSN., p. 92; Bhāskarodayā, pp. 179-81.

¹³⁴ Smṛtir na pūrvānubhava-maryādām atikrāmāti, tadviśayā tadūnaviśayā vā, na tu tadadhikaviśayā. TV., i, 1, 11.

¹³⁵ YBh., i, 1, 11.

of the will. Hence, spontaneous recollection depends upon the mere revival of a particular impression, which must conform to the order in which the object was perceived in the past. It cannot alter the order of the past experience. It cannot be made or unmade by the will of a person.¹³⁶ But imagination is unrestrained; it cognizes real or unreal attributes of perceived or unperceived objects. It is found in revery, phantasy, or day-dream.¹³⁷ A person is free in imagination, and not tied to the order of the past experience. It does not depend upon any other conditions than the mind and free volition.¹³⁸ Building castles in the air (*manorājya*) cannot be restrained by the command of a king or by the scriptures.¹³⁹ Free imagination is not subject to any conditions. In it the contents of past experiences are rearranged in any order which is pleasing to the agent. There is no hindrance to the imagination of unreal objects, which depends upon his free will.¹⁴⁰ Day-dreams, reveries, or phantasies are false and do not conform to the environment.¹⁴¹ They are creations of the normal mind, whereas hallucinations are creations of the diseased or abnormal mind.

10. The Nature of Vikalpa

Patañjali defines *vikalpa* as a mental mode which cognizes a cognition conforming to a word and devoid of an object.¹⁴² When we speak of a sky flower, we have a cognition conforming to the word, though there is no real object corresponding to it. A word produces a cognition, even though its object is non-existent. In a valid cognition there are three factors: (1) an object; (2) a word; and (3) a cognition. But in *vikalpa* there are two factors: (1) a word; and (2) a cognition. It is not valid knowledge,¹⁴³ because its object is non-existent, and because it ascribes difference to non-

¹³⁶ Kartum akartum anyathā vā kartum aśakyā yathānubhūtaṁ vastva-vilaṅghayanti tatsaṁskārod bodhamātrādhīnā smṛtiḥ. VPS., p. 253.

¹³⁷ Dhyānam tvānubhūte' nanubhūte vā vastuni vidyamānānām avidyamānānām vā dharmānām niraṅkuṣaṁ kalpanaṁ yal loka manorājyaṁ itī prasiddham. VPS., p. 253.

¹³⁸ Svecchā-monobhyāṁ vinā sādhanantarānapekṣaṇāt. VPS., p. 253.

¹³⁹ Na hi manorājyaṁ rājādīnā śāstreṇa vā nivārayitum śakyate. VPS., p. 253.

¹⁴⁰ Avastu-viśaye dhyāne puruṣasya svacchanda-pravṛtttau kaḥ prati-bandhaḥ. VPS., p. 255.

¹⁴¹ Manorājya-vikalpānām kāmam astvapramāṇatā. NM., p. 97.

¹⁴² Śabda-jñānānupātī vastuśūnyo vikalpaḥ. YS., i, 1, 9.

¹⁴³ Sa na pramāṇopārohi. YBh., i, 1, 9.

difference and non-difference to difference. Difference and non-difference are not real. Vikalpa is a mere semblance of them.¹⁴⁴

Vikalpa resembles an illusion in that in both there is the knowledge of an object as it is not. But there is a difference between them. When an illusion is contradicted by a sublating cognition, it ceases to produce an action. Ordinary persons have such sublating cognitions. But they have no sublating cognitions which contradict vikalpa. Only learned persons have such sublating cognitions. Hence, vikalpa does not cease to produce actions, though it is produced by a mere word.¹⁴⁵

The imagination of 'the head of Rāhu' attributes difference to non-different things. 'Rāhu', an imaginary demon, is nothing but a 'head'. There is no difference between them. The imagination of a 'distracted mind' attributes non-difference to different entities. 'Distraction' is a state of the 'mind'. They are different from each other. But they are stated to be non-different from each other. We speak of 'the consciousness of a self'. Here we attribute difference to non-different entities, because 'consciousness' is the essential nature of a 'self', which is nothing but consciousness.¹⁴⁶ We speak of 'a self as devoid of the attributes of objects' and of an 'inactive self' though the Yoga identifies negation or absence (*abhāva*) with its locus. So these are examples of *vikalpa*.¹⁴⁷ The cognitions of 'sky flower', 'horn of a hair' and the like also are vikalpas, since these objects are non-existent, and yet there are cognitions of them.¹⁴⁸

Vikalpa is the cognition of a non-existent object which is spoken of by a word. It serves a useful purpose. Many do not recognize it as distinct from an illusion (*viparyaya*). Bhojarāja regards it as definite knowledge, which does not depend on the real nature of its object.¹⁴⁹ But it is different from an illusion which is contradicted by a sublating cognition. The illusion 'this is silver' is contradicted by the sublating cognition 'this is not silver'. But the *vikalpa* 'consciousness of a self' does not vanish, because it is not generally sublated. Hence an illusion should be

¹⁴⁴ TV., i, 1, 9; YV., i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁵ Na viparyayopārohī, vastuśūnyatve'pi śabda-jñāna-māhātmya-nibandhano vyavahāro dr̥ṣyate. YBh., i, 1, 9. TV.,; Chāyā, i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁶ RM., i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁷ YV., i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁸ Chāyā, i, 1, 9.

¹⁴⁹ Vastunas tathātvam anapekṣamāṇo'-dhyavasāyo vikalpaḥ. RM., i, 1, 9.

defined as the knowledge of an object as different from what it is, which does not conform to words and cognitions. The Vaiśeṣikas regard *vikalpa* as a particular kind of attributed cognition (*āhārya-jñāna*), and include it in invalid cognition (*mithyā jñāna*). But the Yoga regards it as a distinct cognition, which is either indeterminate or determinate.¹⁵⁰ The Sāṃkhya regards *vikalpa* (e.g. a man's horn) as invalid because it cognizes a non-existent object which is incapable of producing a valid cognition and an effective action.¹⁵¹

11. *Presumption (arthāpatti): Tarka: Āropa: Hallucination*

Presumption is the assumption of a fact which reconciles an apparent inconsistency between two facts. A person is not found to eat in the day, and yet he is fat. Fasting and fatness of the body cannot be reconciled with each other, unless his eating at night is assumed. This is the framing of a hypothesis which involves intellectual imagination.¹⁵² If one hypothesis is adequate to explain the apparent inconsistency, it is irrational to make more assumptions.¹⁵³ This is the parsimony of hypotheses (*kalpanā-lāghava*). But the law of parsimony does not hold good, if the existence of many entities is established by valid knowledge.¹⁵⁴ The existence of many sense-organs is proved by valid knowledge. So the existence of one sense-organ cannot be assumed for the sake of the parsimony of hypotheses. Presumption illustrates intellectual imagination which is conducive to intellectual advancement.

Tarka is hypothetical reasoning. It is the attribution of a generic quality on the attribution of a specific quality.¹⁵⁵ It is false knowledge because it involves attribution of what is not known to exist. Smoke is pervaded by fire which is its pervader. Wherever there is smoke there is fire. But wherever there is fire, there is not smoke. If a lake is supposed to have smoke, then it may be supposed to have fire. This kind of supposition is called *tarka*, which involves imagination. Fire is known to be non-existent

¹⁵⁰ YV., Chāyā; Sūtrārthabodhinī. i, 1, 9.

¹⁵¹ SSV., v, 52.

¹⁵² Upapādyā-jñānena upapādaka-kalpanam arthāpattiḥ. VP., p. 307.

¹⁵³ Ekatvenaivopapattau bahutva-kalpanā gurvī. SSV., ii, 24.

¹⁵⁴ Na kalpanā-virodhaḥ pramāṇa-dr̥ṣṭasya. SPS., ii, 25.

¹⁵⁵ Vyāpyāropeṇa vyāpakāropas tarkaḥ. TS., p. 89.

in a lake full of water. So smoke also cannot exist in it. Thus *tarka* removes doubt, and involves intellectual imagination.

Tarka consists in attribution (*āropa*) which is a kind of *āhāryajñāna*. 'If there were a jar on the ground, it would be perceived as qualified by the jar'. 'If a lake be smoky, let it be fiery'. Such kinds of knowledge are examples of attribution (*āropa*). *Āhāryajñāna* is the false knowledge of an object existing in a place where it is known to be non-existent. Fire is known to be non-existent in a lake, and yet it may be attributed to it. This is an example of *āhāryajñāna*. Attribution involves intellectual imagination.

Hallucinations (*mānasa vibhrama*) which are solely of mental origin and due to some defects of the mind (*manodoṣa*) involve imagination. In them the impressions of past perceptions are revived by constant brooding (*cintā*) or by strong passions of lust, grief, etc., and rearranged into a pattern which gives satisfaction to the agent. They involve strong phantastic imagination which does not conform to the environment. Yet hallucinatory images are so vivid and aggressive that they appear to be real objects of perception present to the sense-organs. Hallucinations produced by the repetition of impressions through the central sensory (*manas*) appear to be very distinct. Persons overpowered by lust, grief, disease, insanity and the like perceive non-existent objects as present before them.¹⁵⁶ A young man infatuated with intense lust for a woman and separated from her sees his beloved woman here, though she is far away.¹⁵⁷ Hallucinatory images do not appear to be absolutely non-existent like the image of a hare's horn. They obtrude themselves upon consciousness as something real and positive, though they are false.¹⁵⁸

¹⁵⁶ NM., p. 105.

¹⁵⁷ *Mānasī manmathonmāda-mahimnā mānini-matiḥ*. NM., p. 545. NK., p. 179.

¹⁵⁸ NM., pp. 89, 185 and 545; NK., p. 178; see *Ante*, Ch. XIV. *Nira-dhishthāne vibhrame manodoṣamātrānubandhini nārthasya sambhavah*. NK., p. 179.

CHAPTER XXI

THOUGHT AND LANGUAGE

1. *The Nature of Concepts: The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika View*

The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika recognizes the existence of a genus (*jāti*) or a community (*sāmānya*) in the proper individuals. The genus of cow (*gotva*) exists in individual cows. A community is known by assimilative knowledge, while individuals are known by discriminative knowledge.¹ The distinctive characters of many individuals are cognized by discriminative knowledge (*vyāvṛtta-buddhi*), while their common characters are cognized by assimilative knowledge (*anuvṛtta-buddhi*). According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, community as well as individuality is perceived; both assimilative knowledge and discriminative knowledge are perceptual knowledge. But, in fact, its assimilative knowledge corresponds to a concept in western psychology, while its discriminative knowledge corresponds to a percept. Commonness is wider in extent than distinctiveness. Distinctiveness is narrower in extent than commonness.²

The summum genus (*parā jāti*) is Beinghood (*sattā*). It is the highest genus which is of the widest extent. The genus of substance (*dravyatva*), the genus of quality (*gunatva*) and the genus of motion (*karmatva*) are subordinate genera (*aparā jāti*). But the genus of substance is higher than the genus of a jar; the genus of quality is higher than the genus of colour; the genus of motion is higher than the genus of upward motion. So the former are higher than the latter, which are the lowest genera (*aparā jāti*).³

Corresponding to them there is a hierarchy of concepts. The lowest concepts are formed by assimilating the individuals. Higher concepts are formed by assimilating the lower concepts. The highest concept is formed by assimilating the higher concepts. Assimilation depends upon abstraction.⁴

¹ *Anuvṛtta-buddhiḥ sāmānyasya, vyāvṛtta-buddhir viśeṣasya*. VSU., i, 2, 3.

² *Anuvṛttatvam adhika-deśa-vṛttitvam, vyāvṛttatvam alpa-deśa-vṛttitvam*. VSV., i, 2, 3. SM., p. 75.

³ PBh., pp. 311-2; SM., pp. 75-8.

⁴ VSV., i, 2, 3; PBh., pp. 311-2.

A community exists in all its proper individuals ; it is identical with itself ; it is the cause of the assimilative knowledge of its being common to one, two, many individuals ; it is the cause of the common notion or concept of what is identical with itself in many individuals.⁵ The highest genus is the cause of the highest concept or the most general idea.⁶ A subordinate genus is the cause of assimilative and discriminative knowledge.⁷

Different individuals have distinctive characters, and are distinguished from one another by them. They could not be assimilated to one another and recognized as members of a class, if they had no community in them. Common character produces the common notion or concept.⁸ If there were no common character among the individuals of a class, there would be no knowledge of their generic identity.⁹ Ideas are of two kinds, particular and general. Particular ideas are formed by discriminative knowledge, while general ideas are formed by assimilative knowledge. General ideas are called concepts. They are formed by the perception of many individuals belonging to the same class, comparison of them with one another, elimination of their distinctive characters, and abstraction of their common characters. They depend upon the past knowledge of the individuals, and the impressions due to their repeated perceptions.¹⁰ They are formed by assimilation of many homogeneous individuals. Concepts are expressed in words.

Gautama says, "A genus is the cause of a common notion or concept".¹¹ Vātsyāyana asserts that the same genus, which exists in many individuals and holds them together under the same class, is the cause of an inclusive idea or concept (*anuvṛtti-pratyaya*).¹² Uddyotakara also gives the same proof of the reality of a genus. It is the cause of the production of a concept of many individuals.¹³ We have an assimilative knowledge (*anuvṛtti-*

⁵ Sāmānyam anuvṛtti-pratyaya-kāraṇam. PBh., p. 311. NP., p. 22.

⁶ Sattāsāmānyam param anuvṛtti-pratyaya-kāraṇam. Ibid., p. 311.

⁷ Ibid., p. 312.

⁸ Nānādharmīnyeka-prakāra-pramā-prakāribhūto yo dharmāḥ so sāmānyam. Sūkti, p. 52.

⁹ Na hi bhinnāsu vyaktiṣvekākāraṇaṁ matir anugata-dharmam apuraskṛtya. Setu, p. 53. Vyomavati, p. 55.

¹⁰ Abhyāsa-pratyaya-janītāt saṁskārāt atīta-jñāna-prabandha-pratyavekṣaṇād yad anugatam asti tat sāmānyam. PBh., p. 311.

¹¹ Samānaprasavātmikā jātiḥ. NS., ii, 2, 71.

¹² NBh., ii, 2, 71.

¹³ Samāna-pratyayotpatti-kāraṇam jātiḥ. NV., ii, 2, 70.

pratyaya) where there are many like individuals ; it is produced by a genus which is different from them. The genus of cow is different from the individual cows, because it is the object of a different cognition or a concept (*sāmānyā-pratyaya*), and because the assimilative cognition is produced by the common cause (e.g. *gotva*) in the individual cows.¹⁴ There are two kinds of ideas, particular and general. Particular ideas are produced by individuals. General ideas or concepts are produced by individuals. General ideas or concepts are produced by generalities or genera. Common notions or concepts cannot be denied, which are produced by genera.¹⁵ They can never be produced by individuals ; nor are they imaginary as the Buddhists maintain.

2. The Buddhist View of the Nature of Concepts

Paṇḍitāśoka criticizes the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of a community being one, eternal, and present in all its individuals. No wise person should believe in such a community as exists in different momentary specific individuals perceived as the cause of a general idea or concept and a general name which represents them all, because there is no evidence to prove it or to disprove it. The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika realist argues that the existence of a community is proved by the inference: 'An assimilative cognition of something common to many different individuals is produced by an entity common to them all. There is the assimilative cognition of something common to many different individuals which are produced and devoid of any relation to one another. Therefore it is produced by a community'. The Buddhist urges that this inference cannot prove the reality of a community, since many different cooks produce the one common notion of 'cook' though there is no one common entity among them. Even if a community exists in the specific individuals, it cannot be manifested by them, because it is eternal and devoid of an additament (*atiśaya*) and consequently independent of auxiliary conditions which cannot render any aid to it. If it has an additament, it is always ubiquitous and therefore incapable of action. Even if it be the cause of action, the actions of the specific individuals e.g., cooks, being different from one another, cannot produce the same

¹⁴ NV., ii, 2, 70.

¹⁵ NV., ii, 2, 67.

common notion 'cook'. Even if different actions can produce a common notion of them, then the different individuals also can produce a common notion of them, though a community does not exist in them. Hence a real community is not the cause of a common notion of it.

The common notion of 'cook' cannot be said to be produced by the genus of the actions of 'cooking', because one genus cannot be the cause of another common notion or concept, since then any genus would produce any concept. The genus of cooking, it may be argued, being related to cooks through inherent inherence, produces the common notion of 'cook'. This argument is invalid. The actions of cooking are temporary and destroyed. When they are destroyed, the genus of cooking cannot exist in them and cooks who are their agents. No relation exists between the genus of cooking and cooks; so the former cannot produce the common notion of 'cook'. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inference for the existence of a community is not valid; it involves the fallacy of irregular middle (*anaikāntika*). The specific individuals, the Buddhist concludes, produce an illusory common notion or concept by the negation of contradictory individuals (*apoha*).¹⁶

The Buddhists do not deny the possibility of a common notion (*parāmarśa-pratyaya*) which represents many individuals. But they deny the reality of a community in the individuals, which is the cause of the common notion. Paṇḍitāśoka says: "Community is not perceived in the five fingers which are perceived by the sense-organs. Only the individual fingers in their distinct shapes are perceived, but their community is never perceived. The concept of the so-called one community is produced by the illusion of similarity among different individuals."¹⁷ Generality (*jāti*) is a mere conceptual construction (*kalpanā*). It is a mere mental construct, which appears to be similar, produced by specific individuals. An identical genus does not exist because it is never perceived.¹⁸ But how can only certain individuals produce the common notion of a certain generality, and not all? It is the Law of Nature that certain individuals only produce a certain

¹⁶ Sāmānyaduṣanadikprasāritā, SBNT., pp. 94-6.

¹⁷ Sāmānyam pratibhāsate na ca vikalpākāra-buddhau tathā. Sādrśya-bhrama-kāraṇau punar imāvekopabaddhi-dhvanī. Ibid., p. 102.

¹⁸ Apratīter abhinnaṇāpi jātir nāsti iti buddhir eva tulyākāra-pratibhāsa sad asaditī śabdaś ca dṛśyate. NPVP., p. 69.

notion of generality, even as certain drugs cure a certain disease, and not all diseases.

3. The Buddhist View of *Kalpanā* (*Vikalpa*) and *Abhilāpa*

Dharmakīrti defines *kalpanā* as the experience of a cognition of something which is capable of being associated with a significant word.¹⁹ Dharmottara defines *abhilāpa* as a word which denotes an object, or as a significant word. The form of the signified object is united with the form of the significant word in the same cognition, which apprehends them both. This union is association of an object with a name. An object is capable of being associated with a name, if in its cognition there is the cognition of its being so signified by the name. Some cognition is manifested to consciousness as associated with a word. In the cognition (*kalpanā*) of the object 'jar' in a person who is acquainted with the meaning of the word 'jar' it is manifested to consciousness as associated with the word 'jar'. Some cognition, though unassociated with a word, is manifested to consciousness as capable of being associated with it, like the cognition of an infant who is not acquainted with the meaning of a word. The cognition of an infant born to-day is not associated with a word, but capable of being associated with it.²⁰

When there is no association of a cognition with a word, how can its capability of being associated with it be determined? It is determined by its irregular experience, which is due to the absence of a uniform rule of experience. A knowable object producing a cognition produces its experience regularly. A colour producing a visual perception produces it regularly. A cognition of *vikalpa* is not produced by an object. So a *vikalpa* does not produce its cognition regularly owing to the absence of a cause of uniform experience.²¹

Dharmakīrti maintains, that determinate perception apprehends a specific individual (*svalakṣaṇa*), while inference cognizes a common character (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*), which is attributed to the specific individuals.²² Perception is devoid of

¹⁹ Abhilāpa-saṁsarga-pratibhāsa-pratītiḥ kalpanā. NB., p. 13.

²⁰ NBT., pp. 13-4. LV., on SDSm., p. 2.

²¹ Vikalpa-vijñānam arthān notpadyate. Tathā pratibhāsa-niyama-hetor abhāvād aniyata-pratibhāsam. NBT., p. 14.

²² NB., pp. 21 and 24. NBT., p. 24; NPV., p. 34.

conceptual constructs (*kalpanā*). Substance, quality, action, genus and name are *kalpanās*. 'This is a man with a staff'. 'This is white'. 'This man cooks'. 'This is a cow'. 'This is Dīṭṭha'. These perceptual judgments involve the conceptual constructs of substance, quality, action, genus, and name. They are determinate perceptions. Indeterminate perceptions apprehend the momentary specific individuals only, which are real and devoid of the illusory notions mentioned above.²³ The specific individuals are real, but the conceptual constructs are unreal. They are attributed to the individuals by the intellect (*buddhi*). The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika criticism of the Buddhist doctrine has been given already.²⁴

4. Qualified Cognition (*Viśiṣṭa-buddhi*): Judgment

When a substance, a quality, and an action are known as qualified by the genus of substance, the genus of quality, and the genus of action respectively, they produce qualified cognitions (*viśiṣṭa-buddhi*). A qualified cognition involves the knowledge of a qualified being (*viśeṣya*) and a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*). 'This is a substance'. 'This is a quality'. 'This is an action'. These sentences are expressions of judgments which are qualified cognitions. They involve a subject-predicate relation. 'This is possessed of a staff'. Here there is a cognition of 'this' qualified by a cognition of a 'staff' which is a substance. 'This is white'. Here there is a cognition of 'this' qualified by the cognition of 'white' which is a quality. 'This is moving'. Here there is a cognition of 'this' qualified by the cognition of 'motion' which is an action. There is no knowledge of a qualified being, which is not related to a qualification, and the qualification of which has not been cognized.²⁵

'A conch-shell is white'. The quality of whiteness, the knowledge of whiteness as a qualification of a conch-shell, and the inherence of whiteness in a conch-shell are the causes of the qualified cognition.²⁶ The knowledge of a substance, i.e., a conch-

²³ NPV., p. 35.

²⁴ See *Ante*, Ch., X.

²⁵ Nāgrhīta-viśeṣaṇā viśiṣṭa-pratītiḥ na vā viśeṣaṇa-sambandham antareṇa bhavati. VSU., viii, 1, 7.

²⁶ VSU., viii, 1, 8. SM., p. 85; TSN., p. 19; KR., p. 91.

shell, in which whiteness inheres, and the knowledge of whiteness as its quality are the causes of the knowledge 'The conch-shell is white'. The knowledge of 'white' depends upon the knowledge of 'whiteness' as its cause; but it does not cognize 'whiteness'.²⁷ The knowledge of a substance as qualified by an attribute depends upon the knowledge of the attribute.

But the knowledge of 'this is a pitcher' occurring after the knowledge 'this is a post' is not its effect, because a 'post' is not a qualification of a 'pitcher'.²⁸ But where one substance is qualified by another, the knowledge of the substance which is a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) is the cause of the knowledge of the substance which is a qualified being (*viśeṣya*).²⁹ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards substance, quality, action, and genus as real existents, whereas the Buddhist regards them as mere conceptual constructs (*kalpanā*, *vikalpa*) attributed by the intellect to the specific individuals which are real.

Qualified cognitions involve judgments which are syntheses of two or more ideas into complex psychoses. They involve a subject-predicate relation, in which a substance is qualified by another substance, or a quality, or an action, but in which a quality is not qualified by a quality, or an action is not qualified by an action.³⁰ A qualified cognition is a knowledge that apprehends a subject, a predicate, and the relation subsisting between them. It is a relational knowledge as distinguished from a non-relational knowledge.

Some maintain that a qualified being (*viśeṣya*) and a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) are cognized by one and the same cognition.³¹ How can they account for the visual perception of fragrant sandal?³² Śrīdhara urges, that the visual organ cannot perceive fragrance; that the olfactory organ cannot perceive a substance, e.g. sandal; and that they together cannot perceive the relation between them in that the knowledge of relation presupposes that of the relata. The visual perception of fragrant sandal, it may be argued, is produced jointly by the visual organ and the olfactory organ, and apprehends both sandal and fragrance. This argument, Śrīdhara urges, is not sound, since the cognition is devoid of parts. If it were made of parts, one part of it might be

²⁷ VSB., viii, 1, 10.

²⁸ VSU., viii, 1, 10.

²⁹ VSB., viii, 1, 10.

³⁰ VS., VSU., viii, 1, 10.

³¹ Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣyayor ekajñānālambanatvam. NK., p. 116.

³² See *Ante*, ch., V.

produced by the visual organ, and the other part might be produced by the olfactory organ. But, in fact, the cognition is one and undivided, and cannot be produced by the two sense-organs. Further, if one cognition produced by the two sense-organs apprehended both sandal and fragrance, then odour would be apprehended by the visual organ, and a substance would be apprehended by the olfactory organ which, according to the Vaiśeṣika, apprehends smell only. Hence fragrance is perceived by the olfactory organ first, and then the visual organ aided by the olfactory perception of fragrance produces the visual perception of sandal only.³³ If a substance only were apprehended, it may be argued, by the cognition of a qualified being (*viśeṣyajñāna*), then even in the absence of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*), there would be a qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*). But this is not possible. It may be argued, that the cognition of a qualified being (*viśeṣyajñāna*) is not produced in the absence of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*), because it is the cause of the qualified cognition. Still the qualified cognition (*viśiṣṭajñāna*) does not differ from the cognition of substance, because a cognition cannot have a specific character unless its object has a specific character. The cognition of a qualified being does not apprehend a substance only, but it apprehends a qualified substance,—qualifiedness being something over and above the mere nature of a substance. The cognition of a person bearing a staff is not that of a person only, or that of his conjunction with a staff only, but that of a person being qualified by a staff.³⁴ The qualification, e.g. a staff distinguishes the person from other persons.

A qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) is different from a distinguishing feature (*upalakṣaṇa*). Both distinguish an object from other objects. But the former produces the knowledge of its being subordinate to the object that it qualifies, whereas the latter does not produce the knowledge of its being subordinate to the object that it distinguishes. In the cognition of a person bearing a staff the person is the principal factor to whom the staff is subordinate. But in the cognition of a saint wearing matted hair it is not subordinate to him.³⁵ Qualified cognitions involve judgments which are expressed in sentences.

³³ NK., p. 117.

³⁴ Na viśeṣyajñānasya dravyasvarūpamātram ālambanam brūmah kiñ tu viśiṣṭam viśiṣṭatā ca svarūpātirekiṇī eva. NK., p. 117.

³⁵ NK., p. 117.

5. Reasoning or Inference

Inference is the mental process of thinking by which the self passes to a new judgment from certain given judgments. It is inductive-deductive, and arrives at a new truth. It is preceded by perception, Vātsyāyana says, the perception of a probans or sign (*liṅga*) and that of a uniform relation between it and a probandum (*sādhya*). It is produced by the perception of a sign (e.g. smoke) and the recollection of invariable concomitance between the sign and the probandum (e.g. fire). An unperceived object is inferred by this process.³⁶ Inference differs from perception in that the former apprehends present, past, remote and future objects whereas the latter apprehends present objects only.³⁷

The Nyāya recognizes two kinds of inference: (1) inference for oneself and (2) inference for others. The former is a psychological process while the latter is a logical process. The former involves the following mental processes: A person himself perceives an invariable concomitance between smoke and fire by repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*), for instance, in a kitchen and other places, approaches a hill, doubts whether there is a fire on it, perceives a smoke on it, recollects the invariable concomitance that wherever there is smoke there is fire, knows that the hill has a smoke that is pervaded by a fire, and then knows that the hill has a fire. This knowledge is inferential.³⁸ This is an example of an inference for oneself. It is inductive-deductive. It involves the process of generalization from particular instances observed and application of the general principle to a fresh particular instance. The invariable concomitance is the result of repeated observation of the copresence of a probans and a probandum and the absence of the knowledge of contrary instances. Wherever a smoke is perceived a fire is perceived, and wherever a fire is found to be absent a smoke also is found to be absent. But how can a uniform relation between smoke and fire be known in the absence of the knowledge of all cases of smoke and all cases of fire? Gaṅgeśa, the founder of Navya Nyāya, recognizes an extraordinary intercourse (*alaukika sannikarṣa*) called the intercourse characterized by generality (*sāmānyalakṣaṇā pratyāsatti*) which enables a person to perceive all cases of smoke through the

³⁶ Smṛtyā liṅgadarśanena ca apratyakṣo' rtho' numiyate. NBh., i, 1, 5.

³⁷ Ibid, i, 1, 5.

³⁸ TS., p. 50.

genus of smoke, and all cases of fire through the genus of fire.³⁹

The knowledge of invariable concomitance between a probans and a probandum, according to Navya Nyāya, is the principal cause (*karāṇa*) of inferential knowledge; and the knowledge of the probans being pervaded by the probandum and existing in the subject of inference (*pakṣa*) is the causal operation (*vyāpāra*) which immediately produces inferential knowledge. It depends upon the perception of a probans in the subject of inference (e.g. 'the hill has smoke'), the recollection of a uniform relation between them (*vyāpti-smaraṇa*) (e.g. 'wherever there is smoke there is fire'), and the knowledge of the existence of the probans pervaded by the probandum in the subject of inference (e.g. 'the hill has smoke pervaded by fire'). The perception of smoke in a kitchen is the first consideration of sign or reason (*liṅga-parāmarśa*). The perception of smoke on a hill is the second consideration of reason. The perception of smoke pervaded by fire on a hill is the third consideration of sign or reason.⁴⁰ It depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire.

But Dharmarājadhvarīndra, an Advaita Vedāntin, defines inferential knowledge as the knowledge which is produced by the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the knowledge of invariable concomitance.⁴¹ The knowledge of invariable concomitance is the principal cause (*karāṇa*) of inferential knowledge; the impression (*saṃskāra*) of this knowledge is the causal operation (*vyāpāra*) which immediately produces it. The third consideration of sign or reason (*tṛtīya-liṅga-parāmarśa*) is not the principal cause of inferential knowledge as the Navya Nyāya maintains. It is not even its cause, far less its principal cause.

The self's mental perception (*anuvyavasāya*) of the knowledge of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the cause of its *anuvyavasāya* as its object. The recollection of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since it cognizes an object similar to that of the knowledge of invariable concomitance. Verbal knowledge of invariable concomitance is not the cause of inferential knowledge, since it produces the

³⁹ TS., p. 50; TSD., pp. 50-1; SM., pp. 86-8; see *ante*, ch. iv. HIP., i, pp. 724-7.

⁴⁰ TK., p. 10.

⁴¹ Anumitis tu vyāptijñānatvena vyāptijñānanyā VP., p. 186.

knowledge of an object denoted by the word *vyāptijñāna*. But the knowledge of invariable concomitance as the knowledge of invariable concomitance is the principal cause of inferential knowledge. It is immediately produced by the impression (*saṃskāra*) of the knowledge of invariable concomitance as such. But it is not recollection for that reason because a recollection is produced by its prior non-existence or an impression only. A recollection is produced by the destruction of an impression. But the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery' is produced by the revival of the impression of the knowledge 'smoke is pervaded by fire'.

But why should the impression of the knowledge of invariable concomitance be a cause of inferential knowledge, since the recollection of invariable concomitance is its cause? Dharmarājadhvarīndra replies, that even when there is the recollection of invariable concomitance the impression of its knowledge also is its cause because a recollection does not always destroy an impression in that there is a series of recollections. When the impression is not revived, there can be no inferential knowledge. The revival of the impression of the knowledge of invariable concomitance is an auxiliary cause of inferential knowledge. First there is the perception 'the hill is smoky', then there is the revival of the impression of the perception of invariable concomitance between smoke and fire; then there is the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery'. There is neither the recollection of invariable concomitance nor the qualified knowledge 'the hill has smoke pervaded by fire', since there is no evidence for its existence and it violates the parsimony of hypotheses. Thus the Advaita Vedānta rejects the Navya Nyāya doctrine that the recollection of invariable concomitance and the qualified knowledge of the existence of a probans pervaded by a probandum in the subject of inference are the causes of inferential knowledge. In the knowledge 'the hill is fiery' the knowledge of the hill is perceptual, but the knowledge of fieriness is inferential.⁴²

According to Prabhākara, the perception 'the hill is smoky' and the recollection of invariable concomitance 'smoke is pervaded by fire' are the causes of the inferential knowledge 'the hill is fiery'. The knowledge of the existence of smoke pervaded by fire in the hill, which is said to be the principal cause of inferential knowledge by the Navya Nyāya, is not necessary for the

⁴² VP., pp. 186-98; Śikhāmaṇi, pp. 186-98.

inferential knowledge. The two cognitions are adequate to produce it, and the hypothesis of the third consideration of sign or reason or qualified consideration (*viśiṣṭaparāmarśa*) violates the law of parsimony. Gaṅgeśa criticizes Prabhākara's view.⁴³

The Advaita Vedānta defines invariable concomitance as the copresence of a probans and a probandum in all their loci. It is known by the observation of their copresence and the non-observation of contrary instances. The observation of copresence may be single or numerous. The number does not count much. The observation of copresence is the main condition, but the non-observation of contrary instances is essential.⁴⁴ Prabhākara regards repeated observation (*bhūyodarśana*) as the means of knowing invariable concomitance. Gaṅgeśa criticizes this view. He regards the observation of concomitance and the absence of knowledge of non-concomitance aided by hypothetical reasoning as the means of knowing invariable concomitance.⁴⁵

6. The Nature and Import of a Word: The Means of Learning its Meaning

Keśavamīśra defines a word as a collection of letters. By a collection here is meant that all letters are cognized by a single cognition.⁴⁶ Pārthasārathi Mīśra also regards a word as nothing but letters.⁴⁷ Prabhācandra defines a word as a collection of letters, which are dependent on one another, but independent of the letters of another word.⁴⁸ But the Yoga and the Śābdika define it as a single, indivisible, partless, and eternal word-form (*padasphoṭa*) which is cognized by a thought-form, and manifested by successive and momentary letter-sounds.⁴⁹

A word, according to some Buddhists, denotes the negation of contradictory individuals (*apoha*). It denotes, according to Ratnakīrti, a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. According to the Jaina, it denotes a multiform (*anekānta*) object with its positive and negative nature, and general and particular characteristics. According to some, it

⁴³ TCA., p. 493. HIP., i, pp. 731-2.

⁴⁴ VP., pp. 198-201.

⁴⁵ TCA., pp. 210-1; HIP., i, pp. 711-3.

⁴⁶ TBh., p. 14.

⁴⁷ Varnā eva śabdāḥ. SD., p. 368.

⁴⁸ PKM., p. 133.

⁴⁹ YBh., iii, 17; TV.; YV., iii, 17; VPD., i, 73.

denotes a configuration (*ākṛti*). According to Mīmāṃsā and Advaita Vedānta, it denotes a genus. According to the Nyāya, it denotes an individual with a configuration and a genus subsisting in it. According to the Śābdika, a word-form manifests its object. According to the Nyāya, the Mīmāṃsā, the Vedānta and the Jaina, the last letter aided by the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of the perceptions of the preceding letters produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. These views will be considered in detail here.

A word has the power of denoting an object. This power is due to the convention (*saṁketa*) of God that a particular word denotes a particular kind of object.⁵⁰ A convention (*saṁaya*) is a volition of God. A child learns the meanings of words from the actions of the elders. He hears an elder commanding person (*uttama vṛddha*) say 'Bring a cow' to another elder person (*madhyama vṛddha*). Then he sees the latter bring a cow. Then he hears the former say, 'Remove the cow'. Then he sees the latter remove the cow. He learns that the latter's cognition which produces his action is produced by a cow. He learns that the word 'cow' means a cow in which the genus of cow subsists from the presence and the absence of a cow which is the object of bringing and removing. So the meanings of words are learnt from the speech and actions of the elders who are acquainted with them. They are also learnt from grammar, comparison, context, a dictionary, and testimony of reliable persons.^{50a}

7. The Buddhist doctrine of Apoha

The Buddhist maintains that a word denotes the negation of contradictories (*apoha*); that the word 'cow' denotes the negation of 'non-cow'. He regards *apoha* as neither internal nor external, but as different from a cognition and an object.⁵¹ But if it is neither an internal cognition nor an external object, it may be argued, then it does not exist at all, and cannot therefore be denoted by a word. The Buddhist replies, that the relation of a

⁵⁰ Asmāt padād ayam artho boddhavyaḥ śiśvarasamīketaḥ śaktiḥ. TS., p. 69.

^{50a} NM., p. 325; TSD., pp. 71-2.

⁵¹ Nāyam āntaro na bāhyo' pohaḥ kim tu jñānārthābhyām anya eva. NM., p. 306.

word and its object is unreal because *apoha* is neither an internal cognition nor an external object, but a mere attributed form which colours a determinate cognition.⁵² But how can an attributed form colour a determinate cognition, though there is no external object? The Buddhist replies that the attributed form as perceived (*dṛśya*) does not colour a determinate cognition. A specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception; but it cannot be apprehended by determinate cognitions (*vikalpa*). They apprehend the shadows of the specific individuals. They apprehend mere differentiation (*vyāvṛtti*) or negation as the negated objects are not perceived. It may be argued, that negation and negated objects are non-different from each other; that negated objects being specific individuals, determinate cognitions apprehending negations (*vyāvṛtti*) apprehend the specific individuals which are negated; and that therefore indeterminate perceptions and determinate cognitions equally apprehend specific individuals. But this argument is invalid, since determinate cognitions do not apprehend specific individuals which are differentiated or negated, and negation is not real but a mere attributed form. If negation were real, then determinate cognitions apprehending real specific individuals would be faulty. But the negation is not real; so there is no difficulty. The Buddhist concludes, that the determinate cognitions of 'cow' succeeding the indeterminate perceptions of individual cows apprehend the forms differentiated from those of heterogeneous individuals; or that they apprehend the negation of contradictories.⁵³ Words produce verbal cognitions (*vikalpa*) which cognize negations of contradictories (*apoha*). *Apoha* is an attributed form, which is not external as it is attributed, nor internal as it is not in the nature of consciousness.⁵⁴ So it is not real, and because it is unreal it is merely attributed. When it is wrongly regarded as real and in the nature of a negation (*abhāva*), many difficulties arise needlessly. The definite nature of the object of a verbal cognition in such a form as 'this is indeed a cow, and not a horse' is not possible without the negation of other objects. Hence a word denotes the negation of contradictories, and a verbal cognition cognizes the

⁵² Āropitaṁ kiṁ cid ākāramātraṁ vikalpoparañjakam. NM., p. 306.

⁵³ Atatkāryaparāvṛttivīśayatvam eva vikalpānām avatiṣṭhate ityevam yuktā teṣāṁ apohaviśayatvam ucyate. NM., p. 307.

⁵⁴ Soyam āropitākāro na bahir āropitatvād eva nāntaḥ abodha-rūpatvāt. NM., p. 307.

differentiation of an object from other objects. It does not apprehend an external object, but an attributed form. It is an internal form which is not external, but is manifested to consciousness as external. There is no other similarity between an external object and an attributed internal form than an appearance of differentiation (*vyāvṛtticchāyā*). Verbal cognitions apprehend differentiation or negation.⁵⁵ The Yogācāras regard *apoha* as an internal form of cognition, which is a reflection (*pratibimba*) of a determinate or verbal cognition (*vikalpa*), and, though internal, appears to be like an external object, and to differ owing to the difference of various impressions (*vāsanā*), and thus serves the practical purposes of our life. It is called *apoha* because it is related to the reflection of differentiation.⁵⁶ The Mādhyamikas regard *apoha* as an attributed form which is neither external nor internal because of its relation to an appearance of differentiation.⁵⁷ According to both, specific individuals are not cognized by determinate or verbal cognitions (*vikalpa*). The false identification of the object of indeterminate perception (*dṛśya*) and that of determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) induces a person to act. Hence a word denotes *apoha* which is a reflection or semblance of *vikalpa*. An illusion of generality is produced by the specific individuals perceived being not differentiated from one another.⁵⁸ Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives this account of the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* as denoted by a word.

Ratnakīrti (1000 A.D.), the Buddhist author of *Apohasiddhi*, maintains that a word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. What is the meaning of *apoha*? Etymologically it means either the exclusion of this individual (e.g. cow) from another contradictory individual (e.g. non-cow), or the exclusion of another contradictory individual from this individual, or the exclusion of another contradictory individual in this individual. Does *apoha* refer to an external object differentiated from heterogeneous objects, or to the internal form of a cognition, or to mere differentiation from other objects? The first two alternatives are false because a word denotes something positive. The third alternative also is false, since it is

⁵⁵ Vyāvṛttivīśayā eva vikalpāḥ phalato bhavanti. NM., pp. 307-8.

⁵⁶ Vyāvṛtticchāyāyogāt tad apoha iti vyavahriyate. NM., p. 308.

⁵⁷ Soyam nāntaro na bāhyo' nya eva kaś cid āropita ākāro vyāvṛtticchāyā-yogād apohaśabdārtha ucyate. NM., p. 308.

⁵⁸ NM., pp. 306-9.

contradicted by experience. The verbal knowledge of a fire existing on a hill derived from testimony does not refer merely to the non-existence of a non-fire, but to the positive existence of a fire. What is contradicted by perception cannot be proved by any other *pramāṇa*.

It may be argued, that though there is no common notion (*vikalpa*) in the form of the experience of negation (*nivṛtti*) or differentiation, yet the cognition of differentiating objects itself is the cognition of differentiation. But an experience of a qualified object (*viśiṣṭapratīti*) is not the experience of a qualification (*viśeṣanāpratīti*) involved in it. Just as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika regards a common notion (*vikalpabuddhi*) as the cognition of a community (*sāmānyabuddhi*) because of the distinct cognition of a common form of many individuals, so the cognition of differentiation or negation (*nivṛttibuddhi*) involved in the cognition of differentiating objects may be said to generate the empirical use of the experience of negation (*apohapratīti-vyavahāra*). If there is a regular cognition of a positive community because of a distinct cognition of a common form of many individuals, then there may be a regular experience of negation because of the absence of the cognition of the form of negation (*abhāva*). Hence, if there be a cognition of the form of negation in spite of the absence of the experience in the form 'I experience negation' then none can deny the existence of the experience of negation. Otherwise, if there were no experience of negation, there would not be the empirical use of such experience, and the cognition of the form of cow would give rise to the cognition of a horse.

It is said that the cognition of differentiation or negation is involved in the cognition of differentiating objects as a qualification. If a common notion of 'cow' (*vikalpa*) takes the form that it is differentiated from 'non-cows', then the cognition of differentiation may enter into it as its qualification. But the common notion is the experience of 'cow', which is positive in content. If the act of differentiation be present in the common notion as a qualification, but be not manifested to consciousness, then the regularity in the common notions representing positive contents cannot be accounted for. Ratnakīrti maintains, that the word *apoha* does not mean either a positive object only, or mere

differentiation from other objects, but a positive object qualified by differentiation from other objects.⁵⁹

According to Vidhivādins, the word 'cow' denotes a positive individual cow; and then its differentiation from 'non-cows' is determined. According to Pratiśedhavādins, the word 'cow' denotes the negation of 'non-cows'. Ratnakīrti rejects both these views because the verbal experience of the word 'cow' is devoid of sequence; because no one knows its positive import (e.g. cow) first, and then knows its differentiation from 'non-cows' by presumption; because no one knows the negation of 'non-cows' first, and then a positive individual 'cow' differentiated from them; and because the knowledge of 'a cow' is itself the knowledge of its being differentiated from 'non-cows'.⁶⁰ When on hearing the word 'cow' a 'cow' is known, it is known as qualified by the negation of 'non-cows'. Both a 'cow' and the negation of 'non-cows' are known at the same time when the word 'cow' is heard. If the verbal knowledge of a 'cow' does not cognize the negation of 'non-cows', it cannot induce a person to avoid other individuals. He may fasten a horse when he is asked to tie a cow. Hence a word denotes a positive object qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals.⁶¹ This is the view of Ratnakīrti.

Dharmottara (900 A.D.) maintains, that an object with an attributed externality is positively or negatively denoted by a word.⁶² His view is stated by Vācaspati thus: The form which is imagined by the intellect (*buddhi*) to differentiate a specific individual from others is not external to the mind. Yet if it were not external, then a determinate cognition of a person desirous of an external object would not induce him to act on it. Hence, an unreal external object is an object of a determinate cognition; its externality consists in the non-apprehension of the difference of external objects, but not in the apprehension of the non-difference of external objects.⁶³ If an external object were apprehended by a determinate cognition, its non-difference could not be apprehended by it. Hence determinate cognitions following

⁵⁹ Nāsmābhir apohaśabdena vidhir eva kevalo' bhīpretah. Nāpyanya-vyāvṛtti-mātraṁ, kintvanyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhiḥ śabdānām arthaḥ. Apoha-siddhi, SBNT., p. 3.

⁶⁰ Goḥ pratipattir iti anyāpohapratipattir ucyate. Ibid. p. 3.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 1-4.

⁶² Āropitasya bāhyatvasya vidhiniśedhau. Ibid. pp. 16-7.

⁶³ Alīkabāhyam eṣāṁ viśayah bāhya-bhedāgrahaś ca asya bāhyatvaṁ na punar bāhyābhedagrahaḥ. NVTT., ii, 2, 63; p. 339.

upon indeterminate perceptions do not apprehend the difference of external specific individuals—their externality being attributed to them by the imagination; and the unreal and attributed common forms of specific individuals induce a person to act on external objects as if they were real, and make him attain them. Determinate cognitions (*vikalpa*) cannot apprehend the mutual differences of their objects. Nor can other determinate cognitions apprehend them. So a person imagines non-difference among the objects of determinate cognitions, which produces non-difference among determinate cognitions. This non-difference produces non-difference among the indeterminate perceptions, which are the causes of the determinate cognitions. This non-difference is due to the non-difference among the specific individuals which are the causes of the indeterminate perceptions. So it is said: "Non-different cognitions are the causes of a common notion; so non-different specific individuals are the causes of a common notion." Hence an unreal external object is apprehended by a determinate or verbal cognition and denoted by a word.⁶⁴ It is in the nature of the negation of other heterogeneous individuals.

Ratnakīrti refutes the view of Dharmottara. If an object definitely known by a determinate cognition is not manifested to consciousness, why is it said to be definitely known by it? It may be replied, that an object is cognized by a determinate cognition without being manifested to consciousness in the same sense in which an object is acted upon without being manifested to consciousness. But how can a voluntary action be restricted to a particular object, and avoid other objects, though it is not manifested to consciousness? Though the world is not known, yet a determinate cognition of water, being produced by a particular collocation of causal conditions, has a definite form, is endowed with a definite power, and prompts a voluntary action on water only, even as a smoke produces the mediate or inferential knowledge of a fire. Different objects are invested with different natures, which are cognized by different *pramāṇas*. There is no intermixture of powers of the different *pramāṇas* with regard to the same objects. Hence, the object, which is cognized by a determinate cognition, and imprints its form on it,

⁶⁴ Tat siddham alikam bāhyam visayo vikalpānām śabdānām ceti. NVTT., p. 340.

is the cause of action on it. Voluntary action on an object is not due to the attribution of externality to it owing to similarity so that the attribution of an external form to the form of a cognition may produce a voluntary action on it. It is wrong to argue that a cognition, being produced owing to the maturation of an impression (*vāsanā*), functions as an external object, though it does not apprehend it. Hence, the positive import of a word is an object which is differentiated from other heterogeneous individuals, and qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. A word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals. It has a positive import and a negative import.⁶⁵ Every significant word denotes an object which is definitely known by a determinate cognition, and differentiated from contradictory individuals.⁶⁶ An external specific individual, which is cognized by a determinate cognition, is denoted by a word. It is the principal object of its denotation. The negation of the contradictory individuals is the subordinate object of its denotation.⁶⁷

The followers of Kumārila maintain, that an individual object cannot be a community (*sāmānya*) since it consists of parts; that a genus (e.g. treeness) is denoted by a word (e.g. tree), whose existence or non-existence in particular individuals is not yet ascertained; and that the genus is related to existence or non-existence in individuals known from other words 'exists' (*asti*) or 'does not exist' (*nāsti*). Ratnakīrti criticizes this view. When an eternal genus is denoted by a word and known by a verbal cognition, it cannot be said to be related to existence or non-existence in individuals not yet ascertained. Perception and verbal cognition manifest their objects in different ways; they are different means of valid knowledge and endowed with different powers. So perception does not depend upon the word (*asti*) in order to manifest the existence of its object; but verbal cognition depends upon the word (*asti*) to convey the knowledge of the existence of an object. If perception and verbal cognition

⁶⁵ Tad evam anyābhāvaviśiṣṭo vijātivāvr̥tto' rtho vidhih. Sa evāpoha-śabdavācyaḥ śabdānām arthaḥ pravṛtti-nivṛtti-visayaś ceti sthitam. Apoha-siddhi, SBNT., pp. 17-8.

⁶⁶ Yad vācakam tat sarvam adhyavasitātadrūpaparāvṛtta-vastumātragocaram. Ibid., p. 18.

⁶⁷ Śabdais tāvan mukhyam ākhyāyate' rtha Statrāpohas tadguṇatvena gamyaḥ.

apprehend the same nature of an object, then they cease to be different cognitions. Indeterminate perception and determinate cognition are different from each other, and consequently apprehend different objects. The former apprehends a specific individual, whereas the latter apprehends substance, qualities, actions, generality and name which are conceptual constructs. If a verbal cognition apprehends a specific individual apprehended by indeterminate perception, then it is like indeterminate perception. But, in fact, it is not like indeterminate perception, and therefore cannot apprehend a specific individual. The word 'tree', it may be argued, conveys the knowledge of the genus of tree, and that the word 'asti' is necessary to convey the knowledge of its 'being'. Ratnakīrti urges, that this argument is wrong for the following reasons. A specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception as devoid of parts; so its genus cannot be known by the verbal cognition of a word, and its positive nature and negative nature cannot be known by another *pramāṇa*. Perception also may be said to depend upon another *pramāṇa* to strengthen it. Ratnakīrti replies, that the perception of an object which was never perceived before requires the support of another *pramāṇa* because it is uncertain knowledge. But determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) itself is certain knowledge, and apprehends its object definitely, and therefore does not require the support of any other *pramāṇa*. Sometimes it depends upon verbal cognition and inference. But they cannot cognize the nature of its object. It may be argued, that genus and other qualities are different from one another and from the specific individual in which they subsist; that when a tree is known through its one attribute of genus, it is not known as endued with another attribute; and that therefore its other attributes, blueness, motion, tallness, etc. are known by the verbal cognitions of the corresponding words. Ratnakīrti urges, that an entire specific individual is apprehended by indeterminate perception; that the difference between the substrate and its attributes in the perceived object is not apprehended by indeterminate perception; and that the difference between them is imaginary. He further urges that the so-called inherence of attributes in their substrate is riddled with contradictions. So we must seek proximity between them, which renders an aid to them. Proximity (*pratyāsatti*) is close contact. Just as when a substrate is perceived with all its

attributes, being in close contact with the sense-organs, so when a substrate is known by a verbal cognition and an inference because of the invariable concomitance between a word and its object or a probans and a probandum being known, all its attributes are known because proximity is present here also as in perception. Hence a word does not denote a genus, but it denotes a specific individual as a positive entity qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals.⁶⁸

Vācaspati Mīśra argues, that when a being qualified by an accidental attribute is known, its being qualified by another attribute is not known. Ratnakīrti urges, that the intrinsic nature of an object is different from its accidental attributes (*upādhi*). Neither a substance nor the accidental qualities constitute the intrinsic nature (*svabhāva*). If an accidental attribute be non-different from a substance, it cannot be invested with another accidental attribute. If there is a difference between a substance (*dharmīn*) and its attribute (*dharma*), then only the knowledge of a favouring factor (*upakāraka*) will involve the knowledge of a favoured factor (*upakārya*). It is not proper to assume an invariable concomitance by nature between a substance and its attributes like the causal relation between a smoke and a fire. Moreover, a substance and its attributes also are not proved to exist. If they are so proved, they will constitute the intrinsic nature. Hence Vācaspati Mīśra's view is wrong.⁶⁹

Nyāyabhūṣaṇa criticizes the Buddhist view that the difference between a substance and an attribute is due to close proximity between them so that when a favouring factor is known, a favoured factor also is known. He points out that, on the Buddhist view, the knowledge of the sun, a favouring factor, would involve the knowledge of all objects illumined by it, the favoured factor, which is not a fact. Ratnakīrti urges, that Nyāyabhūṣaṇa's objection is based on a misconception of the Buddhist view; that when a substance is known, according to the Buddhist, its attributes, existing in the same place, which are aided by it are known; that therefore when the sun is known, other objects in different places, though favoured by it, may not be known. Therefore, when the nature of an object is perceived through one attribute only, Ratnakīrti concludes, it is perceived in its entirety; consequently its positive nature and negative nature need not be

⁶⁸ Ibid, pp. 9-10.

⁶⁹ Ibid, pp. 10-1.

known by another word. But it is known by a verbal cognition of another word. Hence a specific individual is not apprehended by determinate cognition, inference, or verbal cognition;⁷⁰ it is apprehended by indeterminate perception only.

Ratnakīrti further contends that generality (*sāmānya*) also is not apprehended by a verbal cognition. The word 'cow' denotes an animal with a dewlap, horns, a tail and the like which are perceived together because its differences from other cows are not yet known. But these peculiar limbs do not constitute the generality of cow. The genus of cow is devoid of any form. The aggregate of a dewlap, horns, a tail and the like, though different in different individuals, is made one by the specific individuals in which they exist. So it is called a generality, though it is not really so. An external object with these limbs only is never perceived. So the idea of such common limbs is illusory. Hence, let this idea be a mode of the intellect (*buddhi*) under the influence of an impression (*vāsanā*) of it, or, let this illusory idea manifest such a common form; or, let the specific individuals produce a common notion because of the differences among homogeneous individuals being not known; or, let the common notion be due to the obscuration of memory (*smṛtipramoṣa*). But in fact, the common notion or concept is absolutely objectless; there is no generality corresponding to it in specific individuals.⁷¹ It is wrong to argue, that if there were no generality in specific individuals, a concept would be produced without a cause, because the collocation of causal conditions, which produces non-different cognitions of some individuals, aided by the past perceptions and recollections of the previous similar individuals, produces an objectless concept. Therefore a genus is not apprehended by a verbal cognition. Nor is it apprehended by perception or inference. Because a genus is imperceptible its uniform concomitance with a sign (*liṅga*) cannot be perceived. So the existence of a genus cannot be inferred like that of the sense-organs. A common notion or concept, as an effect, does not prove the existence of a genus as its cause. It is produced by many specific individuals which produce non-different perceptions. According to the Buddhist, the individuals which are different from the so-called genus in their nature and independent of it are the causes

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 11.

⁷¹ Sarvathā nirviśayaḥ khalvayam sāmānyapratyayaḥ. Ibid, p. 12.

of a common notion or concept, even as according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika a genus which is one, independent of, and different from, another genus, is the cause of a concept.⁷²

Trilocana, the teacher of Vācaspati Miśra, maintains, that generality, which is the inherence of a genus in its substrates or individuals, is the cause of a concept and a common name. Ratnakīrti urges, that the individuals can produce a concept and a common name, and that the assumption of a generality or genus is unnecessary. He urges further, that inherence is not possible because it is known as 'a genus subsisting in an individual' which involves the knowledge of two entities that are never found in our experience. Hence Ratnakīrti concludes that a genus is a mere conceptual construct without any foundation in a object. The Mīmāṃsaka and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika argue, that a common notion must be produced by and accord with a common object, i.e. a genus which is common to different individuals; and that otherwise different individuals, which produce different cognitions, cannot produce a common notion. Ratnakīrti challenges the validity of this argument on the ground that a common notion and a general name are produced by the nature of the specific individuals differentiated from the heterogeneous individuals without the existence of any common object in the shape of a generality or a genus.⁷³ Hence the individuals in whose close contact with a sense-organ a genus is said to be known to pervade them are the cause of the verbal cognition of a name. A generality is not perceived even in dream. So if it is presumed to exist, it is better to presume a close contact with a sense-organ to be the cause of a general concept without the additional assumption of generality. The existence of generality may be said to be proved by the following inference. A determinate cognition of a qualified object (*viśeṣya*) is preceded by the cognition of a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*). 'This is a cow'. It is the cognition of a qualified object (*viśiṣṭabuddhi*). So it must be preceded by the cognition of the genus of cow which is the qualification of 'this' individual. Thus the reality of a genus is proved as a qualification of an individual perceived. Ratnakīrti urges, that the difference between a qualified object and its qualification is imaginary; and that

⁷² Ibid, pp. 11-3.

⁷³ Anuvṛttam antarenāpi abhidhāna-pratyānuvṛtter atadrūpaparāyṛtta-svarūpaviśeṣāt avāśyam svikārasya sādhitatvāt. Ibid, p. 14.

the use of the sentence 'this is a cow' is due to the apprehension of an individual cow differentiated from non-cows, which is not the cognition of a generality. Hence the inference for the existence of a genus is not valid.⁷⁴

Vācaspati Miśra maintains, that the individuals in which a genus subsists, are objects of verbal cognitions and denoted by words;⁷⁵ that the forms of an individual and a genus are differentiated from those of other heterogeneous individuals and their genera; and that therefore when a person hears the words 'tie a cow', he does not tie a horse. Rantakīrti, a younger contemporary of Vācaspati, criticizes his view. If the form of an individual is differentiated from those of other heterogeneous individuals, then a word may denote a positive individual with its negation of other heterogeneous individuals, and a common notion may cognize them, and the assumption of a genus subsisting in the individual is needless. If the form of an individual be said to be differentiated from other heterogeneous individuals on the strength of its genus or the series of its causes, then let it be so. But in both cases there is the knowledge of its differentiation from other heterogeneous individuals in the knowledge of an object. The doctrine that a word denotes a positive object 'cow' differentiated from 'non-cows' does not involve mutual dependence (*anyonyāśraya*). But Vācaspati's doctrine that a word denotes an individual possessed of a genus involves mutual dependence. If an individual cow is not known, the genus of cow cannot be known. If the genus of cow is not known, then its being denoted by the word 'cow' cannot be known. But the doctrine that a word denotes an individual which is perceived, on which a common form is imposed by a common notion (*vikalpa-buddhi*) which is a conceptual construct, does not involve mutual dependence. There is no common form in an individual in the shape of a genus; but it is an imaginary form superimposed by a concept on it.^{75a} It is in the nature of the negation of contradictory individuals. There is no contradiction between an individual differentiated from contradictory individuals and the differentiation from them, because they are not exclusive of each other, and because they coexist in

⁷⁴ Ibid, pp. 13-6.

⁷⁵ Jātimātyo vyaktayo vikalpānām śabdānām gocarāḥ. NVTT., ii, 2, 63, p. 341.

^{75a} Yaḥ sarva-vyakti-sādhārāṇa iva bahir adhyasto vikalpa-buddhyākārāḥ. SBNT., p. 5.

the same locus. Nor do they cease to be related as a qualified object (*viśeṣya*) and its qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*). A positive individual 'cow' is a qualified object, and the negation of 'non-cows' is a qualification. The former as qualified by the latter is denoted by the word 'cow'. There is contradiction between a jar and its absence, but not between the ground and the absence of a jar. Similarly, there is no contradiction between an individual cow and the negation of non-cows. They can coexist in the same locus. Thus a word denotes a positive individual qualified by the negation of contradictory individuals.⁷⁶ When a positive object is denoted by a word, it is known as qualified by the negation of contradictories.⁷⁷ Vācaspati argues, that a verbal cognition apprehends an individual in which a genus subsists. Ratnakīrti urges, that it cannot apprehend an external individual which is apprehended by indeterminate perception only. If an external individual were denoted by a word, then its cognition could not be in the form of an assertion or a negation. If it is always positive, then it is useless to speak of its existence and it is incapable of non-existence. If, on the other hand, it is always negative, then it is useless to speak of its non-existence and it is incapable of existence. But we speak of 'existence' and 'non-existence' in this connection. Hence a verbal cognition cannot apprehend a form common to the existence and non-existence of external objects; or, it cannot apprehend the generality of an external object. A genus which is said to be denoted by a word cannot be common to the existence and non-existence of external objects. The existence of a genus is said to consist in its being related to a present proper individual. Its non-existence is said to consist in its being related to past and future proper individuals. So its being common to existing and non-existing individuals is an irregular middle because the non-existing individuals are doubtful or accidental. Vācaspati lays stress on the genus which is denoted by a word, and so admits that an individual is not denoted by a word. But everywhere a word denotes the existence of its object through an individual. It conveys the knowledge of an individual as existing. It is absurd to argue that the existence of a genus consists in its being related to a present proper individual. If a genus cannot be denoted by a word, an individual with a genus

⁷⁶ Tasmād apohadharmaṇo vidhirūpasya śabdād avagatiḥ. Ibid, p. 6.

⁷⁷ Apohaśabdenānyāpohaviśiṣṭo vidhir ucyate. Ibid, p. 6.

subsisting in it also cannot be denoted by it. Hence Vācaspati's view is wrong.⁷⁸

8. *The Nyāya Criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of Apoha*

Uddyotakara states the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* thus: A word denotes the negation of contradictory individuals, which may be called a genus. The word 'genus' does not denote the reality of a genus.⁷⁹ Or, a word denotes the negation of the object denoted by other words.⁸⁰ Uddyotakara refutes this view. (1) If the positive import of a word is known, then only it can be denied of another object. Negation presupposes affirmation. The word 'cow' is said to denote a 'non-cow'. But until a 'cow' is known there is the absence of the knowledge of a 'cow' and a 'non-cow'. (2) In the so-called negation of the contradictory (*anyāpoha*) e.g. 'this is not a non-cow', does the word 'cow' mean a positive entity or a negative entity? If it means a positive entity, does it mean a 'cow' or a 'non-cow'? If it means a 'cow', there is no dispute. If it means a 'non-cow', then it shows a curious skill in manipulating the meanings of words! The word 'cow' does not mean a negative entity (*abhāva*), because absence cannot be the object of a command and the directed person's knowledge of its meaning. No one knows an absence on hearing a command. No one directs another person about an absence. (3) The doctrine of *apoha* does not apply to all words. The word 'all' cannot denote the negation of 'non-all', because 'non-all' does not exist, which may be denied by the word 'all'. (4) Further, does the negation 'this is not a non-cow' denote a 'cow' or a 'non-cow'? If the former, then a 'cow' cannot be absent from a 'non-cow'. If the latter, then the negation of 'non-cow' cannot produce the knowledge of 'cow'. (5) If a 'non-cow' is denied of a 'cow' in such a form as 'A non-cow is not a cow', then who asserts that 'a cow is a non-cow', which is denied of another? Or, how can a 'non-cow' be denied of a 'cow' without knowing that 'a cow is a cow'? The denial of a 'non-cow' of a 'cow' presupposes the affirmation of a 'cow' of a 'cow'. (6) Furthermore, is the negation of a 'non-cow' in a 'cow' distinct or non-distinct

⁷⁸ Ibid, pp. 4-6; 8-9.

⁷⁹ NV., ii, 2, 67.

⁸⁰ Anyasābdārthāpohaḥ śabdārthaḥ. NV., ii, 2, 67.

from it? If it is distinct from it, has it a substrate or not? If it subsists in a 'cow', then the word 'cow' is its quality, and there is no co-existence of 'cow' and 'negation of non-cow' in the same locus. If the negation of a 'non-cow' has no substrate, then it is meaningless. If it is non-distinct from a 'cow', then it is nothing but a 'cow'. Is the negation of a 'non-cow' one or many in regard to every cow? If it is one which is related to many cows, then it is nothing but the genus of cow. If it is many, then it is infinite in number like the individuals in which it exists, and cannot convey any general meaning. (7) Is the negation of contradictory individuals (*apoha*) capable of being denoted by a word (*vācya*) or incapable of being denoted by it? In the first alternative, a word denotes the negation of contradictory individuals, which denotes another negation, and so on to infinity, and thus leads to infinite regress. If exclusion (*apoha*) denotes the negation of non-exclusion (*anapoha*), then also it leads to infinite regress. In the second alternative, the negation of a 'non-cow' is not denoted by a word, and yet negates the imports of other words, and thus involves self-contradiction. (8) Moreover, the Buddhists who advocate the doctrine of *apoha* cannot account for the coexistence of a substance and its quality. The words 'blue lotus' mean, according to them, the negation of 'non-blue' and the negation of 'non-lotus' which do not coexist in the same locus. 'Non-blue' means 'white'; 'non-lotus' means a red *javā* flower; they do not coexist. But, according to the Naiyāyika, the words 'blue lotus' denote a positive substance in which the quality of 'blue' and the genus of 'lotus' subsist, but not the negation of 'non-blue' and the negation of 'non-lotus'. The assumption of the negation of contradictory individuals hinders the operation of the means of valid knowledge. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* is not right.⁸¹

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* in the following manner. (1) Jayanta asks whether the Buddhist advocates the doctrine of *apoha* because an external generality or genus does not exist or because there is no experience of it. The Buddhist admits that there is an experience of *apoha* which takes the place of what is called a genus. But a genus, Jayanta urges, is not non-existent because it is perceived, like a specific individual, by an uncontradicted and undoubted perception due to the

⁸¹ NV., ii, 2, 67. NVTT., p. 344.

intercourse of the sense-organs with it.⁸² (2) The perception of generality, like that of specific individuality, is unexceptionable. Therefore a generality is undeniable like a specific individuality. There is no need of assuming its existence because it is perceived. If it were inferred from its effect, then there might be a need for its assumption. (3) Jayanta asks whether the power of producing a common notion (*anuvrttijñāna*) is distinct or indistinct from the individuals, subsistent in them or independent of them, eternal or non-eternal, perceptible or inferable. He replies that it is distinct from them, independent of them, eternal and perceptible. It is a genus subsisting in the individuals, which produces a common notion or concept. (4) It is wrong to argue that certain individuals (e.g. cows) produce a certain common notion of a 'cow', even as the genus of 'cow' is said to exist in certain individuals (e.g. cows), because a peculiarity in a cognition cannot be produced without a peculiarity in an object.⁸³ If a peculiarity in an object is proved, the reality of a genus is undeniable. (5) It is wrong to argue that one common notion is produced by the accidental quality of producing one and the same effect, since the production of the same effect by the specific individuals is not proved.⁸⁴ The Buddhists argue that the determinate cognitions of the specific individuals are non-different from one another because they produce one common thought.⁸⁵ This argument is wrong because oneness of common thought cannot be produced by many indeterminate perceptions of individuals collectively, which produce many determinate cognitions that are apprehended as different from one another; and because they do not produce any other effect by virtue of which they may acquire oneness; further because the so-called oneness of the determinate cognitions is not apprehended by indeterminate perception which apprehends a specific individual only; and because it is not apprehended by another determinate cognition (*vikalpa*) in that all determinate cognitions are incapable of apprehending difference and non-difference inasmuch as they apprehend their own forms or unreal attributed forms. (6) There is the identity of the determinate cognitions, it may be argued, on account of the non-apprehension of the difference of the forms

⁸² NM., p. 309.

⁸³ Viśayātīśayavyatirekeṇa pratyayātīśayānupapatteḥ. NM., p. 314.

⁸⁴ NM., pp. 313-4.

⁸⁵ Ekapratyavamarśasya hetuvād dhīr abhedini. NM., p. 314.

apprehended by them, even as a determinate cognition following upon an indeterminate perception of an individual cow apprehends the form of 'cow' like another determinate cognition following upon another indeterminate perception of another individual cow, and the object of the determinate cognitions is said to be one because of its non-difference. Even if the determinate cognitions apprehend the forms, the difference of the objects is not manifested to consciousness. So a determinate cognition mixes up the different indeterminate perceptions, because it cannot apprehend the difference of the specific individuals which are apprehended by indeterminate perceptions. Jayanta refutes this argument. Determinate cognitions are momentary and therefore different from one another. The form which is apprehended by the determinate cognitions, the difference of which is not apprehended, is either distinct or non-distinct from them. If it is distinct from them, it is nothing but a generality. It cannot be said to be a distinctive character due to its unreality, since there is no evidence for its unreality. If the form is non-distinct from them, then determinate cognitions exist in their real nature, and cannot have identity. If they have identity, they cannot mix up different indeterminate perceptions of specific individuals. The determinate cognition of the same form cannot be produced without the admission of a generality. It cannot be produced by the identity of effects or the identity of determinate cognitions. Hence it is wrong to maintain that cognitions are non-different from one another because they produce the same common notion. All arguments advanced to prove that verbal cognitions and words have for their objects negations of contradictories (*apoha*) are false.⁸⁶ (7) According to the Nyāya an object continues to exist for some time and is endued with different qualities so that endued with some qualities it is apprehended by indeterminate perception, and endued with other qualities it is apprehended by determinate perception. It has different powers which it manifests with the aid of different auxiliary conditions. So the objects of indeterminate perception and determinate cognitions are not identical. Even if an object is apprehended entirely by an indeterminate perception, it may be apprehended anew by a determinate perception. If an unreal external object in the nature of the negation of contradictory individuals (*anyāpoha*) be said to be

⁸⁶ NM., pp. 314-5.

denoted by a word and apprehended by a verbal cognition, Kumārila's objections against it are unassailable. If in order to remove these objections a mere attributed form with the reflections of determinate cognitions tinged with the appearance of a negation be assumed, it is incapable of inducing a person to act on the object denoted by a word. A *vikalpa* is in the nature of a cognition and transparent by nature. It cannot be tainted unless it comes into contact with something else, either as an internal impression (*vāsanā*) or as an external object. That it is neither an internal impression nor an external object, but something which tinges a mere cognition is an illusory concept made by fraudulent persons. Objects colour their cognitions; but impressions produced by the cognitions of objects cannot colour them. Cognitions may be coloured by certain objects which may exist in some other place, but they can never be coloured by attributed forms which are absolutely non-existent. Further, absolutely non-existent forms cannot be attributed. The Buddhist argues, that determinate cognitions following upon indeterminate perceptions operating on their objects are unable to apprehend the individual objects differentiated from other objects, but apprehend mere differentiation (*vyāvṛttimātra*); that determinate cognitions apprehend differentiation or negation only because their objects are differentiated from other objects homogeneous with the perceived individuals (*dṛśya*) and from heterogeneous objects (*vikalpa*). If the objects of determinate cognitions are related to both perceived individuals and *vikalpas*, then they simply apprehend what has already been apprehended, and become useless. Determinate cognitions are indeed useless as means of valid knowledge; or they apprehend other objects. But that they partly apprehend differentiation and partly do not cannot be believed. The negation of homogeneous individuals and the negation of heterogeneous entities are not different in their nature, so that a determinate cognition may apprehend the one and not the other. If a determinate cognition apprehended an object differentiated from other individuals which are homogeneous with the perceived individual, and from other heterogeneous entities (*vikalpa*), then it would apprehend a specific individual like an indeterminate perception, and there would be no inference and verbal cognition owing to the absence of any knowledge of the relations due to the reality of generalities (*sāmānya*). (8) If the negation or

differentiation be external, then Kumārila's objections stand. If it be internal, then it cannot be related to and colour a determinate cognition (*vikalpa*). That it is neither external nor internal is a fiction of the imagination. If it is a non-entity, then it cannot be related to and colour a determinate cognition, since an absolutely non-existent entity, like the horns of a hair, is not an object of speech and action. If it is an entity, it must be either external or internal. Hence the hypothesis of an attributed form, which is neither external nor internal, is irrational and unwarranted. (9) The cognition produced by the word 'cow' when it is heard apprehends the mere generality of cow unrelated to the words 'existence' and 'non-existence'. But it may be related to existence or non-existence denoted by the corresponding words in order to satisfy the desire to know more about the object. If the real nature of an object is not definitely known, then its distinction from other objects is investigated. 'A jar is really a jar, and not a cloth.' But from this it does not follow that a verbal cognition apprehends the negation of the contradictories (*apoha*). (10) The Buddhist maintains, that a person acts on an external object because he identifies the object of an indeterminate perception (*dṛśya*) with that of a determinate cognition (*vikalpa*). Jayanta urges, that if the identification is the absence of the knowledge of distinct cognitions, then, being akin to swoon and the like, it cannot give rise to action; that if it is an object of action, then it is perceived (*dṛśya*), and the assumption of the negation of contradictories (*apoha*) is unnecessary; that if it is an unreal imaginary object of a determinate cognition which is manifested to consciousness in its own form, then no conscious person can act upon it; that if it is apprehended as a perceptible object (*dṛśya*), then it gives rise to a contrary cognition, which is not non-distinction of cognition (*aviveka*); and that this contrary cognition is not false, because it is not contradicted like the illusory cognition of water in the rays of the sun in a desert. Jayanta further urges that an object cannot be said to be attained as an ultimate consequence of the indeterminate perception of a momentary specific individual, even as a gem is said to be attained as an ultimate consequence of the indeterminate perception of its ray. He concludes, that a determinate perception which apprehends a qualified external object is valid; and that when an individual (*vyakti*) endowed with a configuration (*ākṛti*)

and possessed of a genus (*jāti*) is apprehended by a verbal cognition when a word is heard, a person acts upon it. Hence the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha* is not tenable.⁸⁷

9. The *Mīmāṃsaka* Criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of *Apoha*

Kumārila offers the following criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of *apoha*. (1) If exclusion (*apoha*) is absence (*abhāva*), then it is not known independently, like a jar, and subsists in another substrate. What is its substrate? The specific individual is not its substrate, because it is not an object of determinate cognition. Nor is the aggregate of all specific individuals the substrate of the negation of non-cows, because it is not possible. The specific individuals are infinite in number in different times and places, and can never be observed in thousands of years. Therefore the aggregate also does not subsist in them. Hence something unique existing entirely in all specific individuals is the substrate of the negation of non-cows. That is nothing but the genus of cow; if its reality is admitted, then the assumption of the negation of non-cows is needless. (2) The doctrine of *apoha* leads to infinite regress. The word 'cow' denotes the negation of 'non-cows' e.g., horses, etc., which also are not known as positive entities, but only by the negation of non-horses, and so on to infinity. Thus an *apoha* cannot be apprehended by a determinate cognition. Indeterminate perception cannot induce an agent to act upon an object. Thus the doctrine of *apoha* leads to an extinction of practical life. (3) It would make all words synonymous, since they are in the nature of negations of contradictories without any difference. The argument that negations of contradictories are different from one another is wrong, since they are not different from one another. If they are different from one another, then they are real like specific individuals. But the Buddhists do not consider them to be real. (4) The Buddhist may retort, that 'generalities' of the Naiyāyika, being denoted by words and not differing from one another, are synonymous with one another; and that therefore the doctrines of *apoha* and *sāmānya* are vitiated by the same defect. Kumārila replies, that generalities are positive in their nature, devoid of

⁸⁷ NM., pp. 315-7.

the natures of other generalities, and consequently different from one another; but that negations of contradictories, being merely in the nature of absence (*abhāva*), do not differ from one another. (5) If negations of contradictories be said to differ from one another because their substrates are different from one another, then the negations differ with every specific individual. If there are as many negations as there are specific individuals, then they cannot serve the purpose of generality. (6) Negations of contradictories, it may be argued, cease to be identical with one another, because their difference depends upon the difference of the objects negated. This argument is wrong, because the difference of *apohas* due to the difference of negated objects does not destroy their identity inasmuch as such difference of *apohas* is not real, but attributed. The difference of *apohas* cannot be due to the difference of negated objects (*apohya*). (7) The argument that the negation of 'cow' is the basis of the classification of 'non-cows' is wrong, because the 'cow' is already known as a positive being by denying which 'non-cows' are known. The denial of 'non-cow' presupposes the affirmation of 'cow'. If a 'cow' is known already, the assumption of 'non-cow' and the negation of 'non-cow' are needless. (8) If a specific individual cow is known already to exist, it does not require a word to denote it. If the genus of cow is known already to exist, then the assumption of the negation of contradictories is unnecessary. (9) The difference of *apohas* cannot be due to the difference of the negated objects, because their nature cannot be known. Are 'non-cows', e.g. horses negated in their general nature or special nature? They are not negated in their special nature, because they are not denoted by words. Nor are they negated in their general nature, because in that case they would be in the nature of absence, being the negations of contradictories. But there can be no negation of a negation. If a negation be negated, it leads to a positive affirmation, and a word denotes a positive entity. (10) Is the negation (*apoha*) of the negated (*apohya*), e.g. non-cows or horses different or non-different from them? If it is different from them, then it is a positive entity. If it is non-different from them, then it is the same as the negated, and thus a 'cow' is the same as a 'non-cow'. (11) The doctrine of *apoha* cannot account for the coexistence of a qualified object (*viśeṣya*) and a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*), for instance, a 'lotus' and 'blue', because two negations cannot

function in regard to the same object. (12) A negation of contradictories has no denotative power. The words 'non-existent', 'unknown' etc., do not denote the negations of contradictories because they cannot be ascertained. Nothing 'non-existent' or 'unknown' is known, which may be differentiated from others. If it is known, then it is existent and known. The existent cannot be negated by the word 'existent'; and the known cannot be negated by the word 'known'. An unknown entity is absolutely incapable of being negated. It cannot be said to be imagined, because its existence is known as soon as it is imagined. (13) What is denoted by the word *apoha* (negation)? It denotes the negation of non-negation (*anapoha*). What is the nature of non-negation? Why is it not *apoha*? If it is not *apoha*, what is its nature? These questions cannot be answered. The *apohas* of negative words, prefixes, verbs and the like are not thinkable. What is the *apoha* of 'is cooking' is not known. (14) General words, it may be argued, are denoted by the negation of contradictories (*apoha*), which are considered by some as denoting genera or individuals in which genera subsist. If general words denote external objects, they may denote genera as well. If they are without any basis in external objects, or consist in mere cognitions, the word 'genus' also may be objectless or a mere cognition, and the assumption of *apoha* is needless.⁸⁸

10. The Jaina View of the Import of a Word

Prabhācandra defines a word as an independent aggregate of letters which are dependent on one another. It does not depend upon the letters of another word.⁸⁹ Māṇikyanandin observes that a word produces the knowledge of an object owing to the natural relation of signifying and being signified between them and convention.⁹⁰ An object of valid knowledge is individual and general; it is characterized by common characters and distinctive characters because it is apprehended by assimilative knowledge and discriminative knowledge, and because it prompts fruitful actions in the shape of the attainment of good and the rejection of evil.⁹¹ Similar modifications constitute generality.

⁸⁸ NM., pp. 303-6. SV., *Apohavāda*.

⁸⁹ PKM., p. 133.

⁹⁰ PMS., iii, 95; PMLV., iii, 95.

⁹¹ PMS., iii, 1-2.

The Jaina does not believe in a genus which is considered by the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to be one, eternal, and inherent in many individuals.⁹² Vidyānanda Svāmī holds that a word denotes an aspect of a multiform (*anekānta*) object. 'A jar exists'. 'A jar does not exist'. Here particular aspects of an object are denoted by words occurring in positive and negative sentences. If words denoted objects endowed with one definite nature (*ekānta*), they would falsify their real nature, since they are multiform in their nature. Words denote both positive and negative characters of their objects. If they denoted their positive characters only, they would falsify their nature because they have positive characters at particular times, in particular places, and under particular circumstances. A word denotes its object, and negates other objects. The word 'jar' denotes a jar, and negates a cloth and other objects. So it denotes a multiform object. If it denoted its object in its general character and devoid of its distinctive characters, then its object would be unreal inasmuch as there is no generality without distinctive characters. If a word denoted a generality (*sāmānya*) directly, and indirectly denoted an individual, then also its object would be unreal since one word cannot denote another object which is denoted by another word. A word denotes both general and distinctive characters of an object. The positive character of an object is not inconsistent with its negative character, both of which are denoted by a word. The acceptable nature of one object is not inconsistent with the avoidable character of another object.⁹³ Hence a word denotes a multiform object with its general and distinctive characters and positive and negative characters. This doctrine is consistent with *Syādvāda* advocated by the Jaina thinkers.

Kundakunda Svāmī regards a sound as an aggregate of atoms or as an effect produced by it. It is an aggregate of innumerable atoms. It is produced by the modification of large aggregates which are struck by one another. It is perceived by the auditory organ which is a physical sense-organ (*dravyendriya*).⁹⁴ The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard sound as a quality of *ākāśa*. But the Jaina criticizes this view. If sound were a quality of *ākāśa*, it would not be perceived through the auditory organ because, *ākāśa* being incorporeal, its quality is incorporeal and

⁹² PMS., iv, 1-2, 4.

⁹⁴ PK., 79; TDTV., 79.

⁹³ AM., 109-13; AMV., 109-13.

incapable of being perceived through a sense-organ.⁹⁵ Sounds are of two kinds, human and non-human. Human sounds are uttered by persons. Non-human sounds are made by natural objects (e.g. clouds). Or, sounds are of two kinds, language and non-language. Linguistic sounds either consist of letters or do not. Sanskrit, Prākṛta, Ārya, and Mleccha languages consist of letters. Sounds uttered by animals endowed with two sense-organs and supernatural sounds of an omniscient person are devoid of letters.⁹⁶

11. *Akṛtivāda*

The Akṛtivādins maintain that a word denotes a form, configuration (*ākṛti*), or arrangement of parts (*avayava-sanniveśa*). The meaning of a word is ascertained by its use and cognition. The elders use the word 'cow' to denote a particular kind of object on which they act. The hearers also know that the word denotes that particular kind of object. It is applied to an individual with a dewlap and the like, but not to one with manes. So it denotes an individual with a peculiar arrangement of parts. Further, the word 'cow' denotes a perceived object; perception apprehends a configuration; the peculiar arrangement of parts in an individual cow, which is different from that of a horse, is perceived through a sense-organ. A word denotes a configuration, since it denotes a perceptible object. Furthermore, a configuration only can be related to the act of command through an individual which is possessed of it. A genus subsisting in all its proper individuals which manifest it cannot be brought or removed. But a configuration which is common to all individuals coming under the same genus can be brought or removed. Hence a word denotes a configuration.⁹⁷

Vātsyāyana urges, that an individual, which is the substrate of a genus, is denoted by a word. It has a configuration. But a genus does not subsist in it. So a configuration is not denoted by a word. 'Bring a cow'. 'Give a cow'. In these sentences the word 'cow' does not denote an earthen cow, since the genus of cow does not subsist in it. Hence a word does not denote a configuration.⁹⁸

⁹⁵ TRV., V, 6, 24; p. 231.

⁹⁶ TRV., V, 24, 6; p. 231.

⁹⁷ NBh., NV., ii, 2, 64; NM., p. 318; SBNT., pp. 11-2; HIP., i, p. 572.

⁹⁸ NBh., ii, 2, 65-6.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the view of the Akṛtivādins. Configurations differ in different individuals. There are innumerable individuals, and consequently their configurations are innumerable. So the uniform relation of words to configurations cannot be known. The word 'cow' does not denote the configuration of white cows, since in its absence it denotes the configuration of black cows, which is perceived. There is no configuration common to all individual cows in the world, because it can never be known in that they are infinite in number. Further, there can be no action on a configuration to carry out a command; nor is it capable of action. Only an individual can act and be acted upon. If a person is commanded to bring a cow, he does not bring a painted cow or an earthen cow, though it has the peculiar configuration. Hence the doctrine that a word denotes a configuration is wrong.⁹⁹

12. *Vyaktivāda: Criticism of Jātivāda*

The Vyaktivādin advances the following arguments to prove that a word denotes an individual. 'A cow exists or sits'. An individual cow only can exist or sit. The genus of cow is incorporeal and motionless. But individual cows are corporeal and moving. A 'collection of cows' is a collection of individual cows, because the genus of cow is one. 'He is giving a cow to a Vaidya'. An individual cow only can be given or received, since the genus of cow is incorporeal and motionless and incapable of being given or received. 'Kaundinya's cow' is an individual cow belonging to Kaundinya. An individual cow only can be owned, but the genus of cow cannot. 'Ten cows' mean ten individual cows which can be enumerated. Number does not apply to the genus of cow. 'A cow is increasing or decreasing in bulk'. An individual cow only is capable of increase or decrease. The genus of cow is incapable of it, since it is incorporeal. 'A cow is white'. An individual cow only can be white. The genus of cow is devoid of qualities. Qualities can subsist in a substance only. 'The pleasure of a cow' means the pleasure of an individual cow. The genus of cow cannot have pleasure. 'A cow gives birth to a calf'. An individual cow only can produce a calf. The genus of cow is eternal, and consequently incapable of producing or being

⁹⁹ NM., p. 318.

produced.¹⁰⁰ An individual only can be the substrate of a genus, and be an object of action, while a configuration cannot be the abode of a genus, and is incapable of being acted on. So a configuration cannot be denoted by a word. An individual only is an object of use and command. It can be an object of action, e.g. acquisition, destruction, etc. But a genus cannot be acquired or destroyed. Even others admit that a word denotes a perceptible object, and that perception does not apprehend a mere genus, but an individual in which a genus subsists.

If a word denotes a genus, it may be asked, why a person does not bring an earthen cow when he is directed to bring a cow since the genus of cow is present everywhere. It may be replied that, though the genus of cow is present everywhere, it is manifested by the individual cows only. An individual cow with a dewlap and the like manifests the genus of cow; but an earthen cow does not manifest it. But the peculiar arrangement of parts exists in an earthen cow, and yet it is not denoted by the word 'cow'. It does not denote a configuration because, in that case, there can be no coexistence of white colour and the like in the same locus when it is denoted by another word. Qualities do not exist in a configuration. But white colour and the genus of cow coexist in an individual cow. Hence an individual is denoted by a word, and it produces a particular idea.¹⁰¹

13. *Jātivāda: Criticism of Vyaktivāda*

The Mīmāṃsaka and the Advaita Vedāntist maintain that a word denotes a genus (*jāti*). Kumārila argues: If an individual distinct from a genus were denoted by a word, no uniform relation could be established between them, since individuals are infinite in number. But if a word denotes a genus, it may denote an individual through its genus which qualifies it. Thus a relation can be established between a word and its object. A generality is common to many individuals, and produces a common notion or concept.¹⁰² It is denoted by a word. Prabhākara also maintains that a word denotes a genus. The genus of cow only is denoted by the word 'cow'. An individual cow being denoted by it contains a greater number of elements. So it is

¹⁰⁰ NS., NBh., ii, 2, 62.

¹⁰² ŚV., NR., Ākṛtivāda, 1, 3-4.

¹⁰¹ NM., pp. 319-20.

not denoted by the word 'cow'.¹⁰³ Maṇḍana Miśra regards a genus as the primary meaning of a word, and an individual in which a genus subsists as its secondary meaning.¹⁰⁴

According to the Advaita Vedāntists, a word denotes a genus, and not an individual. It cannot denote an individual, since individuals are innumerable. But whenever it denotes a genus, it denotes an individual as well, since a genus is apprehended by that cognition which apprehends an individual. Or, a word has a natural power of denoting an individual, but it is not cognized by us. But its power of denoting a genus is cognized by us. A word is known to denote a genus and produces the knowledge of it. To maintain that a word is also known to denote an individual violates the law of parsimony, because no sooner than a genus is known to be denoted by a word an individual also is known. So the knowledge of an individual being denoted by a word is unnecessary. That is expressible by a word (*vācya*), which is the object of its denotative power which is cognized. Hence a genus is expressible by a word, but an individual is not. Though the word 'cow' denotes the genus of cow, it implies an individual.¹⁰⁵

Vātsyāyana gives the following arguments of the Jātivādin. An individual does not exist without a genus subsisting in it. An individual without being qualified by a genus is not denoted by a word. But it is denoted by it as qualified by a genus. A genus is capable of movement, increase, decrease, enumeration, collection, production and the like through the individuals in which it subsists. An earthen cow is not denoted by the word 'cow' because the genus of cow does not subsist in it, though an individual and a configuration exist.¹⁰⁶

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa gives the following arguments of the Mīmāṃsaka against the doctrine that a word denotes an individual: The Mīmāṃsaka asks whether a word denotes a mere individual or whether it denotes a qualified individual, and replies that it does not denote a mere individual, because the word 'cow' is not applied by speakers to any individual (e.g., a horse), and because the hearers do not know any individual when they hear the word. The word 'cow' may be said to denote an individual

¹⁰³ SSP., p. 91; HIP., Vol. I, pp. 573-4.

¹⁰⁴ SSP., p. 87; HIP., Vol. I, p. 573.

¹⁰⁵ S.B., i, 3, 28; VP., ch. IV.

¹⁰⁶ NBh., ii, 2, 62, 66.

cow qualified by the genus of cow. Then the genus of cow is denoted by the word, and not an individual; because if a word denotes an individual, another individual cannot be denoted by it; and because if it denotes another individual also, then it denotes an entity common to all individuals, and not one individual only. If an individual were denoted by a word, individual cows would be perceived as 'this is a cow', 'this is a cow', etc., and not as 'this is also a cow'. The uniform perception of cows as cows may be said to be due to the existence of a genus in them. Is it known or unknown? It is not unknown because then it would not serve any purpose. If it is known, it is known either through a word or through some other means of valid knowledge. It cannot be known by any other *pramāṇa*, since it is absent. If it were known through a word, then the word might denote it in the beginning. The word 'cow' may be said to denote a genus (*gotva*) as a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) and an individual cow as a qualified substance (*viśeṣya*). But it cannot denote innumerable individual cows as qualified substances and their genus as a qualification. There is no other means of knowing individual cows so that a word may denote them as qualified by a genus. The experiences of an individual and a genus are not denied for every one has both these experiences. But a word cannot denote an individual and a genus both. If it did, it would imply one by denoting the other. Then the word 'cow' either denotes the genus and implies an individual; or, it denotes an individual and implies a genus. If the genus is a qualification, then it is known before an individual is known, and can be denoted by a word. If it is known through a word, an individual also can be known through it. Then a word does not denote both a genus and an individual directly.¹⁰⁷

We know the genus of cow, it may be argued, as a qualification, and an individual cow as a qualified substance when we hear the word cow, even as we know a person bearing a staff when we hear the word 'daṇḍin'. This is not an appropriate example. The word 'daṇḍin' denotes both a staff (*viśeṣaṇa*) and a person with a staff (*viśeṣya*). It does not denote a staff which is a qualification; the word 'daṇḍa' does not denote a person, that is a qualified substance. But the word 'cow' denotes the genus of cow, a qualification, and an individual cow, a qualified substance.

¹⁰⁷ NM., p. 320.

When it denotes an individual cow (*viśeṣya*), it depends upon another *pramāṇa* to produce the knowledge of the genus of cow (*viśeṣaṇa*). When it denotes a genus, it implies an individual to produce the knowledge of it. There is nothing wrong in it. When a word being uttered, an individual is known,—whether it is known through a word or a genus,—it is not perceived, but known by reasoning. A word denoting a genus and an individual is not experienced. A genus is known through the perception of an individual; an individual is known through the perception of a genus, which is known through a word also. An individual only is not an object of action. A genus also can be an object of action. 'Make a sacrifice with an animal'. An incorporeal genus can be an object of action, even as incorporeal qualities and actions are the means of actions. A genus can be an object of action by suggesting an individual. Though it is incorporeal, it acts through an individual, even as the self, though incorporeal, acts through its body and sense-organs. Hence the Mīmāṃsaka concludes that a word denotes a genus.¹⁰⁸

14. *Jāti-vyakti-ākṛtīvāda: Criticism of Jātivāda*

Gautama says, "An individual, a configuration, and a genus are denoted by a word."¹⁰⁹ Sometimes a genus is its principal import, and an individual is its subordinate import. 'The cow ought not to be touched with feet'. Here the cow means the genus of cow or all cows. Sometimes an individual is the principal meaning, and a genus is a subordinate meaning. 'Bind a cow'. Here a cow means an individual cow. Sometimes a configuration is the principal meaning, and an individual is a subordinate meaning, and a genus is not denoted at all. 'Make an earthen cow'. Here a configuration is the chief import of the word 'cow', and an individual is its subordinate meaning. It does not denote the genus of cow, which is non-existent in an earthen cow. Sometimes a word denotes an individual only, because it has no genus in that it is one. The word 'Dittha' denotes a particular individual because it is a proper name (*saṃjñā*) and devoid of a genus.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ NM., pp. 321-2. ŚV., Ākṛtīvāda.

¹⁰⁹ Vyaktyākṛtijātayas tu padārthah. NS., ii, 2, 68.

¹¹⁰ NM., pp. 325-6.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta view that a word denotes a genus. A word occurring in a sentence has a case, a gender, and a number. But a genus cannot have any of them. It is wrong to argue that a genus can have these through an individual which is implied by a word, for a word, which is uttered only once, cannot denote a genus at first, then imply an individual, and then denote a case, a gender, and a number through an individual inasmuch as the sequence of such experiences is not cognized. A self, though incorporeal, may become an agent as related to a cognition and a volition. But a genus, though incorporeal, has no direct relation to an action, and consequently cannot have a case that is always related to an action. We perceive an individual qualified by a genus and related to a number. So an individual qualified by a genus is denoted by a word. The genus is a qualification (*viśeṣaṇa*) of an individual which is a qualified substance (*viśeṣya*). A word does not denote a mere genus, but an individual qualified by it. Nor does it denote a mere individual unqualified by a genus, if it is not one. Both a genus and an individual are perceived through a sense-organ. It cannot be said that a genus is perceived while an individual is inferred, because it is contradicted by experience. If it were so, then qualities only being perceived, a substance would be inferred. But, in fact, a substance and qualities both are perceived. Similarly, a word denotes both a genus and an individual, and not a mere genus. 'The cow is white'. The sentence means that the genus of cow and white colour coexist in the individual cow. If a word denotes an individual in which a genus subsists, then only a genus and a quality can coexist in the same substrate. Hence a word does not denote a mere genus.¹¹¹

15. The Yoga doctrine of *Sphoṭa*

Vyāsa (400 A.D.) expounds the doctrine of word-forms (*padasphoṭa*) and sentence-forms (*vākyasphoṭa*) in the *Yogabhāṣya*. There are three kinds of sounds: (1) articulate letter-sounds (*varṇa*) uttered by the vocal organs; (2) audible sounds (*dhvani*), which are modifications of air perceived by the auditory organ;

¹¹¹ NM., pp. 323-5. HIP., Vol. I, pp. 573-4, 804.

and (3) a word-image or a thought-form, which is a mental mode, and apprehends all the component letters at a time. This is called a word or word-form which signifies an object. The first two kinds of sounds do not signify it.¹¹² The articulate sounds and the audible sounds are produced successively, and do not coexist together. Nor are they aided by one another. So they do not constitute a word, and signify an object. All letters can signify all objects.¹¹³ The same letter combined with other letters in a particular order is modified into a significant word-form (*śabdaspṛṣṭa*), and signifies a definite object. It is a single thought-form which apprehends all the component letters in a single grasp,—which are determined by a convention (*saṃketa*), and from which the temporal order of the audible sounds has been withdrawn,—and signifies an object. It is one, the object of a single cognition, uttered by a single effort, devoid of parts, letters and temporal order, notional, and presented to the mind by the last letter aided by the impressions of the preceding letters.¹¹⁴ A word is devoid of parts. But the articulate letter-sounds (*varṇa*) appear to the intellects (*buddhi*) of persons invested with the impressions (*vāsanā*) of the words used by the people from beginningless time as its parts. A word (*śabda*), a cognition (*jñāna*), and an object (*artha*) are erroneously identified with one another. A convention is the mutual superimposition of a word and its object upon each other, which is in the nature of recollection.¹¹⁵

Vācaspati Miśra rightly asserts that a word-form is not a word-image or a thought-form, but that it is manifested or cognized by the intellect or a thought-form and manifested by audible sounds. Vijñānabhikṣu also is of the same opinion. He regards a word-form as cognized by the intellect only, and manifested by a single effort and successive letters.¹¹⁶ Nāgeśa states that it

¹¹² Tatra vāḥ varṇeṣvevārthavati, śrotam ca dhvani-pariṇāmamātra-viṣyam, padam punar nādanusāhāra-buddhi-nirgrāhyam. YBh., iii, 17.

¹¹³ Varṇaḥ punar ekaikaḥ padātmā sarvābhidhānaśaktipracitaḥ. Ibid, iii, 17.

¹¹⁴ Tad ekaṁ padam ekabuddhiviṣaya ekaprayatnākṣiptam abhāgam akramam avarṇam bauddham antyavarṇapratyaya-vyāpāropasthāpitam. Ibid, iii, 17.

¹¹⁵ Saṅketas tu padapadārthayor itaretarādhyāsarūpaḥ smṛtyātmakaḥ. Ibid, iii, 17. HIP., ii. pp. 131-3.

¹¹⁶ Bauddham anusāhāra-buddhi-viditam. Buddhyaṁ nirbhāsyate prakāśyate iti buddhi-nirbhāsaḥ. TV., iii, 17. Padākhyo buddhimātra-grāhyaḥ sphoṭaḥ. YV., iii, 17.

is called a *sphoṭa* because it manifests an object.¹¹⁷ Thus a word-form is not a mere verbal image or a thought-form, but an objective sound-essence which is cognized by it. Vyāsa appears to regard it as subjective and notional (*bauddha*).

16. The *Sābdika* doctrine of *Sphoṭa* (*Padasphoṭa*)

Bhartṛhari (600 A.D.—650 A.D.), the great grammarian-philosopher, recognizes the reality of a letter-form (*varṇasphoṭa*), a word-form (*padasphoṭa*), and a sentence-form (*vākyasphoṭa*). One letter-form is manifested by many parts of a letter-sound (*varṇa*). One word-form is manifested by many letters. One sentence-form is manifested by many words. But parts of a letter-sound do not exist in a letter-form which is one, indivisible and partless; letters do not exist in a word-form which is one, indivisible and partless; words do not exist in a sentence-form which is one, indivisible and partless.¹¹⁸

The constituent letters of a word do not produce the knowledge of the object denoted by it, because each letter cannot produce it. Nor can the aggregate of them produce it, since there can be no aggregate of the successively produced momentary letters which are immediately destroyed. There can be no collection of the simultaneously produced letters, because the same person cannot produce different efforts in the different vocal organs to produce them simultaneously. Nor can the last letter aided by the preceding letters produce the knowledge of the object, since the preceding letters cannot render any aid to it as they are destroyed as soon as they are produced. Just as the preceding letters cannot render an aid to the last letter, so their perceptions and impressions (*samskāra*) of these perceptions also cannot render an aid to it as they also are destroyed as soon as they are produced. Further, the impressions of the perceptions of the preceding letters can produce the recollections of these letters only, but cannot produce the knowledge of another object (e.g. a cow). Nor can the recollections produced by the impressions of the preceding letters render an aid to the last letter,

¹¹⁷ Chāyā on YS., iii, 17.

¹¹⁸ Pade na varṇa vidyante varṇeṣvavayavā na ca. VPD., i, 73; BPR., i, 73; HIP., i, pp. 870-1.

since they cannot be produced simultaneously and they cannot co-exist together if they are produced successively as they also are produced and destroyed. Nor can all the impressions of the preceding letters produce one recollection only with the aid of the last letter, for then the impressions of conflicting perceptions of many objects will produce one recollection only, which is not found in our experience. Nor can the last letter (e.g. *w*) independently of the other letters (e.g. *c* and *o*) produce the knowledge of the object (e.g. cow), since the other letters will then be useless. Hence the constituent letters can neither collectively nor distributively produce the knowledge of an object denoted by a word. The last letter combined with the impressions produced by the perceptions of the preceding letters cannot produce such knowledge, for a letter can produce the knowledge of an object if its relation to the object is already perceived. But the impressions are imperceptible, and consequently the last letter combined with them also is imperceptible. The last letter combined with the recollections of the preceding letters due to their impressions also cannot produce such knowledge, since the recollections also are successive.¹¹⁹ The assumption of the imperceptible impressions of all letters except the last one violates the parsimony of hypotheses. A word-form (*padasphoṭa*) which is manifested by the successively uttered letters produces the knowledge of the object denoted by the word. Though it is imperceptible, it is presumed to exist in order to account for such knowledge. To argue that letters only are perceived and that a word-form distinct from them is not perceived is wrong, because oneness of a word is perceived, which does not accord with letters, since they are different from one another and oneness and multiplicity which are contradictory to each other cannot coexist in the same object. Oneness of a word cannot be due to its producing the knowledge of one object because it involves mutual dependence. Oneness of a word is due to oneness of the object denoted by it; and oneness of the object denoted by a word is due to oneness of the word. Hence a word is not in the nature of letters, but a word-form (*padasphoṭa*).¹²⁰ It must be assumed to exist in order to account for the knowledge of an object denoted by a word. It is manifested to auditory perception as

¹¹⁹ YSP., Bombay, 1915, p. 95; S.B., i, 3, 28.

¹²⁰ YSP., p. 95; PKM., p. 131.

one, partless, and devoid of sequence, because there is the experience of one meaning after hearing the word. This perception cannot have letters for its object, since many letters which are different from one another cannot produce one perception. Nor has it a generality (e.g. the genus of letters) for its object, because it cannot produce the knowledge of one definite object. Nor is it illusory as it is not contradicted. Nor is it non-existent inasmuch as it is an uncontradicted perception. The word-form (*padasphoṭa*) must be admitted to be eternal. If it were non-eternal, then it would be destroyed after being perceived at the time when a convention (*saṃketa*) is made, and the word 'cow' being heard at some other time and in some other place would not produce the knowledge of the object (e.g. a cow), because a word-form which has not been made a convention cannot produce the knowledge of an object. If it could do so, then a person coming from an island where there are no cows would have the knowledge of a cow on hearing the word 'cow' and making a convention would be unnecessary. But both these contingencies are unthinkable. Hence a word-form is eternal.¹²¹

17. *The Jaina Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa*

Prabhācandra criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of a word-form (*padasphoṭa*). The Jaina maintains, that the last letter qualified by the destruction of the preceding letters perceived through the auditory organ produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word, and that, therefore, the utterance of the preceding letters is not needless. A negation can be an auxiliary cause of an effect. For instance, the negation of the conjunction of a stem and a fruit is a cause of the fall of the fruit. A motion qualified by the negation of a prior conjunction is an auxiliary cause of a subsequent conjunction. The conjunction of a fire with the atoms of earth qualified by the destruction of their previous black colour produces red colour in them. Or, the last letter aided by the impressions (*saṃskāra*) of the perceptions of the preceding letters, and qualified by the negation of the perceptions of the preceding letters, produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. An impression of the perception of a preceding letter (e.g. *c* or *o*), it may be objected, cannot produce

¹²¹ PKM., p. 131. HIP., i, Ch. XII.

the knowledge of another object (e.g. cow). This objection, Prabhācandra urges, is without any foundation, since the last letter modified by the impression of the perception of the preceding letter is found to produce the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. The impression of the perception of the preceding letter renders an aid to the last letter with the help of other conditions. The first letter (e.g. *c*) produces a cognition, which produces an impression. Then the cognition of the second letter (e.g. *o*) is produced. It is qualified by the impression of the preceding cognition, and produces an impression, which is qualified. Then the cognition of the last letter (e.g. *w*) is produced. It is qualified by the impression of the cognition of the second letter. The last letter aided by the last impression produces the knowledge of the object denoted by the word 'cow'. Or, the experiences of the preceding letters and their impressions are not destroyed, but continue to exist and modify the last letter. Or, the last letter depending on the recollection produced by the impression of the cognition of the preceding letter produces the knowledge of the object denoted by a word. The Śābdika argues, that when a word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is present, the knowledge of the import of a word is present; that when the former is absent, the latter is absent; and that, therefore, a word-form is the cause of the knowledge of the import of a word. But Prabhācandra contends, that the assumption of an imperceptible cause is justified when a perceptible cause cannot account for the production of an effect; and that the last letter qualified by the impression of the preceding letter can adequately account for the knowledge of the import of a word. He contends further, that all the component letters of a word, collectively or distributively, are unable to manifest a word-form, because they are produced and destroyed successively, and consequently do not coexist together, and because the first letter manifesting the word-form completely, the second and the subsequent letters become unnecessary. To argue that the utterance of the second and the subsequent letters is not unnecessary because the last letter manifests the word-form while it is refined by the preceding letters is wrong, since the nature of refinement as distinguished from manifestation is not known. Hence the Śābdika doctrine of a word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is not tenable.¹²²

¹²² PKM., p. 132.

18. *The Mīmāṃsaka Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa (Padasphoṭa)*

Kumārila criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa elaborately. Pārthasārathi Miśra sums up his arguments in the following manner. A word which is nothing but letters or letter-sounds is perceived through the auditory organ. Nothing over and above them is manifested by auditory perception. The so-called word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is capable of being perceived, and yet it is not perceived. Hence it does not exist. The Śābdika who assumes the existence of a word-form has to further assume the impressions of letters. All letters manifest a word-form. But they are successive and consequently can co-exist through the impressions of the preceding letters. So the Śābdika must assume the existence of impressions (*saṃskāra*). If a word-form is manifested by each letter of a word—the preceding letters indistinctly manifesting it and the succeeding letters manifesting it more and more distinctly, then the second and the other subsequent letters are not needless. But, in that case, the succeeding letters capable of manifesting a word-form distinctly would manifest it, and the preceding letters would be useless. If the letters manifest a word-form partly, then it is not indivisible and partless. It may be argued, that a word-form is not distinctly manifested all at once, but that it is first indistinctly manifested, and more and more distinctly manifested as the letters are heard again and again. This argument is wrong for, in that case, a word-form would be manifested by the repeated preceding letters or by the repeated succeeding letters, and all letters would not be necessary. Further, if each letter manifested a word-form, then the preceding letters would distinctly manifest it, and the succeeding letters would indistinctly manifest it, or the letters uttered in a reverse order would manifest it. In order to avoid these difficulties the Śābdika must admit that a word-form is manifested by the last letter aided by the impressions of the preceding letters. So he must admit the reality of impressions (*saṃskāra*) in addition to that of an imperceptible word-form. Thus he violates the parsimony of hypotheses. According to the Mīmāṃsaka, the impressions of the letters produce collectively one recollection which cognizes all letters and produces the knowledge of the import of a word.

But this is not possible for the Śābdika, who holds that there are four kinds of words (*vāk*): (1) *parā*, (2) *paśyantī*, (3) *madhyamā*, and (4) *vaikhari*. The first is Śabdabrahma called *Bindu* abiding in *mūlādhāra* at the bottom of the spinal cord; it is in the nature of refined air in this plexus. The second abides in a plexus in the spinal cord near the navel; it is manifested by air and known by the mind (*manas*). The third abides in a plexus in the cord near the heart; it is a word-form (*śabdasphoṭa*), which is subtle and inaudible through the auditory organ, manifested by air, and cognizable by the intellect (*buddhi*) in the course of mental recitation of a *mantra* or a divine name. The fourth abides in a plexus in the cord near the throat, rises upward through air, strikes the head, returns, and is heard by the auditory organ. It is an audible word.¹²³ Articulate sounds (*nāda*), either being known, or remembered, or existing, manifest a word-form. They are not perceived through the auditory organ, and cannot, therefore, manifest a word-form. Their recollection also cannot manifest it because they are not perceived. They cannot be said to refine the auditory organ by their mere existence and thus manifest a word-form, for they are successive and cannot exist simultaneously. So they can exist simultaneously through their impressions only, and the assumption of impressions of letters is indispensable. It may be argued, that the impressions which are the causes of recollections are unable to manifest a word-form, but that the refinements of the auditory organ manifest it like the letters, and that the assumption of other impressions is not necessary. This argument is wrong because the refinements are momentary, and cannot therefore manifest it collectively. If each refinement manifests it, then the first refinement manifesting it, the later refinements are needless. Or, the conjunction of the auditory organ with a letter itself is its refinement. But it is momentary because letter-sounds are mobile. So other abiding impressions must be assumed to exist. Hence a word is not an entity over and above its component letters; a word-form is non-existent. According to the Mīmāṃsaka the letters being remembered signify the object denoted by a word. The order of succession among them also is its auxiliary condition. Otherwise the letters being uttered in a reverse order would produce the knowledge of the meaning

¹²³ SDP., p. 374; NM., pp. 373-4.

of a word. Hence the remembered letters invested with the order attributed to them by the letter-sounds which manifest them signify the object denoted by a word.¹²⁴

19. *The Vaiśeṣika Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa (Padasphoṭa)*

Śrīdhara criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa. When a word is uttered, its letter-sounds are heard in succession. Nothing over and above them is perceived. If a word-form is perceived after the letters are perceived, then the perception of letters is illusory, and that the word-form is valid. But the former is never contradicted by the latter, as the illusory perception of silver is contradicted by the valid perception of a nacre. A word-form is neither perceived nor known by any other *pramāṇa*. It cannot be said to be assumed to account for the knowledge of the meaning of a word. If a word-form being unperceived could produce such knowledge, it would always do so. It being perceived also cannot produce it for it is not perceived. The letters perceived and aided by their impressions can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word. Though the letters are momentary, yet their impressions being produced successively produce such knowledge jointly. Or, the last letter aided by the impression or recollection of the preceding letter produces such knowledge.¹²⁵ The Nyāya also maintains, that though impressions produce recollections, yet they can produce other effects. The Śābdika assumes the existence of a word-form and its power of producing the knowledge of the import of a word with the aid of the impressions of the component letters, and thus violates the parsimony of hypotheses. Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika hypothesis is better than the Śābdika hypothesis of Sphoṭa.¹²⁶

20. *The Naiyāyika Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa*

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa. The successive letters of a word only are perceived, but a word-form is not perceived. Nor is it inferred from the experience of the meaning of a word for it is produced by the successive letters

¹²⁴ ŚD., and ŚDP., pp. 370-7. ŚV., Sphoṭavāda.

¹²⁵ Pūrvavarnasamskārasamarāṇayor anyatarasāpekṣo'ntyo varṇaḥ pratyāyakah. NK., p. 270.

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp. 269-71. HIP., i, pp. 891-3.

which are perceived. A single letter cannot produce such knowledge. But all letters can jointly produce it. It is wrong to argue that all letters cannot collectively produce such knowledge because they are successive, for successive causes are often found to produce an effect jointly. For instance, many successive morsels of food jointly produce one satisfaction. They are successive and yet conjointly produce such an effect. Similarly, successive letters collectively produce the experience of the meaning of a word. Though the preceding letters are past and the last letter is present, yet the former render an aid to the latter. Therefore all letters jointly produce the knowledge of the import of a word, even as many successive momentary acts jointly produce an effect. The aggregate of successive letters is as imaginary as the aggregate of successive acts. Or, the mental cumulative knowledge (*samkalanājñāna*) of all letters, which is produced after the successive letters are perceived, produces the knowledge of the meaning of a word. When Devadatta has eaten a hundred mangoes, he has a cumulative mental representative knowledge (*mānasa anuvyavasāya*) of all these mangoes. Such a cumulative knowledge (*samuccayajñāna*) of a collection of objects exists, which is neither doubtful nor uncontradicted. The cumulative knowledge of the perceived last letter and the remembered preceding letters is variegated, and apprehends existing and non-existent letters. It is produced after the successive letters are perceived, and produces the knowledge of the import of a word. It may be argued, that the impressions of letters can produce the recollections of them, but that they cannot produce the comprehension of the meaning of a word. This argument is wrong because it is not a command of the king that impressions can produce recollections only. An impression is not an independent substance, but a power of the self produced in it by the apprehension of an object, which is inferred from recollection that is its effect. This power can produce another effect viz., the knowledge of the meaning of a word. The self has such knowledge after having the impressions of the perceptions of the component letters. So an impression is not the power of recollection only. But it is a quality of the self called *vāsanā* which can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word like recollection. The letters and their perceptions are past; another word-form is not perceived; but there is the knowledge of the meaning of a word.

It is produced by the impressions of letters. But why should impressions be the causes of apprehension (*anubhava*)? There is no rule that they must always produce recollections. Just as impressions are inferred from recollections as their causes, so they are inferred from the apprehension of the meaning of a word as its cause. Or, the impressions of letters produce such apprehension through recollections; the perception of the last letter and the recollections of the preceding letters, or the perceived letter and the remembered letters, produce such apprehension.¹²⁷ But recollections of letters also, it may be argued, are produced successively as they follow the order of the original perceptions, and cannot, therefore, coexist together and collectively produce such apprehension. This argument is invalid, since the self affected by the successive impressions of the letters remembers at once all of them, and acquires the apprehension of the meaning of the word. The *Śābdika* also admits the impressions of letters in order to account for the manifestation of a word-form. But he makes a number of needless assumptions e.g., a unique word-form, its existence, its distinctness from the letters, and its partlessness. Further, a word-form is said to be indistinctly manifested by the first letter, and more distinctly manifested by the succeeding letters. But because it is partless and indivisible, it is entirely and distinctly manifested by the first letter, and the other letters are needless. If it is partially manifested by the different letters, then it is not partless. If a succession of letters be said to manifest a word-form, it may as well produce the knowledge of the import of a word, and a word-form is not necessary for it.¹²⁸ Furthermore, the validity of verbal knowledge depends upon the reliability of the speaker of the words. But a word-form is eternal and not created by a reliable person. So it is not valid. Hence the non-eternal letters of a word, which are uttered by a trustworthy person, produce the valid knowledge of the meaning of a word.¹²⁹

21. *The Advaita Vedānta Criticism of the Śābdika doctrine of Sphoṭa*

The component letters of a word successively produced and heard can produce the knowledge of the meaning of a word.

¹²⁷ Smāryamānānubhūyamānavarnākaraṇako'rthapratyayaḥ. NM., p. 377.

¹²⁸ NM., pp. 374-8.

¹²⁹ Ibid, p. 366.

So the assumption of a word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is unnecessary. It cannot be said to be apprehended by the perception of the last word modified by the impressions of the preceding letters, since it apprehends all the letters, and not a word-form. The one cognition of 'cow', which is produced just after the perceptions of the successive letters, apprehends nothing but these. What is called the one unique perception of a word-form is a mere recollection of all letters. But how can many letters be cognized by one cognition? That is not impossible. The one cognition of a line of trees, a forest, an army, a hundred, or a thousand cognizes many objects. Similarly, a series of successive letters (e.g. *c*, *o*, and *w*) can be cognized by one cognition. But if all letters constituted a word and were cognized by one cognition, then the same letters in different orders (e.g. 'pot' and 'top') would produce the knowledge of the same object. But, in fact, they produce the cognitions of different objects. *Śaṅkara* replies, that the same letters in the same order convey the same meaning, but that they in a different order convey a different meaning because they become different when they are in a different order. The letters in a particular order are cognized by the cognition of a word, even as ants in a particular order are cognized by the cognition of a line. The assumption of a word-form is unnecessary because it contradicts our experience and postulates a needless imperceptible entity.¹³⁰

22. *The Nature and Import of a Sentence (Vākyārtha)*

(1) The *Nyāya* defines a sentence as a collection of words, which has a single meaning.¹³¹ The mutual relation of the objects denoted by the component words is signified by it.¹³² The knowledge of the words is the principal cause (*karana*); the presentation of the imports of the words is its causal operation (*vyāpāra*); and expectancy, compatibility, proximity and knowledge of the intention of the speaker are the auxiliary causes of the knowledge of the import of a sentence. Verbal knowledge is the result (*phala*) of these causes. The words 'a jar' do not make a sentence; they expect other words to make a complete sense. Devadatta, bring a jar'. This is a sentence. There must be close

¹³⁰ Sphoṭavādināḥ tu dr̥ṣṭāhānir adṛṣṭakalpanā ca. S.B., i, 3, 28.

¹³¹ Vākyam padasamūhaḥ. TS., p. 68. TK., p. 15.

¹³² Padopasthitānām mithah saṅgo vākyārthah. TK., p. 15.

proximity among the words. If they are uttered at long intervals, they do not make a sentence. 'Irrigate the field with fire'. There is no compatibility of 'irrigate' with 'fire'. So this is not a sentence. 'Irrigate the field with water'. This is a sentence as the words are compatible with one another. A person says at the time of eating, 'Bring *saindhava*'. The word means either salt or a horse. He means by it salt here. So expectancy, proximity, compatibility and the speaker's intention are the auxiliary causes of verbal knowledge.¹³³

Viśvanātha makes the following observations on verbal knowledge. The known words are not the principal cause (*karaṇa*), but the knowledge of the component words is so. If a silent person mentally recites a verse, he knows the meaning of the sentence, though words are not present here. The recollection of the objects denoted by the words is the causal operation (*vyāpāra*) which immediately produces verbal knowledge. The perception of the objects denoted by the words is not the causal operation. If that were so, a person perceiving them and acquainted with the meanings of words would have verbal knowledge. The words produce the recollection of the objects by their denotative power (*vr̥tti*). *Vr̥tti* is either denotation (*śakti*) or implication (*lakṣaṇā*). Words and objects were associated with each other in a person's past experience. He hears the words now and remembers the objects according to the law of contiguity. *Śakti* is the relation between a word and its object, which depends upon a convention (*saṁketa*). It is a volition of God. The ancient Nyāya does not regard a recent convention as a volition of God. The Navya Nyāya regards a convention as a mere volition, and not as a volition of God,¹³⁴ and maintains that recent conventions also have denotative power.¹³⁵ The Nyāya gives the realistic interpretation of a sentence. (2) Some maintain that a sentence is not external and distinct from the component letters and words, but a mere subjective cognition in the form of a sentence (*anusamhāra-buddhi*), which cognizes a series of letters and words in a single grasp. This is the idealistic interpretation of a sentence.¹³⁶ (3) The Śābdika regards a sentence as one, indivisible,

¹³³ TA., p. 18; TK., p. 15.

¹³⁴ Navyās tu īśvareccā na śaktiḥ kiṁ tvicchaiva. SM., p. 361.

¹³⁵ SM., pp. 360-1.

¹³⁶ Anusamhrtir vākyam. PKM., p. 134. YBh., iii, 17. ŚV., Vākyādhi-karaṇa, 118; NR., 118.

partless sentence-form (*vākyasphoṭa*), which is devoid of words but manifested by them. He considers the import of a sentence also to be one and indivisible (*akhaṇḍārtha*).¹³⁷ This is the transcendental interpretation of a sentence, since a sentence-form is supersensible but comprehended by the intellect or reason (*buddhi*). (4) The Jaina defines a sentence as an independent aggregate of words dependent on one another, which does not depend upon the words of another sentence, and which is partly different and partly non-different from the component words.¹³⁸ He distinguishes between a subjective sentence (*bhāvavākya*) and an objective sentence (*dravyavākya*).

23. The Śābdika doctrine of Sentence-form (*Vākyasphoṭa*) and its Criticism

A sentence, according to the Śābdika, is one, indivisible, partless sentence-form (*vākyasphoṭa*). There are no words in a sentence, as there are no letters in a word, and there are no parts in a letter. As a sentence is partless, so its meaning also is partless. The import of a sentence is really undivided and devoid of distinctions. But it appears to have distinctions owing to the limiting adjuncts (*upādhi*) of the meanings of the words.¹³⁹ A word-form is manifested by many kinds of articulate sounds, which are similar to those that manifest another sentence-form. The cognitions of the parts of a sentence are illusory due to the similarity of the manifesting sounds.¹⁴⁰ A word-form (*padasphoṭa*) is cognized by the knowledge of a word; a sentence-form is manifested by the knowledge of a sentence. A word-form manifests the meaning of a word; a sentence-form manifests the meaning of a sentence.¹⁴¹ An indivisible sentence manifests an indivisible meaning.

Kumārila criticizes the Śābdika doctrine of a sentence-form in the following manner. The Śābdika, who regards a sentence

¹³⁷ Eko' navayavaḥ śabdo vākyam. PKM., p. 134. VPD., Ch. II. YBh., iii, 17.

¹³⁸ Padānām tadapekṣānām nirapekṣaḥ samudāyo vākyam. Pade-bhyaḥ kathaṇḍid bhinnam abhinnam ca vākyam. PKM., pp. 133, 135.

¹³⁹ Avikalpe'pi vākyārthe vikalpā bhāvanāśrayāḥ.

Samudāyo'bhidheyaḥ syād avikalpasamuccayaḥ. VPD., ii; ŚDP., p. 610.

¹⁴⁰ ŚV., Vākyādhikaraṇa, 119, 123; NR., 119, 123.

¹⁴¹ Padabuddheḥ padasphoṭo vākyabuddheḥ ca vākyasphoṭo viśayaḥ. Padasphoṭāt padārtha-pratipattiḥ vākyasphoṭacca vākyārtha-pratipattiḥ. NM., p. 371. YBh., iii, 17.

or its meaning as external, indivisible and partless, maintains that the cognitions of its parts, words and their meanings, are illusory. Even if they are considered to be illusory, he cannot explain how they are thought to be real. If the parts of a sentence are not existent and separate, then there can be no similarity among them which may produce the illusion of parts. If there is similarity among them, then they are existent, and a sentence is not devoid of parts. If the parts were non-existent, then all sentences would be similar to one another, which is absurd! A sentence has no parts, but it appears to have similarity of parts, even as the cognition of a picture, which has no parts, appears to have similarity of parts (e.g. colours). This argument is wrong, since the object of the cognition has parts, though the cognition has no parts. The letters and words of a sentence are non-existent, and therefore cannot be similar to one another, and have any temporal order. If they are non-existent, then one non-serial, indivisible sentence-form cannot produce the cognition of many successive letters and words. The Śābdika doctrine of one indivisible sentence-form manifesting its meaning violates the parsimony of hypotheses, for an infinite number of sentence-forms invested with infinite imperceptible powers manifest infinite meanings. It is more rational to assume that a small number of words and their meanings produce an infinite number of sentences and their meanings.¹⁴² Pārthasārathi Miśra urges, that the parts of a sentence are known, and that the context determines the meaning of a sentence. There is a distinction of means and ends in Vedic and Tāntric injunctive sentences. They become useless, if sentences are partless and indivisible. An action depends upon the knowledge of the means and the end to be realized by them. Therefore the meaning of a sentence is not indivisible. It consists of a collection of many meanings of the component words. Or, it is qualified by their meanings. It is not uncaused; nor is it due to convention (*saṃketa*). It is produced and made known by the remembered meanings of the component words. It is also determined by the context. Hence an injunctive sentence is valid, and the doctrine of *Vākyasphoṭa* is untenable.¹⁴³ This is the Mīmāṃsaka criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

Prabhācandra urges, that the doctrine of *Vākyasphoṭa* is a

¹⁴² ŚV., *Vākyādhikaraṇa*, 120-4, 129-30, 132-5; NR., 120-33.

¹⁴³ ŚD., pp. 610-1.

mere fiction of the imagination, since it cannot be proved by any means of valid knowledge, and a sentence-form cannot produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.¹⁴⁴ This is the Jaina criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the doctrine of *Vākyasphoṭa*. A sentence is not devoid of parts, since it contradicts our experience. In every sentence different words and their meanings are distinctly manifested to consciousness. The experience cannot be said to be illusory, as it is not contradicted by a sublative cognition. The illusion cannot be said to be due to similarity, since it presupposes the existence of some entities which are similar to one another. So the parts of some sentence must exist. A sentence may be said to be partless like the cognition of picture. This is a false analogy. The cognition of a picture is partless; but its object, the picture, has parts. Hence a sentence and its meaning are not partless. It is foolish to argue that a sentence and a word have no parts as letters have parts, and that if the former have parts, then the latter also have parts. Apprehension and non-apprehension determine the nature of an object; it is so as it is apprehended, and it is not so as it is not apprehended. If the argument mentioned above be valid, then the argument that atoms also have parts because jars have parts is valid. The parts of words and sentences are perceived, and so they are existent. But the parts of letters are not perceived, and so they are non-existent. A sentence is produced and destroyed when its component words are produced and destroyed. The meaning of a sentence is produced and destroyed when its component words are produced and destroyed. Similarly, the parts of a word also are real. Hence a sentence and its meaning have parts. The doctrine of a sentence-form is irrational.¹⁴⁵ This is the Nyāya criticism of the Śābdika doctrine.

24. The Doctrine that a Sentence is a Cognition (*Anusamhṛti*)

A sentence is a construction of the intellect. The first word, the last word, and the other words are dependent on one another. But the sentence composed by them is a creation of the intellect. It is a reflection (*anusamhṛti*) on the successive letters formed

¹⁴⁴ PKM., p. 134.

¹⁴⁵ NM., pp. 383-4.

into words. It cognizes the successive letters and words in a single grasp.¹⁴⁶ After they are uttered, a cognition is produced by the appearance of the relation of a substance, a genus, a quality, and an action to one another, which is the meaning of a sentence.

But there can be no cognition without an object ultimately. So there must be an external sentence corresponding to the cognition. This is Kumārila's criticism of the doctrine. The Jaina distinguishes between a subjective sentence (*bhāvavākya*) and an objective sentence (*dravyavākya*). The cognition of a sentence is a subjective sentence. It is a modification of the self invested with the impressions (*saṁskāra*) of the cognitions of the preceding letters and perceiving the last letter through the auditory organ. But it is not an objective sentence. A rational person cannot regard a cognition as an external sentence, since it contradicts our experience. An external sentence is real and cognized by the cognition. Hence a sentence cannot be regarded as a mere cognition.¹⁴⁷ This is Prabhāchandra's criticism.

25. *Prabhākara's doctrine of Anvitābhīdhāna and Criticism of Abhihitānvayavāda*

Prabhākara is an advocate of the doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna*. According to him, the words of a sentence denote their meanings as related to one another, from which the meaning of a sentence is known; they do not denote their separate meanings unrelated to one another. They cannot constitute a sentence, if they do not denote its unitary meaning. The meanings of words are not learnt from the usage of the elders. But the meanings of sentences are learnt from their speech and actions. The meanings of words are learnt from those of sentences which are spoken by certain elder persons (*prayojaka vṛddha*) acquainted with their meanings and the actions of bringing and removing certain objects performed by other elder persons (*prayojya vṛddha*) in execution of their commands.¹⁴⁸

Prabhākara criticizes the doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* advocated by Kumārila and the Naiyāyika, who maintain that the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings. If words

denote their separate meanings, they can do so only when their meanings are learnt from the behaviour of the elders (*vṛddhavyavahāra*), which consists in their speech in the shape of a sentence, since a word only is not used in speech. A speaker speaks a sentence in order to communicate related meanings. A hearer also comprehends related meanings of a sentence. So related meanings are learnt from a spoken sentence. All component words collectively denote the meaning of a sentence.¹⁴⁹ This is the doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna*. If the last word denotes the unitary meaning of a sentence unrelated to the meanings of the other words, then all words do not produce such knowledge. It is wrong to argue that if the first word denotes the integral meaning of a sentence, the subsequent words are needless, because one word without the other words cannot denote it. Each word persists in exercising causal operation until the knowledge of the unitary meaning of a sentence is produced so that no word is needless. Then let a sentence and its meaning be partless. This is not possible, since words singly denote their own meanings, but they collectively produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence,¹⁵⁰ which is a collection of words denoting one meaning. Prabhākara does not deny the meanings of words in producing the integral meaning of a sentence, which do not cease to function until the related meaning of it is produced. But he does not admit that words denote their separate meanings. The meanings of words apart from a sentence are not learnt, since there is no means of knowing them. The utterance of the second and subsequent words is not unnecessary, for their proximity is necessary for producing the integral meaning of a sentence. As all causes of action jointly produce an action, so all words collectively produce the meaning of a sentence. The unrelated meanings of words of a sentence cannot be learnt. No relation can be established among them, because there is no means of doing so. Expectancy, proximity and compatibility cannot be said to relate the meanings of words to one another. Words and their meanings are unconscious and cannot therefore have expectancy. It is absurd to say that a word expects another word or that a meaning expects another meaning. A person's expectancy

¹⁴⁹ Saṁhitayārtham abhidhāti padāni vākyam. NM., p. 397.

¹⁵⁰ Vākyaarthapratipattiḥ saṁghātakāryam, svakāryam tu padārthapratipattiḥ. NM., p. 397.

¹⁴⁶ YBh., iii, 17; PKM., p. 134; ŚV., Vākyaadhikaraṇa, NR., 118.

¹⁴⁷ PKM., p. 134. ¹⁴⁸ Vākyaarthamātrkāvṛtti, p. 2.

or desire after a sentence has been heard cannot establish a relation among the separate meanings of the constituent words. If it does so, then the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not due to words, and is non-verbal. Hence the words denote the meanings related to one another. Mutual relations among the meanings of words are known from the cognitions of the related meanings of words. There is no other means of knowing them. We learn the related meanings of words from the sentences spoken by the elders who are acquainted with their meanings. Hence the doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* is not tenable.¹⁵¹

26. The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā Criticism of *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*

Kumārila criticizes Prabhākara's doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna*. Words do not denote related (*anvita*) meanings, because when a word is uttered, its own meaning only is apprehended. Hence the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings unrelated to one another. The meanings of words being known from the words, which are related to one another by proximity, expectancy and compatibility, produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence. When the former are present, the latter is produced.¹⁵²

According to *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*, the unity of a sentence is due to the unity of its integral meaning denoted by the component words and the unity of purpose. Pārthasārathi Miśra urges that on this view 'should perform a sacrifice heaven result animal fire god' is a sentence, since all the words are connected with the performance of a particular sacrifice with a particular substance to a particular god with the object of achieving a particular end. He urges further, that a Vedic injunctive sentence is one because it embodies one purpose, but that its oneness is not perceived, but inferred from its context. Similarly, the unity of the sentence 'Bring a cow' is not perceived. The unity of a sentence is due to the unity of its meaning produced by the component words which denote their separate meanings, and do not cease to function. The words directly denote their separate meanings, and imply the related meaning of a sentence.¹⁵³ This

¹⁵¹ NM., pp. 396-9.

¹⁵² SV., Vākyādhikaraṇa, NR., 104, 110-1.

¹⁵³ Padābhīhitaiḥ padārthaiḥ lakṣaṇayā vākyārthaḥ pratipadyate. ŚD., p. 604

is the view of Pārthasārathi Miśra. It may be argued, that in the sentence 'Devadatta, bring a cow' 'Devadatta' and 'a cow' being known by perception and their expectancy, proximity and compatibility being present, there is no knowledge of the mutual relations among the meanings of the words, that therefore the meanings of words do not produce the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence; but that the words themselves denote the related meanings. Pārthasārathi contends that Prabhākara's doctrine also suffers from the same difficulty, since 'Devadatta' and 'a cow' being perceived, and expectancy, proximity and compatibility being present, the two words cannot denote the mutual relations among their meanings, because they are not actually present, but are remembered only. Hence Prabhākara's doctrine that words denote their related meaning is untenable.¹⁵⁴

27. The Nyāya Criticism of *Anvitābhīdhānavāda*

Jayanta Bhaṭṭa criticizes the doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna* thus: Prabhākara maintains, that we learn the meanings of sentences uttered by elder persons acquainted with their meanings. Jayanta urges, that then we must learn the meaning of each sentence afresh; but that if we learn the meanings of words of a sentence, then the meaning of each new sentence need not be learnt afresh. Prabhākara does not maintain, like the Śābdika, that the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is independent of the meanings of the component words. He admits that the meanings of the words collectively produce the meaning of a sentence. The meaning of a word is said to be related to the meanings of other words which are expected, proximate and compatible. A word does not always jointly produce a unitary meaning of a sentence, but it denotes its own meaning only. It does not renounce its meaning when it is combined with other expected, proximate and compatible words. Its limited meaning is known by the double method of agreement. Again, when one word is not used, the unitary meaning of a sentence is not produced. It is known from the intention of the speaker. Prabhākara advocates the doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna* because he does not consider the intention of the speaker. But his doctrine is wrong since words always possess

¹⁵⁴ ŚD., pp. 599-609. Na padānām anvite śaktiḥ pramāṇavatī, nirastaś cāyam anvitābhīdhānavādaḥ. Ibid, p. 609.

the power of denoting their limited meanings. It is self-contradictory to maintain that a word denotes a related meaning (*samsr̥stārtha*) without denoting its limited meaning, for the knowledge of a relation presupposes that of the relata. If it denotes its limited meaning as well as the related meaning, then it may as well denote all meanings. Hence a word does not denote all meanings, or a related meaning, but its separate limited meaning only; it can manifest an unrelated object, but not a related object. The doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna* is irrational.¹⁵⁵

28. The Nyāya and Kumāṛila's doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya*

The Nyāya advocates the doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* according to which the words of a sentence denote their separate meanings, and convey the knowledge of their relations to one another when expectancy, proximity and compatibility of the words are considered. The meaning of a sentence is known after the meanings of its component words are known. It is not known if the meanings of the words are not known. The words mean a substance, a quality, an action, or a genus. The import of a sentence is comprehended when the relations among the objects denoted by the words are known. The meanings of words are known from the sentences uttered by some elder persons and acted upon by other elder persons acquainted with their meanings. Otherwise the meaning of each sentence would have to be learnt anew, and sentences being infinite in number, comprehension of their meanings would not be possible. Hence there would be extinction of the use of sentences. It is found that the meanings of the new verses of a poet are comprehended. The comprehension of them depends upon that of the meanings of the constituent words. But it would not be possible, if a sentence and its meaning were learnt from the speech and actions of the elders. Hence words do not denote their meanings related to one another. If they did so, the first word would denote the meaning of the sentence, and the subsequent words would be needless. But it contradicts our experience. If the proximity of the other words be said to be the cause of the first word's denoting the meaning of the sentence, then it is so by its mere existence or by denoting

¹⁵⁵ NM., pp. 400-1.

the meanings of other words. It cannot be so by its mere existence, since then proximity would not differ from non-proximity. Mere proximity whose relation to the words is not known cannot render any aid to the first word. If it is so by denoting the meanings of other words, then the separate meanings denoted by the component words are related to one another by virtue of their proximity, expectancy and compatibility. A word is related to those other words which it expects, which are proximate to it, and which are compatible with it. Hence the separate meanings denoted by the words are related to one another.¹⁵⁶ The words denote their separate limited meanings; and then they collectively produce the related meaning of a sentence. They do not denote the related meaning of a sentence.^{156a} They produce the knowledge of its integral meaning. The relations of the meanings of words are not denoted by them; but they are known from a sentence.¹⁵⁷ The Nyāya doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* is better than Prabhākara's doctrine of *Anvitābhīdhāna*, because it does not make the second and subsequent words unnecessary, and because it is not vitiated by the defects of the doctrine.¹⁵⁸

Kumāṛila also advocates the doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya*. The words denote their separate meanings from which the meaning of a sentence is known. They never denote the related meaning of a sentence. They do not lose their meanings in the meaning of a sentence, which is known from them due to the power of the intention of the speaker. The knowledge of the meanings of the words is verbal (*śābda*), since it is produced by words. But the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence is not directly produced by them. But it is not non-verbal (*aśābda*) for that reason. It is verbal inasmuch as the causal operation of the intention of the speaker conveyed by the words has not yet ceased to operate. Hence the words are indirectly the cause of the knowledge of the meaning of a sentence.¹⁵⁹ The component words, according to Pārthasārathi Mīśra, denote their separate meanings, which collec-

¹⁵⁶ *Abhihitānām eva padārthānam anvaya itī yuktam.* NM., p. 396.

^{156a} *Anvitam artham padāni samhatya sampādayanti no tvaṇvitam abhidadhati. Padānyanvitam pratīyayanti na tanvitam abhidadhati.* NM., pp. 402-3.

¹⁵⁷ *Na hi samsargo'bhīdhīyate pratīyate ca vākyāt.* NM., p. 403.

¹⁵⁸ NM., pp. 400-4.

¹⁵⁹ *SV., Vākyādhikaraṇa, 228-30; NR., 228-30.*

tively produce the unitary meaning of a sentence; they do not directly denote the related meaning of a sentence.¹⁶⁰

29. *Anvīyamānābhīdhānavāda and Abhidhīyamānānvayavāda*

According to the doctrine of *Anvīyamānābhīdhāna*, words denote their separate meanings which are related to one another. According to *Abhidhīyamānānvaya*, words relate the separate meanings which are denoted by them. Jayanta criticizes these views, and urges that both are wrong, since the two separate acts of denoting (*abhīdhāna*) and relating (*anvaya*) are not experienced. They are either successive or simultaneous. They do not exist simultaneously, as they are not experienced together. When words are used, the act of relating their objects is not perceived. If they are successive, then either the act of denotation is prior to the act of relating or the act of relation is prior to the act of denotation. In the first alternative, the doctrine is nothing but *Abhihitānvaya*. In the second alternative, the doctrine is nothing but *Anvītabhīdhāna*. They are not *Abhidhīyamānānvaya* and *Anvīyamānābhīdhāna* respectively. The act of denotation is one, which is known by experts. The act of relating the objects denoted by words is not possible without their denotation. There is nothing new in these two doctrines. They are vitiated by the defects of the doctrines of *Abhihitānvaya* and *Anvayābhīdhāna*.¹⁶¹

30. *The doctrine of Anvītabhīdhāna in a general way and Abhihitānvaya in a special way*

Some maintain that words denote the related meaning in a general way, and denote their meanings which are related to one another in a special way. The word 'cow' denotes its own meaning related to the meanings of other words in a general way, its special qualities and actions being unknown. So far the doctrine is *Anvītabhīdhāna*. The relation of a cow to its special qualities and actions is known from other words. So far the doctrine is *Abhihitānvaya*. *Anvītabhīdhāna* in a general way is vitiated by the defects of *Anvītabhīdhāna*. *Abhihitānvaya* in a special way

¹⁶⁰ Padārthā ekaika-viśiṣṭārtha-pratipādanāya samāhṛtā vākārthaṁ prati-pādayanti. SD., p. 609.

¹⁶¹ NM., pp. 401-2.

is vitiated by the defects of *Abhihitānvaya*. Hence this is not a new doctrine.¹⁶²

31. *The Jaina doctrine of the Import of a Sentence and Criticism of Abhihitānvaya*

Prabhācandra criticizes Kumārila's doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* which maintains that the words denote their separate meanings, and that a sentence means the relation among them. Prabhācandra asks whether the meanings denoted by the words are related to one another by another word or whether they are related to one another by a cognition. The first alternative is not possible, for another word which manifests the meanings of all the words and relates them to one another is absent. The second alternative does not prove Kumārila's thesis, since the knowledge of the words itself is a sentence (*bhāvaavākya*), which comprehends its meaning, but the words are not a sentence. It may be argued, that a sentence is not different from the constituent words, because it is produced indirectly by them, and because the meaning of a sentence is known from the meanings of the words, which are related to one another owing to their presence to the discriminative intellect (*apekṣābuddhi*). Then, Prabhācandra contends, words are not different from their roots, case-endings, etc., since they are stated when their parts are stated and their meanings are known from the parts, which are related to one another. Kumārila may argue, that a word only is used in common parlance and in the Vedas to convey the meaning of a sentence, but that its roots, etc., are not used; that they are separated from a word in order to show its derivation; and that a word which is partless like a letter, and the parts of which are distinguished from one another by the imagination is known to produce the knowledge of its meaning. Prabhācandra urges that this argument is wrong, because a sentence only is real on a similar ground; that words are separated from it in order to show its construction; and that a sentence only is used in common parlance and in the Vedas to produce the knowledge of objects, which prompts actions to accept or reject them. Hence Prabhācandra concludes, that a word which is experienced as partly different and partly non-different from its parts must be admitted to be so; that it is not

¹⁶² NM., p. 402.

entirely partless as it cannot be proved; and that a sentence which is experienced as partly different and partly non-different from its component words must be admitted to be so; that a sentence is a collection of mutually dependent words, and independent of other words in another sentence; and that there are two kinds of sentences: (1) an objective sentence (*dravyavākya*) which is in the form of a statement; and a subjective sentence (*bhāvavākya*) which is the thought of it. Experience cannot be denied. So Kumārila's doctrine of *Abhihitānvaya* is not tenable.¹⁶³

APPENDIX

1. *The Jaina views on the Manas* (chapter I).—Pūjyapāda regards the mind (*manas*) as not a sense-organ because it is partly a sense-organ and partly not.¹ The external sense-organs can apprehend their objects here and now. But the objects of the mind are not restricted to a particular time and place. The external sense-organs apprehend external objects. But the mind (*manas*) cannot apprehend external objects. It is called an internal organ, because it does not depend upon the external sense-organs in deliberation on merits and defects of objects and recollection of objects.² There are two kinds of *manas*: (1) objective mind (*dravyamanah*) and (2) subjective mind (*bhāvamanaḥ*). The former depends upon the emergence of infrasensible atoms of *karma*, which are the modifications of atoms. The latter is the purity of the self, which depends upon subsidence or partial destruction of *karma*—matter concealing sensuous knowledge.³ The former is composed of atoms which are aids of the self, and incline it to the discrimination of merits and demerits of things, recollection of, and reflection upon, objects due to the subsidence or partial destruction of knowledge-concealing *karma*-matter. Certain atoms which are aids to the self are modified into the objective mind and constitute *dravyamanah*. The latter consists in *labdhi* and *upayoga*.⁴

The Nyāya and the Vaiśeṣika regard the *manas* as non-material, atomic and devoid of colour and other modifications. Pūjyapāda criticizes this view thus. He asks whether the *manas* is unrelated to the self and the sense-organs or whether it is related to them. In the first alternative, it cannot be an aid to the self, nor can it assist the sense-organs. In the second alternative, being atomic, it is related to a part of the self, and cannot assist it in its other parts. It cannot be said to be connected with different parts of the self in quick succession like a quickly moving firebrand, under the influence of merits and demerits (*adṛṣṭa*), since it is devoid of the power of quick movement. *Adṛṣṭa* is a quality of the self which is incorporeal and unmoving;

¹⁶³ PKM., p. 135.

¹ Anindriyam manah. Iṣad indriyam anindriyam. SS., i, 14.

² SS., i, 14.

³ SS., ii, 11.

⁴ SS., v, 19.

it is devoid of movement, and, consequently, cannot generate movement in the *manas*. A particular substance called air is perceived to be active, endowed with touch, and causing motion in an object with which it comes into contact. But the *manas* is inactive, devoid of touch, and does not cause motion in another object with which it comes into contact. It is corporeal, because it is struck by the roar of a thunder. It cannot be struck by a corporeal substance, if it is not corporeal. It is influenced by the drinking of wine. It is overpowered by phlegm. Hence it is corporeal.⁵ Hence the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of *manas* is wrong.

Bhaṭṭa Akalaṅka regards the *manas* as a sense-organ, because it does not depend upon another sense-organ in its function, viz. examination of merits and defects of objects, even as the eye does not depend upon another sense-organ in apprehending colour. The *manas* does not cease to be a sense-organ because it is imperceptible. It is imperceptible as it is a modification of a subtle substance. It is inferred from the absence of simultaneous production of many kinds of sensuous perception in spite of the presence of colour, sound, odour, taste and touch. It is inferred from the recollection of an object seen or heard once before.⁶ Hence it is a sense-organ. *Manas* is the internal organ. Its function is not restricted to a specific kind of objects like an external sense-organ. It is not a sense-organ like an external sense-organ. But it is not devoid of the characteristics of a sense-organ.⁷

The author of *Jainatarkavārtika* does not regard the *manas* as a sense-organ. He regards the self itself as *manas*, which may have simultaneous cognitions due to the subsidence or partial destruction of *karma*-matter which conceals knowledge.⁸ A *jina* has clairvoyant perception of objects at a distance (*avadhi*) owing to the subsidence or partial destruction of the *karma*-matter which conceals clairvoyant knowledge due to the conquest of love and hatred. He has telepathic perception of the mental processes of other persons owing to the destruction of the *karma*-matter which conceals telepathic knowledge (*manahparyaya-jñāna*). The inclination of the self towards knowledge or its self-luminosity is the invariable precondition of such kinds of knowledge, which do not require the aid of *manas*. A Yogin can have one synchronous

⁵ SS., v, 19.

⁶ TRV., i, 5, 19, 4-8.

⁷ TRV., i, 5, 14, 2.

⁸ Manahsaṁjñāsyā jīvasyā jñānāvṛti-śamakṣayau. JTV., p. 100.

knowledge of common and distinctive features of objects owing to his inclination to know them without its aid. A *kevalin* also can have an omniscient cognition of all objects simultaneously without a *manas*. Hence the *manas* is not the internal organ.⁹ The self itself is *manas*, and nothing else.

Amṛta Sūri recognizes five sense-organs, e.g. tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual, and auditory. He maintains, that the auxiliary function of *manas* is assisting the five sense-organs in performing their functions, and that its primary function is the production of mediate knowledge (*śrutajñāna*), e.g. inferential knowledge and verbal knowledge.¹⁰

2. *Veṅkaṭanātha's view of Perception: Indeterminate and Determinate Perception* (chapter II).—Veṅkaṭanātha defines perception as immediate knowledge. It is not mediated by any other knowledge. It is free from recollection. It is direct knowledge. It is immediate apprehension. Directness of a cognition consists in its manifesting its object distinctly. Distinctness consists in manifesting an object with its specific individuality.¹¹ Perception is either eternal or non-eternal. Divine perception is eternal. Human perception is non-eternal. It is either yogic perception or non-yogic perception. Yogic perception is produced by a particular excellent merit acquired by the practice of meditation and austerities. It is either ecstatic perception (*yukta pratyakṣa*) or non-ecstatic perception (*viyukta pratyakṣa*). The former is produced by the internal organ only in the state of ecstatic union with God. The latter is produced by the internal organ and the external organs in the state of falling off from ecstatic union with God. Veṅkaṭanātha includes sagic intuition (*ārsajñāna*) in yogic perception because both are produced by excellent merit.¹² Divine perception, perception of the liberated souls, and perception of the souls united with God are independent of the sense-organs. Cognition by its essential nature manifests all objects, but it is obstructed by the veil of ignorance (*avidyā*), which is partially destroyed by the intercourse of a sense-organ with an object, and completely destroyed by perfect

⁹ Ātmaiva mano nānyat. JTVV., p. 100.

¹⁰ TSar., ii, 48.

¹¹ Sākṣātkāri pramā pratyakṣam. Sākṣād anubhavaḥ pratyakṣam. Āparokṣyam nāma viśadābhāsatvam. Vaiśadyam nāma asādhāranākāreṇa vastvabhāsatvam. NP., pp. 70, 71, 72.

¹² Prakṛtādṛṣṭajātvaīśeṣāt. NP., 75. Ibid, pp. 74-5.

knowledge in liberated souls. So their cognitions manifest all objects by their essential nature. The cognitions of sages also manifest all objects because the veil of their ignorance is destroyed by excellent merit due to the practice of austerities. Their super-normal perceptions are non-sensuous. The Yogins have mental perception (*mānasa pratyakṣa*). Non-yogic perception (*ayogi pratyakṣa*) is produced by the intercourse of normal external sense-organs with external objects aided by ordinary merit, light and other auxiliary conditions. It is of five kinds, visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactual. Each sense-organ apprehends its own appropriate object.

Normal perception is indeterminate or determinate. Both of them apprehend qualified objects.¹³ Only indeterminate perception is devoid of recognition, while determinate perception involves recognition.¹⁴ Indeterminate perception does not apprehend an unqualified object, since a cognition apprehending such an object is never perceived or possible. Even perceptions of babies, dumb persons, birds and beasts apprehend qualified objects, though they are devoid of names. They recognize the objects perceived by them as favourable or unfavourable and either accept them or reject them. The cognition of a qualified object, it may be argued, presupposes the cognition of a qualification, because it is a determinate cognition, like the acquired visual perception of fragrant sandal. This argument is wrong. In indeterminate perception, a substance, an attribute, and the relation between them are perceived through a sense-organ.¹⁵ The cognition produced by the first intercourse of a sense-organ with an object apprehends a qualified object, because it is a cognition. All cognitions apprehend qualified objects. Determinate perception is the cognition which is produced by the sense-organs aided by the revival of subconscious impressions. Indeterminate perception is independent of subconscious impressions. Determinate perception is dependent on them. The perception of the first individual of a class is indeterminate. The perception of the second individual and so on of the same class is determinate.

¹³ Ubhayavidam apyetad viśiṣṭa-viśayam. NP., p. 77.

¹⁴ Sapratyavamarśapratyakṣam savikalpam. Tadrāhitam pratyakṣam nirvikalpam. NP., p. 77.

¹⁵ Nirvikalpake dharmavad dharmivacca tatsambandhasyāpyāindriya-katvāviśeṣeṇa grahaṇasambhāvāt. NP., p. 79.

Indeterminate perception does not apprehend mere Being (*sanmātra*) as Sāṅkara wrongly maintains.¹⁶

The Advaita Vedāntist disputes the Rāmānujist's view that indeterminate perception apprehends a qualified object, e.g. a jar as a jar. He asks whether the difference of a jar from other objects is apprehended by a momentary indeterminate perception successively or simultaneously. In the first alternative, the difference cannot be apprehended because the different objects which are the substrates of difference were not apprehended at first. In the second alternative, the same first cognition apprehends different objects (*dharmin*) first, and then their difference (*bheda*). Thus it operates successively on its object, and does not apprehend it simultaneously. It cannot be held that the first cognition apprehends different objects only (*dharmimātra*) and that the second cognition apprehends their difference (*dharmā*), because the first cognition is destroyed when the second cognition appears, which, consequently, apprehends both different objects and their difference; so that the difficulty of its apprehending both either successively or simultaneously is not obviated. If the first cognition apprehends different objects only (*dharmimātra*) without their difference (*dharmā*), then perception does not apprehend jars, cloths and the like, nor their existence, but it apprehends mere Being which is common to them and their substratum, which is pure consciousness or Brahman. Śrīnivāsa urges, that in that case there would not be the perception of a jar or a cloth as existing, but that of 'existing', 'existing' and the like. Hence perception apprehends both different objects and their difference.¹⁷ Veṅkaṭanātha maintains that an infant does not apprehend an object devoid of a substratum (*dharmin*) and an attribute (*dharmā*), even though there is no inherence (*samavāya*) between them; and that he perceives them as inseparably related to each other. Indeterminate perception, therefore, apprehends a qualified object. A Rāmānujist does not recognize inherence as a distinct category.¹⁸

3. *Non-perception* (chapter III).—Non-perception is due to the absence of the intercourse of a sense-organ with its object, or its great distance, or great proximity, or hiddenness, or minuteness,

¹⁶ NP., pp. 82-3.

¹⁷ Nyāyasāra on NP., pp. 82-5.

¹⁸ TMK., p. 597; SAS., p. 598.

or being overpowered, or preoccupation of mind. It is due to inattention (*mano'navasthāna*) or instability of mind. Inattention is due to an intense emotion. When the mind is overwhelmed with grief, it cannot attend to an object and perceive it, even if it is quite near a person. Inattention is a condition of non-perception.¹⁹

4. *The Buddhist view of sense-object-contact* (chapter VII).—What is called the sense-object-intercourse by the Naiyāyika is called contact by the Buddhist. It is in the nature of a clash between a sense-organ and its object, like the clash between two cymbals or the butting together of two rams. The eye should be regarded as one of the two, the form or object as the other, and the contact as the union of the two. Contact is the dynamic union of a sense-organ and its object. This is the view of Nāgasena.²⁰

5. *The Buddhist view of the distinguishing mark of perception* (chapter VII).—According to Nāgasena, recognition is the distinguishing mark of perception. "What, Nāgasena, is the distinguishing mark of perception?" 'Recognition, great king.' "Recognition is the mark of perception."²¹ A person recognizes an object which he perceives with his eye, or a sound which he hears with his ear, or an odour which he smells with his nose, or a taste which he experiences with his tongue, or a touchable thing which he touches with his body, or a quality that he recognizes by his mind. Thus recognition is the distinguishing mark of perception. Definite perception involves recognition.

Nāgasena maintains also that recognition is the mark of an idea (*saṃjñā*). "What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of idea (*saṃjñā*)?" 'Recognition, O King'. 'And what does he recognize?' 'Blueness, yellowness, redness, whiteness and brownness.'²² When the treasurer of a king enters the treasure, he recognizes the jewels by their colours. So when we perceive different objects, we recognize them by their qualities.

6. *The Buddhist view of preadaptation in the perceptual process* (chapter VII, 1).—Nāgasena maintains that investigation should precede the perceptual process. A traveller should test the stability of a bamboo bridge before he mounts on to it. Perceptual

¹⁹ SSV., i, 108.

²⁰ *The Questions of King Milianda*, I, pp. 92-3.

²¹ Ibid., I, pp. 95, 132.

²² Ibid., I, p. 94.

activity should be preceded by preadjustment of the sense-organs to the object to be perceived by a train of perceptual activity.²³ The perceptual process involves attention. Alertness or set is a condition of attention. Buddhaghosa makes readiness (*upatthāna*) the mark of mindfulness (*satī*). Nāgasena regards repetition as a condition of attention.²⁴

7. *The Jaina theory of Perception* (chapter VII, 2).—Vidyānanda Svāmī defines perception as a vivid cognition.²⁵ Inference and the like are not vivid cognitions. Perception is presentative knowledge. It is of three kinds: (1) sensuous; (2) non-sensuous; and (3) supersensuous. (1) Sensuous perception is produced by the external sense-organs. It is empirical perception (*sāṃvrya-vahārika pratyakṣa*). It has spatial vividness. Or, its object is vividly perceived in space. (2) Non-sensuous perception is internal or mental perception. It is not produced by the external sense-organs. It has partial vividness. (3) Supersensuous (*mukhya*) perception is of two kinds: (1) incomplete or partial (*vikala*); and (2) complete or total (*sakala*). Incomplete (*vikala*) perception is of two kinds: (1) perception of distant objects (*avadhijñāna*); and (2) telepathic perception of the mental processes of other persons (*manahparyaya-jñāna*). Complete (*sakala*) perception is omniscience (*kevalajñāna*). It is transcendental perception (*mukhya pratyakṣa*). It is independent of the sense-organs and the mind (*manas*), transcends temporal distinctions, and vividly apprehends the forms of all objects completely. Transcendental perception is different from empirical perception, which is dependent on the sense-organs and the *manas*. The knowledge of formless objects is not perception.²⁶

Amṛtacandra Sūri defines perception as the cognition of the real form of an object, which depends upon the sense-organs or the mind (*manas*).²⁷ A valid cognition apprehends itself and its object definitely. It is of five kinds: (1) *matijñāna*; (2) *śrutajñāna*; (3) *avadhijñāna*; (4) *manahparyaya-jñāna*; and (5) *kevalajñāna*.²⁸ Hemacandra divides knowledge into immediate and mediate: Perception is immediate knowledge. It is empirical and transcendental. Empirical perception is sensuous and non-sensuous. It consists of four stages: (1) *avagraha*; (2) *īhā*; (3) *avāya*; and (4)

²³ Ibid., I, pp. 172-3.

²⁴ Ibid., I, p. 58.

²⁵ Viśada-jñānātmakam pratyakṣam. PRP., p. 67.

²⁶ PRP., p. 68.

²⁷ TSar., i, 17.

²⁸ TSar., i, 18.

dhāraṇā. Transcendental perception is of three kinds: (1) *avadhi*; (2) *manahparyaya*; and (3) *kevala*. Mediate knowledge is of five kinds: (1) recollection; (2) recognition; (3) conjecture (*ūha*); (4) inference; and (5) scriptural testimony.²⁹

8. *The Jaina view of Matijñāna*.—Brahmadeva defines *matijñāna* as determinate perception such as 'this is white' which the self acquires with the help of the five sense-organs and the *manas* which is not a sense-organ. It follows upon an indeterminate perception of the being of an object owing to the subsidence or destruction of the appropriate *karma*-matter concealing knowledge. This indeterminate perception of an object through a sense-organ is wrongly called intercourse (*sannikarṣa*) by the Naiyāyika. *Matijñāna* is determinate perception. Amṛtacandra Sūri includes the internal perception of pleasure and the like, sense-perception, recollection, recognition, knowledge of inseparable relation between a probans and a probandum (*ūha*), inferential knowledge of the probandum, *buddhi*, *medhā* and the like in *matijñāna*. Vidyānandi Svāmī regards *buddhi* as the power of comprehending objects, *medhā* as the power of remembering words, *prajñā* as a kind of thought which is in the nature of conjecture (*ūha*) and the negation of contradictories (*apoha*), and *pratibhā* as recognition and knowledge of similarity, and includes them in *matijñāna*. He includes inclusion, presumption, non-apprehension, and comparison in *matijñāna*. He treats them as kinds of inference.³⁰

9. *The Jaina view of Śrutajñāna* (chapter VII).—*Śrutajñāna* is of two kinds: (1) inferential (*liṅgaja*) and verbal (*śabdaja*). (1) Inferential knowledge is the knowledge of one object (e.g. fire) from that of another object (e.g. smoke). (2) Verbal knowledge is the knowledge of an object (e.g. a jar) from hearing a word (e.g. a jar). This is the view of Brahmadeva. These two kinds of knowledge give us the determinate knowledge of the objects, which are not perceived. Verbal knowledge is of three kinds: (1) verbal knowledge preceded by perception; (2) verbal knowledge preceded by inference; and (3) verbal knowledge preceded by testimony. The first kind is produced by perception aided by the testimony of another person. The second kind is produced by a mark of inference aided by another's testimony. The third

kind is produced by another's testimony only. *Śrutajñāna* is the knowledge that is derived from the testimony of other persons. This is the view of Śāntyācārya.³¹

10. *Veṅkaṭanātha's criticism of Prabhākara's view that Movement is not an object of perception* (chapter VIII).—According to Prabhākara, movement is not perceived, but it is always inferred from the successive positions of an object; a motion (*karma*) is imperceptible, because it is a motion, like the motion of an atom. Veṅkaṭanātha refutes this view. He urges, that the inference is not valid, because there is no uniform concomitance between motion and imperceptibility. The motion of the sun is imperceptible because it is at a great distance. All objects, which are perceptible, are not perceived owing to the absence of auxiliary conditions. Further, if motion is imperceptible, then it does not exist. The conjunction of an object with another point of space, which is said to be the effect of motion, would be called motion. It might be regarded as the effect of the cause of what is said to be motion, and the assumption of motion would be needless. Furthermore, the conjunction of a bird with a post would be the effect of motions of both, even as the conjunctions of two wrestlers is the effect of their motions, because motion is nothing but the conjunction of an object with another position. But this contradicts our perception. Hence motion must be regarded as an object of perception, which is different from its effect, viz. conjunction of a moving object with another position.³²

11. *Nāgasena's view of time* (chapter IX).—"What does the word 'time' mean? 'Past time, O King, and present, and future'. 'But what? Is there such a thing as time?' 'There is time which exists, and which not?' 'Which then exists, and which not?' 'There are constituent potentialities of being, O King, which are past in the sense of having passed away, and ceased to be. To them time is not. But there are conditions of heart which are now producing their effect, or still have in them the inherent possibility of producing effect, or which will otherwise lead to reindividualisation. To them time is. Where there are beings, who, when dead, will not be reborn, there time is not; and where there are beings who are altogether set free, who, having attained

²⁹ VRS., p. 206.

³⁰ DSV., 44, pp. 169-70; TSar., i, 19-20; TSV., i, 13, 1-7, p. 188.

³¹ DSV., 44, p. 170; JTVV., pp. 131-2.

³² TMK., p. 693; SAS., pp. 693-4. See ch. VIII.

Nirvāṇa in their present life, have come to the end of life, there time is not—because of their having been quite set free’.”³³

“The King said: ‘What is the root, Nāgasena, of past time, and what of present, and what of future time?’ ‘Ignorance. By reason of Ignorance came the predispositions (*sankhāra*), by reason of predispositions consciousness, by reason of consciousness name-and-form, by reason of name-and-form the six organs of sense, by reason of them contact, by reason of contact sensation, by reason of sensation thirst, by reason of thirst craving, by reason of craving becoming, by reason of becoming, birth, by reason of birth, old age, grief, lamentation, sorrow, pain and despair. Thus is it that the ultimate point in the past of all this time is not apparent’.”³⁴

Thus the Buddhist realist, Nāgasena, regards time as relative to our empirical life due to ignorance. When ignorance is completely destroyed by enlightenment, there is no time. The past, the present, and the future are real to ignorant persons, who regard the impermanent as permanent and are whirled in the wheel of birth and death. But to the enlightened who have destroyed the predispositions due to ignorance, there is no distinction of the past, the present, and the future. They are relative to desires due to ignorance. The desire which is in the course of being fulfilled indicates the present time. The desire which has been fulfilled indicates the past time. The desire which craves for fulfilment indicates the future time. To the enlightened person who has uprooted desires there is no time. Thus time is relative to the empirical life of a person.

12. *The Yoga conception of time as a construction of the intellect (buddhinirmāṇa)* (chapter IX).—Vyāsa regards time as unreal and subjective, a construction of the intellect, which appears to ordinary persons with empirical consciousness as a real entity.^{34a} The present moment alone is real; the past moments and future moments are non-existent. So they cannot be combined with one another. The past moments and future moments are in the nature of modifications of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. So time is not an aggregate of the past, the present, and the future.

³³ *The Questions of King Milinda*, I, pp. 77-8.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, I, p. 79.

^{34a} Sa khalvayam kālo vastuśūnyo buddhinirmāṇaḥ śabdajñānānupātī laukikānām vyutthitadarśanānām vastusvarūpa ivāvabhāste. YBh., iii, 52.

It is an imaginary collection of moments, which is a construct of the intellect.^{34b} A moment (*kṣaṇa*) is the time that is required by an atom to move from one position of space to the next position. Continuity of the series of moments is called succession. There can be no real synthesis of moments, but there can be imaginary synthesis of them by the intellect. Day, night, etc. are imaginary combinations of moments. They are intellectual constructions (*buddhinirmāṇa*).³⁵ The Pātañjalas call the order (*karma*) of moments time, though it is unreal and subjective, because there is no real aggregate of moments.³⁶ The Sāṃkhya-Yoga does not consider time to be a real entity, like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

The Pātañjala views the present, the past, and the future in relation to causal activity in the following manner. The present is engaged in its causal activity. The past is that whose causal activity or manifestation was perceived already. The future is that whose causal activity or manifestation will be perceived afterwards.³⁷ The past and the future exist at present in a subtle form. The past exists in a sublatent condition in a present substance, the manifestation of which was perceived in the past. The future exists in a latent condition in a present substance, the manifestation of which will be perceived in the future. But the present exists as a manifest modification of a substance which is perceived now.³⁸ The present modifications are manifest, while the past and future modifications remain unmanifest and hidden in their causes.³⁹

13. *Puruṣottamaṇi Mahārāja's view of the perception of time and space* (chapter VIII-IX).—Puruṣottamaṇi Mahārāja, a follower of Vallabha, maintains that space and time are not directly perceived, but that they are perceived as qualifications of perceived objects.⁴⁰ His view agrees with that of Pārthasārathi Miśra, a follower of Kumārila.⁴¹

^{34b} Buddhikalpitah samāhārah. YV., p. 252.

³⁵ Tatpravāhavicchedas tu kramah, kṣanatatkramayor nāsti vastu-samāhāra iti buddhisamāhāro muhūrtāhorātrādayaḥ. YBh., iii, 52.

³⁶ YBh., iii, 52.

³⁷ Bhaviṣyadvyaktikam anāgatam, anubhūtavvyaktikam atītam, svavyāpāropārūḍham vartamānam. YBh., iv, 12.

³⁸ Svenaiva vyaṅgyena svarūpeṇānāgatam asti, svena cānubhūtavvyaktikena svarūpeṇātītam iti, vartamānasyaivādhvānaḥ svarūpavyaktir iti. YBh., iv, 12.

³⁹ YBh., iv, 13.

⁴⁰ Dikkālau grāhyārthaviśeṣaṇatayaiva gṛhyete, na sāksāt. PR., p. 110.

⁴¹ See *ante*, pp. 140-2, 149.

14. *The Jaina view of a self-aware cognition* (chapter IX).—The Buddhists regard a self-aware cognition (*svasamvedana pratyakṣa*) as a distinct kind of perception. But the Jaina does not regard it as a distinct perception, since it is common to all cognitions.⁴² Sensuous perception perceives itself and another object. It is one perception, and does not consist of two cognitions, viz. a cognition of an object and a cognition of that cognition. Mental perception also is one and self-aware. Transcendental perception also is one and self-aware. Otherwise each kind of perception would consist of two cognitions, and would not apprehend itself and its object. Hence a self-aware perception has no other object than itself. It is not a distinct kind of perception.⁴³ Vidyānanda Svāmī propounds this view.

Amṛitacandra Sūri defines a valid cognition as the determinate cognition of itself and its object.⁴⁴ It is a determinate cognition of the real nature of its object, and it cognizes itself. According to the Naiyāyika, a cognition cognizes an object, but does not cognize itself; it requires another cognition (*anuvyavasāya*) to cognize it. But the Jaina maintains that a cognition cognizes itself and its object. If it does not cognize itself, it cannot cognize an object. The Advaita Vedānta maintains that a cognition cognizes an object, but that it is cognized by the witness self (*kevalasākṣivedya*). He further maintains, that the integral knowledge (*samyagjñāna*) cognizes pure universal consciousness or *Brahman*, but that it does not cognize any object. The Jaina does not believe in *Brahman*, but he believes in the omniscient cognition of an individual self, which cognizes itself and all objects in their real nature. Omniscience is attained by a person on the complete destruction of *karma*-matter which encrusts the soul.

15. *Rāmānuja's view that a cognition is self-luminous* (chapter XI).—Rāmānuja regards a cognition as self-manifest or self-cognized (*svaprakāśa*). A cognition, he argues, manifests itself by virtue of its being; it does not require another cognition to apprehend it. A jar is manifested by a cognition which is different from it. But a present cognition is never experienced as unmanifest. If it were unmanifest, it would require another cognition to apprehend it. The opponent may argue thus: When a

cognition is produced, there is the manifestation of an object only in it, but there is no manifestation of the cognition, which is not an object of valid knowledge. The existence of a cognition is a condition of the manifestation of an object, like the intercourse of a sense-organ with it. Hence a cognition is inferred from an adventitious peculiarity called manifestness (*prakāśa*) in an object. If a cognition were perceived by another cognition, then it would be insentient like an object. But a cognition is admitted to be sentient. What is sentience? It is an entity in the presence of which there is no absence of manifestation. Rāmānuja urges, that this argument is wrong, because the non-absence of manifestation is possible in the case of pleasure and pain. Existent pleasure and pain are never unperceived or unknown. Hence a cognition is perceived by itself, and not perceived by another cognition. Manifestation is a property of a cognition, which does not depend upon another valid knowledge. It manifests an object by virtue of its relation to itself. It is the cause of the manifestation of an object without depending on other conditions. Hence a cognition is self-manifest;⁴⁵ it manifests itself by virtue of its existence.⁴⁶

16. *Veṅkaṭanātha's criticism of Kumārila's doctrine of Cognizedness (jñātātā) or Manifestness (prākāṣya)* (chapter XI).—Kumārila maintains, that a property called manifestness is produced in an object by its relation to a cognition. Veṅkaṭanātha criticizes it thus. Knowledge is always favourable to action. This favourableness is sometimes natural; sometimes it is an object of a cognition. It is natural in a self-manifest entity. It is an object of a cognition in an entity which is manifested by another. A cognized object is manifested by a cognition abiding in a self, even as a desired object or a hated object is qualified by desire or hate abiding in a self. Cognizedness is not produced in a cognized object, even as desiredness or hatedness is not produced in a desired or hated object. Further, past and future objects are cognized, but cognizedness cannot be produced in them. The argument that a cognitive act must produce cognizedness or manifestness in its object because an action must produce a result in its object is wrong, since desire or hate does not produce

⁴² Tasya sakala-jñāna-sādhāraṇa-svarūpatvāt. PRP., p. 68.

⁴³ Na tato'rthāntaram svasamvedana-pratyakṣam. PRP., p. 68.

⁴⁴ Samyag jñānaṁ svārthavyavasāyātmakaṁ viduḥ. Tattvārthasāra, i, 18.

⁴⁵ Anubhūtiḥ ātmanah prakāśamānatve, 'prakāśate' iti vyavahāre ca svayam eva hetuḥ. RB., i, 1, 1.

⁴⁶ Svasattayaiva prakāśamānatvāt. Ibid, i, 1, 1.

desiredness or hatedness in its object. The cognition of acceptability or avoidability or neutrality of an object cognized is the only result of the cognition, which is experienced. Cognizedness or manifestness is not experienced in it. Hence there is no manifestness in an object of a cognition.⁴⁷

Kumārila argues, that a cognition is neither apprehended by itself nor by a mental perception, but that it is inferred from its result, viz. manifestation of its object.⁴⁸ Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that the inference is invalid because there is no difference between the probans, viz. manifestation of an object and the probandum, viz. cognition. Manifestation of an object may be said to be the probans and manifestation in the self may be said to be the probandum. Even if there were such a difference between them, the manifestation of an object would be produced by the same collocation of conditions as would produce the cognition; and there would be no action without the manifestation of an object. Therefore the cognition would be useless. It is neither the cause of action on an object nor the cause of its manifestation, since both depend upon other conditions. Hence a cognition is not inferred from the manifestation of its object.⁴⁹

17. *Veṅkaṭanātha's view of Self-luminosity of a Cognition* (chapter XI).—Veṅkaṭanātha, as a follower of Rāmānuja, maintains that a cognition is self-luminous or self-apprehended, which involves a knowing self and a known object; that it manifests itself and an object; that it is conducive to an action which does not depend upon another cognition apprehending it.⁵⁰ A cognition manifests itself because it is a cognition. It apprehends itself without depending upon another cognition apprehending it (*anuvyavasāya*) as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika maintains. A cognition apprehends itself and other objects, even as the cognition of an omniscient self apprehends itself and other objects. If an omniscient cognition did not apprehend itself, it would not be omniscient or all-knowing. Some maintain, that the omniscient cognition is apprehended by itself (*svasamvedya*), but that it does not manifest itself (*svaprakāśa*). Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that self-luminosity of a cognition does not imply that it is a knowing

⁴⁷ TMK., p. 658; SAS., p. 658.

⁴⁸ Buddhist arthprakāśādnumitiḥ. TMK., p. 394.

⁴⁹ TMK., p. 394; SAS., p. 394.

⁵⁰ Svayamitaramatir buddhiḥ TMK., p. 389. Buddhiḥ svayamsiddhā svagocaraññāna-nirapekṣa-vyavahārānugūṇā. SAS., 389.

subject or a known object; that a cognition does not manifest itself as a knower or a known object; but that its conduciveness to an action is independent of another cognition apprehending it, which cannot be denied. Some maintain, that omniscience of God consists of two cognitions,—one apprehending itself and the other apprehending the entire universe. Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that there is no proof for the existence of two cognitions of God; that the existence of one omniscient cognition of God is proved by other valid arguments; and that one omniscient cognition of God is enough to apprehend itself and all other objects, so that the assumption of two cognitions in God is needless. Some maintain, that God's cognition apprehends the entire universe, but does not apprehend itself, because a cognition does not manifest itself. Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that if God did not know his cognition, then he would not know it to be his cognition, and others' cognitions as not his cognitions, and he would not know some objects as objects of his knowledge, and other objects as not objects of his knowledge, and thus he would cease to be omniscient; and that in that case an unconscious cognition of a conscious self would act, and that an unconscious unseen principle (*adr̥ṣṭa*) of a conscious self would act, and that the Vedic testimony about the omniscience of God would be contradicted. Veṅkaṭanātha further urges, that the denial of self-luminosity of a cognition would make continuous cognition (*dhāravāhikabuddhiḥ*) impossible, because a continuous cognition apprehends itself; and that if it did not apprehend itself, but were apprehended by another cognition, then there would be a breach in its continuity. The existence of a continuous cognition is proved by its valid recollection in the form 'I perceived an object for such a long time'. It may be argued, that it is self-contradictory to regard a cognition as self-luminous, because it cannot act upon itself, even as a fire cannot burn itself, or as an axe cannot cut itself, or as a finger cannot touch itself. Veṅkaṭanātha urges, that a cognition apprehends itself, even as a self apprehends itself, or as a perceived object is apprehended by a perception, and produces the perception that apprehends it. Hence a cognition is self-manifest.⁵¹

18. *Veṅkaṭanātha's criticism of the doctrine that denies the apprehendedness of a cognition* (chapter XI).—Some deny the apprehendedness (*vedyatva*) of a cognition in order to save its

⁵¹ SAS., pp. 390-1; TMK., p. 389.

self-manifestness (*svayāṃprakāśatva*). They maintain, that a self-manifest cognition is not known by itself, but that it is known by a recollection, or a testimony, or an inference, or a yogic perception. The recollection 'I perceived Devadatta' apprehends the previous cognition. Testimony or verbal cognition apprehends another cognition. Cognitions of others are inferred from their behaviour. A yogic perception apprehends another cognition. But Veṅkaṭanātha disputes this view. If a cognition is self-manifest because it is a cognition, then it is self-contradictory to maintain that it is not known by itself. 'Apprehension (*anubhūti*) is self-manifest because it is in the nature of apprehension'. Is the apprehension indicated by the subject of inference, the probandum, or the probans? Or, is it not indicated by them? In the first alternative, a cognition is known by itself. In the second alternative, the opponent's antithesis is not proved. If a cognition is said to be indicated by them, erroneously, but not in reality, then even this illusory apprehendedness presupposes its real apprehendedness. If the real apprehendedness of a cognition be not proved, its illusory apprehendedness cannot be established.⁵² If a cognition were apprehended, it may be argued, it would be insentient (*jada*). Veṅkaṭanātha criticizes this objection thus. A cognition is either known by testimony, or it is not known by it. If it is known by testimony, then it is not insentient. If it is not known by testimony, then it contradicts its own statement. Further, is the so-called insentience (1) mere apprehendedness or (2) being proved by a cognition apprehending it or (3) the absence of self-manifestness or (4) the absence of connection with the state of being unknown? The first alternative is desirable. Veṅkaṭanātha admits that a cognition is apprehended, but that apprehendedness is not insentience. The second alternative is wrong. A cognition known definitely is proved independently of another cognition apprehending it; it apprehends itself. The third alternative also is false. The absence of self-manifestness is another name for insentience. The fourth alternative is a desirable contingency. A cognition is not apprehended by another cognition during its existence.⁵³ Therefore apprehendedness is not insentience. Further, if cognitions were not

⁵² TMK., p. 392; SAS., pp. 392-3.

⁵³ Na hi buddhir vidyamānāvasthāyām svabuddhyantaraviditā. SAS., p. 393.

apprehended, then a teacher could not educate a pupil, because their cognitions would not be apprehended by each other, and the opponent also would not be able to make his views known to others. Hence the view that a cognition is not apprehended is wrong.⁵⁴

Veṅkaṭanātha refers to a view of an old school that there is no mental perception. The self and its cognitions, according to them, are self-luminous. Pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition are not different from their cognitions which are produced by their causes. The cognitions of past apprehensions are recollections. The mind cannot operate independently of the external sense-organs in the perception of external objects, which are different from the self, pleasure and the like.⁵⁵

19. *Keśavamiśra's view of cognitions* (chapter XI).—Keśavamiśra divides cognitions into apprehension (*anubhava*) and recollection (*smṛti*). Apprehension is valid or invalid. Valid apprehension is perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Invalid apprehension is of three kinds viz. doubt, hypothetical reasoning (*tarka*) and error or illusion. Recollection is valid or invalid. All cognitions are formless. Forms are not produced by their objects in their cognitions. The existence of objects is not inferred from the forms of cognitions as the Sautrāntikas maintain, since their forms are not perceived, but objects are perceived as jars and the like. All cognitions manifest their objects, and do not cognize other objects. Particular cognitions apprehend particular objects, and are determined by them. Cognitions are known as cognizing objects, and not as unrelated to them.⁵⁶

20. *The Sāṃkhya and the Advaita Vedānta views on the Nature of Dreams* (chapter XV).—The Sāṃkhya advocates the representative theory of dreams. Viṇṇānabhikṣu regards dreams as recollections during sleep. They are the modifications of *buddhi*, which are produced by impressions (*saṃskāra*) only.⁵⁷ They are not produced by the external sense-organs or by the external stimuli. They are of central origin, and in the nature of false recollections.

Sāṃkhya, the Advaita Vedāntist, regards dreams as false cognitions of unreal objects. The mind (*manas*) creates, by its

⁵⁴ SAS., p. 393.

⁵⁵ NP., p. 76.

⁵⁶ TBh., pp. 29-30.

⁵⁷ SPB., I, 148.

own power, the knower and the known.⁵⁸ Dreams do not conform to the proper time, place, and causes of real objects. A person dreams of objects hundreds of miles away, which it is not possible for him to travel. So there is no correspondence between the place of dreams and that of their objects. A person dreaming at night dreams of objects in the day. A dream occurring in a few seconds cognizes events occurring in several years. So there is no correspondence between the time of dreams and that of their objects. Perceptible objects are perceived through the external sense-organs, and produced by their causes. But objects (e.g. chariots) of dream-cognitions are not perceived through the external sense-organs, and cannot be produced by their causes (e.g. wood) in a moment. So there is no correspondence between the causes of dreams and those of their objects. Further, dreams are contradicted by waking perceptions, while real objects corresponding to dream-objects are not contradicted. Hence dream-cognitions are false.⁵⁹ Dreams are recollections due to the revival of the impressions of waking perceptions of objects, which therefore appear to be like them.⁶⁰ Dreams with their objects are produced by the impressions of waking perceptions when the external sense-organs cease to operate. The empirical self limited by the subtle body (*taijasa*) experiences dream-cognitions.⁶¹ Śaṅkara is an advocate of the representative theory of dream.

Śaṅkara regards the subtle body (*liṅga deha*) as the vehicle of the experience of dreams. It contains the potencies of actions and the impressions of waking cognitions, and makes the empirical self enjoy the fruits of actions. It is the limiting adjunct of the empirical self, until it realizes its essential nature.⁶² Dreams are the manifestations of the subtle body. The self-luminous pure self is manifested as an agent with the help of the impressions (*vāsanā*) of waking perceptions of objects in dream with the subtle body as its organ. But the pure self is detached.⁶³ This is Śaṅkara's view. Rāmānirṭha Yati also maintains, that in the dream-state the subtle body invested with the impressions of

waking cognitions is the limiting adjunct of the empirical self.⁶⁴ Sureśvara also maintains that the *taijasa* or empirical self limited by the subtle body is the knower of dreams. The subtle body is its organ of experience. Dream is a mental mode which is manifested to consciousness in the form of a knowing self and a known object.⁶⁵ Ānandagiri also defines dreams as cognitions of objects produced by the impressions of waking experiences when the external sense-organs cease to operate.⁶⁶ Mādhavācārya Vidyāranya regards dreams as illusions during light sleep. They are modes of the mind (*antaḥkaraṇa*) tainted by sleep, which are produced by impressions (*saṃskāra*) revived by merits and demerits (*adṛṣṭa*). They abide in pure consciousness limited by modes of the mind.⁶⁷

Padmapāda maintains that the mind (*manas*) tainted by sleep and aided by particular impressions revived by merits and demerits (*adṛṣṭa*) produces false cognitions of unreal objects, which are called dreams. The power of nescience (*avidyā*) abiding in the immediate consciousness limited by the dream-objects is transformed into dream-cognitions. But if it were so, it is objected, the objects of dream-cognitions would be manifested to consciousness as within the mind. This objection is not sound, since dream-objects are not extra-mental. But dream-objects are perceived as external to the mind like the objects of waking perceptions, and cannot, therefore, be within the mind. This objection is not valid, because space or externality is an unreal construction of imagination. Even in waking perceptions the perceptibility of an object does not differ from its valid, subjective, immediate apprehension, because they are manifested in this form. Hence, even in waking experience an object is apprehended together with a subjective immediate apprehension. Otherwise an insentient object would not be manifested. The appearance of externality in dream-objects is projected by cosmic nescience (*māyā*) like that of the empirical objects. Pure consciousness (*caitanya*) is partless and non-spatial. It is the substratum of the whole universe of phenomenal objects which appear to be external to one another. In fact, subjectivity and objectivity are mere appearances, which are projected by cosmic nescience. Or, space and

⁵⁸ VCM., 172.

⁵⁹ Māyāmātram svapna-darśanam. S.B., iii, 2, 3.

⁶⁰ Jāgarita-prabhava-vāsanā-nirmitatvāt tu tattulya-nirbhāsatvābhīprāyam tat. S.B., iii, 2, 6.

⁶¹ Karaṇeśūpasamhr̥teṣu jāgarita-saṃskāraḥ pratyayaḥ saṃskāraḥ svapna ityucyate. Pañcīkaraṇa, K.S.S., 1923, p. 2.

⁶² VCM., 99.

⁶³ VCM., 100-3.

⁶⁴ Svapne jāgrad-vāsanāmayaṃ liṅga-śarīram upādhiḥ. VMR., p. 111.

⁶⁵ Grāhya-grāhaka-rūpeṇa sphuraṇam svapna ucyate. PKV., 38.

⁶⁶ Pañcīkaraṇavivarana, pp. 53-4.

⁶⁷ Adhiṣṭhānam vṛttyavacchinnaṃ caitanyam eva. VPS., p. 39.

ākāśa, which are the substrates of appearances, are mere constructions of the mind.⁶⁸

Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa (1700 A.D.) maintains that dream-objects are produced in the witness self (*sākṣin*) limited by the internal organ (*antaḥkaraṇa*). They are the modifications of the cosmic nescience (*mūlājñāna*). There is no evidence of any other entity being their material cause. The dream-objects have illusory existence (*prātibhāsikasattā*), and are sublated by waking perception. They have no empirical existence (*vyāvahārika sattā*), because they are produced by nescience (*ajñāna*) tainted by sleep. The nescience which is the cause of dream objects does not disappear until a contradictory waking perception appears. Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa maintains that cognitions of dream-objects are cognized by the witness self which is self-manifest.⁶⁹ No other cognition of dream-cognitions can exist at the time. Dream-cognitions, according to Raṅgojī Bhaṭṭa, are not recollections, since they are sometimes not recollections of objects perceived in a particular place at a particular past time.⁷⁰ Dream-creations are not real. The empirical self (*jīva*) experiences pleasure and pain by creating dream-objects out of his own nescience. They are manifested by the witness self limited by the adjunct of the internal organ.⁷¹

Rāmatīrtha Yati maintains, that dreams are the modes of the mind tainted by sleep, similar to the impressions of waking cognitions, which are revived by merits and demerits. The empirical (*taijasa*) self limited by the subtle body experiences subtle objects created by the power of *avidyā* abiding in the pure consciousness limited by the mind. Dream-objects are subtle and composed of the impressions of waking cognitions. They are experienced slightly indistinctly.⁷² Rāmatīrtha Yati does not regard dreams as recollections, since they are manifested to consciousness as immediate presentations.⁷³ But they are not valid perceptions, since they are not produced by the right intercourse

⁶⁸ Digākāśau manomātragocarau vidyete. Pañcapādikā, p. 11. Ibid, pp. 10-1.

⁶⁹ Svāpna-padārtha-jñānam api svaprakāśa-sākṣyeva. Advaitacintāmaṇi, p. 22.

⁷⁰ Ibid, p. 22.

⁷¹ Ibid, pp. 23-4.

⁷² Nidrādidōṣadūṣitasādrṣṭādī-samudbodhita-saṁskāra - viśeṣa - sacivasyā - ntaḥkaraṇasya yāḥ saṁskārānurūpā vṛttayas tādrḡ antaḥkaraṇa-saṁsrṣṭa-caitanyasthāvidyāśakti-vijrmbhita-viśyākārās tābhiḥ sūkṣma-viśayāṇ jāgrad-vāsanā-mayān īśad asphuṭān anubhavataḥ. VMR., p. 107.

⁷³ Na svapnaḥ smṛtir aparokṣāvabhāsitatvāt. VMR., p. 107.

of the sense-organs with their objects. Nor are they deep sleep, since they are distinct cognitions of objects. Nor are they waking cognitions, because they do not conform to the time, place, and causes found in the waking condition. The objects of dreams are constructed by the impressions of waking cognitions; they are unreal.⁷⁴

Mahādevānanda Sarasvatī regards dreams as the cognitions of objects produced by the impressions of waking perceptions when the external sense-organs cease to operate and merits and demerits capable of producing the waking experience of pleasure and pain cannot produce any effects.⁷⁵ But dreams are not recollections, but perceptions. They are illusory perceptions during light sleep.⁷⁶ Thus Śaṁkara's followers do not advocate his representative theory of dreams.

Rāmānuja treats dreams as illusory perceptions produced by the sense-organs overcome by the defect of sleep, which are contradicted by waking perceptions.⁷⁷ God creates dream-objects by a mere fiat of will, which are perceived by a dreamer, and persist so long as they are perceived.⁷⁸ According to Mādhvas, dream-cognitions are false, but the creation of dream-objects is real and devoid of any material. Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja criticizes this view. If the creation of dream-objects is real, then dream-cognitions of them are true. If the creation of dream-objects were devoid of any material and yet real, then magical acts devoid of any material also would be real. A person dreams that his head has been cut off. If the dream-cognition were false, but the act of cutting were real, then the dreamer would die. Hence the Mādhva view is wrong.⁷⁹ Puruṣottamajī Mahārāja maintains that the creation of dream-objects is a mere appearance, and not real; that dream-objects are created by God out of the stuff of nescience (*māyā*) with the instrument of *māyā*; and that dreams are the cognitions of dream-objects, which are perceptual in character, since they are not sometimes recollections of waking perceptions (e.g. cutting off one's head).⁸⁰

⁷⁴ VMR., p. 107.

⁷⁵ Jāgrad-bhoga-prada-karmoparame sati indriyoparame jāgrad-anubhava-janya-saṁskārodhbhūta-viśayas tajjñānāvasthā svapnāvasthā. ACK., pp. 89-90.

⁷⁶ Svapnaḥ tvanubhava eva na smṛtiḥ. ACK., p. 265.

⁷⁷ Svapna-jñānāni hi nidrādi-doṣa-duṣṭa-karaṇa-janyāni bādhitāni ca. R.B. ii, 2, 28.

⁷⁸ Svapnadṛg-anubhāvayatayā tatkalā-mātrāvasānān srjate. R.B. iii, 2, 3.

⁷⁹ PR., p. 25.

⁸⁰ PR., p. 24.

21. *Puruṣottamaṃ Mahārāja's view of the perception of the Ātman or Self* (chapter XII).—The pure self cannot be perceived without resorting to the means prescribed by the scriptures. Only the attributes of the self are perceived through the internal organ (*manas*). The pure self is not an object of normal perception because it is ubiquitous, like ether (*ākāśa*). One's own self is not an object of normal perception because it is a knowing-self. It is inferred by the method of agreement like another's self. It is not perceived because it is atomic or subtle. It is inferred like an atom. The ego-consciousness is illusory because the self is erroneously identified with egoism (*ahamkāra*).⁸¹ The pure self can be intuited after continuous practice of meditation.

22. *The Sāṃkhya view of the perception of the Self* (chapter XII, 5).—Listening to the scriptures about the nature of the self (*śravaṇa*), reflection (*manana*) on the self with the help of rational proofs after knowing its nature from the testimony of the scriptures, and meditation (*dhyāna*) on the self are the means of intuiting the self.⁸² Indirect knowledge derived from testimony is strengthened by rational reflection. Then it is further strengthened by meditation (*nīdīdhyāsana*). It is the concentration of the mind on the self. These three are the causes of the intuition (*darśana*) of the self. It is not sense-perception, but higher supra-rational intuition. The first two yield general knowledge. The third gives particular or detailed knowledge. The self is intuited when the sense-organs are controlled and withdrawn from their objects and the mind is controlled and not affected by joys and sorrows and absorbed in the self, and primal desires for sons, wealth and happiness are uprooted.⁸³ Hence the pure self is not an object of normal perception, but of ecstatic intuition.

23. *The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view of the intuition of the pure self* (chapter XII).—The pure self, according to some later Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, can be apprehended by supra-rational intuition, which is higher immediate apprehension. It is the effect of listening to the scriptures, reflection on their instruction, and meditation on the self. Jagadīśa regards reflection (*manana*) as

⁸¹ PR., p. 110.

⁸² Śrotavyaḥ śrutivākyebhyo
Mantavyaś copapattibhiḥ.
Matvā ca satatam dhyeya
Ete darśanahetavaḥ. SSV., ii, 1.

⁸³ SSV., ii, 2.

inference of the self as different from the not-self.⁸⁴ Mādhava Sarasvatī regards it as reasoning which excludes contrary thoughts and opposite alternatives.⁸⁵ The pure self devoid of empirical contents—cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition can be intuited. This intuition is the effect of rational reflection and intense meditation. Śaṅkara Miśra also maintains, that the pure self can be intuited through the internal organ (*manas*) with the aid of merit brought about by meditation, when it is in conjunction with the self. Though we have flashes of perception also of the self, they are almost non-existent because they are concealed by false knowledge (*avidyā*).⁸⁶

24. *Vasubandhu's view of four kinds of Meditation* (chapter XVII, 7).—Vasubandhu mentions four kinds of meditation. The first meditation involves discrimination (*vicāra*), zest (*prīti*), and pleasure (*sukha*). The second meditation involves zest and pleasure. The third meditation involves pleasure only. The fourth meditation is devoid of discrimination, zest, and pleasure.^{86a} Vasubandhu mentions four kinds of pure meditation free from impurities. The first pure meditation involves reflection (*vitarka*), discrimination (*vicāra*), zest (*prīti*), pleasure (*sukha*), and trance (*samādhi*). The second pure meditation involves zest, pleasure, trance, and tranquillity (*adhyātmaprasāda*). The third pure meditation involves neutral feeling (*upekṣā*), recollection (*smṛti*), wisdom (*samprajñāna*), pleasure, and trance. The fourth pure meditation involves refinement of neutral feeling, refinement of recollection, feeling of non-pleasure, feeling of non-pain, and trance.⁸⁷

Nāgasena maintains that passions and evil thoughts are destroyed by meditation. Ideas of lust, ideas of anger, ideas of cruelty, various bad thoughts, that spring from evil dispositions of pride, self-righteousness, wrong views, and doubt are dispelled by meditation.⁸⁸

25. *Omniscience of the Buddha on Reflection* (chapter XVII, 7).—According to Nāgasena, the Buddha was omniscient even when he did not know all things for he could know them on reflection. He did not know all things at all times. His

⁸⁴ TA., p. 1.

⁸⁵ MB., p. 32.

⁸⁶ VSU., ix, 1, 11.

^{86a} Vicāraprītisukhavat pūrvapūrvāṅga-varjitam. Abhidharmakośa (edited by Rahul Sankrityayan, Benares, Sarvāt, 1988), viii, 2.

⁸⁷ AK., AKV., viii, 7-8.

⁸⁸ The Questions of King Milinda, II, pp. 222-3.

omniscience was dependent on reflection. "Venerable Nāgasena, was the Buddha omniscient?" "Yes, O King, he was. But the insight of knowledge was not always and continually with him. The omniscience of the Blessed One was dependent on reflection. But if he did reflect, he knew whatever he wanted to know."⁸⁹ "The knowledge of the Blessed One, O King, is dependent upon reflection, and it is on reflection that he knows whatever he wishes to know."⁹⁰ "And although it is by reflection that they know whatever they want to know, yet even when they are not reflecting, the Blessed Buddhas are not, even then, anything other than omniscient."⁹⁰ The omniscience of the Buddha dependent on reflection is similar to the non-ecstatic intuition (*yuñjana pratyakṣa*) of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Only the Buddhist does not believe in God. It is similar to the transcendental perception of an omniscient person conceived by the Jaina who also does not believe in God.

26. *The Jaina view of Avadhijñāna* (chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtacandra Sūri defines *avadhijñāna* as the immediate knowledge of corporeal objects independently of the sense-organs and the mind (*manas*). *Matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* depend on them, and are therefore mediate knowledge (*parokṣajñāna*). But *avadhijñāna* is supersensuous, valid, immediate knowledge of corporeal objects.^{90a} It is the first stage of supernormal perception due to the subsidence or partial destruction of the *karma*-matter concealing *avadhijñāna* in ordinary persons. But *jinas* or *tīrthaṅkaras* have *avadhijñāna* from their birth. Their clairvoyant perception is innate. *Avadhijñāna* can apprehend atoms.⁹¹

27. *The Jaina view of Manahparyayañāna* (Chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtacandra Sūri defines *manahparyayañāna* as the supersensuous and very vivid immediate knowledge of the objects of other persons' mental processes independently of the sense-organs and the mind (*manas*). The mental processes are more subtle than atoms. So *manahparyayañāna* is higher than *avadhijñāna*. There are two kinds of *manahparyayañāna*: (1) *ṛjumati* and (2) *vipulamati*.⁹² The former perceives the present simple thoughts of others' minds. The latter perceives the past, future, complex and subtle thoughts of others' minds. The latter is purer than

⁸⁹ *The Questions of King Milinda*, I, p. 154.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, I, pp. 160-1.

^{90a} *Parāpekṣām vinā jñānam rūpiṇām bhanito' vadhiḥ*. TSar., i, 25.

⁹¹ TSar., i, 27.

⁹² TSar., i, 28.

the former because it perceives more subtle mental processes. It persists till the advent of omniscience, because the subsidence or destruction of the *karma*-matter concealing knowledge is so stable that it does not stop, but the former may disappear. There is a greater purity of character in *vipulamati* than in *ṛjumati*.⁹³

Manahparyayañāna differs from *avadhijñāna*. (1) A person in the first four stages of *guṇasthāna* may have *avadhijñāna*. But a person in the sixth stage of *guṇasthāna* may have *manahparyayañāna*. (2) The sphere of *avadhijñāna* extends to numberless islands. But the sphere of *manahparyayañāna* consists of the region of human beings. (3) *Avadhijñāna* perceives subtle corporeal objects like atoms. But *manahparyayañāna* perceives subtler incorporeal objects like others' mental processes. (4) The latter requires greater purity of the self than the former does.⁹⁴

28. *The Jaina view of Kevalajñāna* (chapter XVII, 8).—Amṛtacandra Sūri defines *kevalajñāna* as the particular determinate knowledge of all objects, which is produced by the innate purity of the self, which is due to the complete destruction of all *karma*-matter concealing knowledge, which is devoid of succession, and which is independent of the sense-organs and the mind (*manas*) and other conditions.⁹⁵ It is omniscience. Umāsvāmī traces it to the destruction of delusion and hindrances to the general and detailed knowledge of all objects. Vidyānandi Svāmī asserts that it apprehends all objects distinctly, certainly and simultaneously with their modifications in their real nature owing to the complete destruction of the veil of *karma*-matter encrusting the self.⁹⁶

29. *The Jaina view of the relation of five kinds of knowledge* (chapter XVII, 8).—An intelligent person can know all substances with some of their modes through *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna*. He can know corporeal substances with some of their modes through *avadhijñāna*. Infinitesimal parts of corporeal substances, which are perceived by *avadhijñāna*, can be perceived by *manahparyayañāna*. All substances with their modes are perceived by *kevalajñāna*.⁹⁷

All these five kinds of knowledge cannot exist simultaneously in any person. In some persons the first two, three, or four kinds

⁹³ TSar., i, 29.

⁹⁴ TSar., i, 30.

⁹⁵ *Asahāyaṁ svarūpottharā nirāvaraṇam akramam*.

Ghātika-karma-kṣayotpannaṁ kevalaṁ sarvabhāvagam. TSar., i, 30-1.

⁹⁶ TVS., i, 29, 1-2, p. 251.

⁹⁷ TSar., i, 31-3.

of knowledge can exist synchronously. *Kevalajñāna* is one, and cannot exist with other kinds of knowledge. So long as the *karma*-matter concealing knowledge persists, a person has knowledge of some objects sometimes through the first two, or three, or four kinds of knowledge owing to its subsidence or destruction for the time being. When the *karma*-matter concealing knowledge is completely destroyed, he has complete knowledge of all objects with their modes, which ceases to be fragmentary. So long as the knowledge-concealing *karma*-matter is not completely destroyed, and the *karma*-matter concealing *avadhijñāna* and *manahparyayañāna* persists, *matijñāna* and *śrutajñāna* may exist owing to the subsidence or destruction of the *karma*-matter concealing them. If there is the subsidence or destruction of the *karma*-matter concealing *avadhijñāna*, such knowledge may also emerge. At that time three kinds of knowledge exist simultaneously. If there is the subsidence or destruction of the *karma*-matter concealing *manahparyayañāna*, such knowledge also may appear. At that time four kinds of knowledge exist simultaneously.⁹⁸

30. *Recollection and Recognition* (chapter XX).—Hemacandra defines recollection as a representative cognition of an object perceived in the past due to the revival of its subconscious impression, which assumes the form of 'that'.⁹⁹ He defines recognition as a composite cognition produced by perception and recollection both.¹⁰⁰ 'He is that Jinadatta'. 'A wild cow is like a cow'. 'This cow belongs to that variety'. Such cognitions are recognition. But Annambhaṭṭa holds that recognition is produced by the sense-object-intercourse aided by a subconscious impression, but that recollection is produced by a subconscious impression only.¹⁰¹ He does not regard recognition as an effect of perception and recollection. This is the difference between the Jaina view and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view.

31. *Nāgasena's views on the marks of Reflection, Investigation, Reasoning, and Wisdom* (chapter XXI, 5).—"What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of reflection (*vitakka*)? 'The effecting of an aim'. 'Give me an illustration'. 'It is like the

⁹⁸ TSar., i, 34.

⁹⁹ Saṃskāra-prabodha-sambhūtam anubhūtārtha-viśayaṃ tadityākāraṃ vedanaṃ smṛtiḥ. VRS., p. 206.

¹⁰⁰ Anubhava-smṛti-hetukaṃ saṃkalanātmakaṃ jñānaṃ pratyabhijñānaṃ. VRS., p. 206.

¹⁰¹ TSD., p. 35.

case of a carpenter, great king, who fixes in a joint a well-fashioned piece of good. Thus is it that the effecting of an aim is the mark of reflection'. 'Very good, Nāgasena'.¹⁰² In reflection the mind focusses its attention on an aim, and selects the proper means for the realization of it.

"What is the distinguishing characteristic, Nāgasena, of investigation (*vicāra*)?' 'Threshing out again and again'. 'Give me an illustration'. 'It is like the case of the copper vessel, which, when it is being beaten into shape, makes a sound again and again as it gradually gathers shape. The beating into shape is to be regarded as reflection, and the sounding again and again as investigation. Thus is it, great King, that threshing out again and again is the mark of investigation'. 'Very good, Nāgasena'.¹⁰³ Investigation is repeated deliberation on the different courses of action for the realization of an end. Reflection is the concentration of the mind on an end. These two mental processes go together.

"The King said: 'What is the characteristic mark of reasoning and what of wisdom?' 'Reasoning has always comprehension as its mark; but wisdom has cutting off.' 'The recluse by his thinking grasps his mind, and by his wisdom cuts off his failings. In this way is the comprehension the characteristic of reasoning, but cutting off of wisdom'.¹⁰⁴ Here Nāgasena speaks of practical reason by which the nature, causes and conditions of one's evil propensities are known, and of wisdom by which one eradicates them. Desires and passions are due to ignorance. When it is completely destroyed by wisdom, they are destroyed for ever. Enlightenment also is another mark of wisdom. "How is enlightenment its mark?' 'When wisdom springs up in the heart, O King, it dispels the darkness of ignorance, it causes the radiance of knowledge to arise, it makes the light of intelligence to shine forth, it makes the Noble Truths plain. Wisdom puts an end to evil dispositions'.¹⁰⁵ Thus wisdom destroys evil dispositions and brings about enlightenment. Discrimination is the mark of reason.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Ibid, I, p. 96.

¹⁰³ Ibid, I, p. 96.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, I, p. 132.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid, I, p. 51.

¹⁰⁵ Ibid, I, p. 62.

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